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THE TREND TOWARDS ENHANCING
TRADEMARK OWNERS' RIGHTS-A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF U.S. AND GERMAN
TRADEMARK LAW
Rudolf Rayle*
I. INTRODUCTION

Conventionally trademarks are said to serve primarily as source
identifiers. They are the medium through which consumers identify a
particular product with a specific source (i.e., serve an identification or origin
function). The origin function is therefore claimed to be the main function
of trademarks and at first glance the definitions of trademarks in the Lanham
Act as well as in the German Trademark Act, seem to confirm this
traditional view.'
* Rudi Rayle attended the Universities of Bonn and Tuebingen, Germany. After clerkship at the
Regional Court of Ravensburg he completed his law studies in Germany with the Second State Bar
Examination in 1998. He pursued an LL.M. in International and Comparative Law at the University of
Iowa before passing the February 2000 New York Bar Examination.
This paper was part of the assignment conferring the LL.M degree obtained in Iowa. I would like
to thank all the helping hands and minds at the College of Law. Special thanks to the law school's library
staff for their neverending assistance and patience.
I CompareThe Lanham Act of 1946 5 45, 15 U.S.C. S 1127 (1994) (The term 'trademark' includes
any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof(1) used by a person, or
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to
register on the principal register established by this chapter, to identify and
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The basic understanding in U.S. law is that protection of trademarks is
justified only where marks serve the essential function of preventing
customer confusion in the marketplace.2 Thus, the source-identifying
function gains special importance under U.S. law. Protection is afforded to
the owner only concomitant with the protection of consumers and their
need to distinguish products. Therefore, protection is limited to those cases
where goodwill has been built up, ie., where marks serve the essential
function of distinguishing one market player's products from another's.3
U.S. law, therefore, has been reluctant to confer rights and grant protection
topotential trademark owners where it is not in accord with the traditional
origin function of trademarks.
The developments over the last few decades, however, have somewhat
put to question this traditional understanding. The Trademark Law
Revision Act of 1988 (TLRA) and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995 (FTDA) illustrate the trademark law's struggle with making necessary
adjustments, on the one hand, and accepting a deviation from the consumer
confusion model, on the other hand. Two recent appellate level decisions by
the Fourth Circuit and Second Circuit concerning the interpretation of the

distinguish the service of one person, including a unique service, from the services of
others and to indicate the source of the services, even if that source is unknown.),
with Gesetz Ober den Schutz von Marken und sonstigen Kennzeichen, (Markengesetz) The German
Trademark Act of 1995 S 3(1) v. 25.10.1994 (BGBL I S.3082), as amended, translated in MARTIN
AUPENANGER &GEALDBARTH,MARKENGEE./Tm GE ANTRADEMAARKACT (1996) [hereinafter
German Trademark Act]
(Any signs, in particular words including personal names, designs, letters, numerals,
acoustical signs, three-dimensional configurations including the shape or packaging
of a product as well as other get-ups including colours and compositions of colours,
which are capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from
those of other undertakings can be protected as trade marks).
2 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,157, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1847,185455 (1989)
(The law of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law tort of deceit: its
general concern iswith protecting consumers from confusion as to source. While that
concern may result in the creation of "quasi-property rights" in communicative
symbob, the focus is on the protection of consumers, not the protection of producers
as an incentive to product innovation);
see Lisa H. Johnston, Drifting Toward TrademarkRights in Gross, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 19, 20-21 (1995)
(stating that the purchaser's misunderstanding ultimately results in higher costs to the purchaser and
seller); J. THoMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, S 2:14

(1999) (stating that trademark infringement in the United States isbased on the right of the buying public
to be free of confusion).
3 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 2:15.
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FTDA illustrate this struggle particularly well. Should a "likelihood of
dilution" suffice to trigger the FTDA,4 thus enhancing the federal trademark
protection scheme dramatically, or does such an interpretation run afoul of
the traditional understanding that trademark owners have only a very
limited right and nothing close to a property right in gross?'
Notwithstanding these concurrent discussions, U.S. trademark law shows
a clear trend towards enhancing trademark owners' rights in deviation from
the traditional purposes for trademark protection. This trend complies with
the more radical development of German trademark law.
German trademark law today expresses an understanding of the functions
of trademarks which deviates from the traditional understanding. The
German Trademark Act of 19956 brought considerable changes to German
trademark and competition law. While some of these changes were required
by the European Union Directive to Approximate the Laws of the Member
States Relating to Trademarks, 7 others go beyond the Directive. The changes
reflect decade-long developments in German trademark doctrine! This
modem protection scheme has led German scholars to classify trademarks
as "entrepreneurial instruments" which deserve protection merely because
they enhance enterprises' options when doing business.9 The German

" Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 223-25, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1882, 1893-94 (2nd

Cir. 1999) (disagreeing with the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the FTDA inRinglingBros.According
to the Second Circuit requiring 'actual dilution" instead of mere "likelihood" is based "on excessive
literalism*); see infra note 5 (discussing the holdings of Ringling Bros. and Nabisco).
s CompareRinglingBros.-Barnum&Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170
F.3d 449, 454, 459 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1068, 1073 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that proof of "actual
dilution" is required to establish a dilution claim under the FTDA as opposed to mere "likelihood of
dilution, referred to as "mental association." The court vigorously rejected the idea that trademarks are
property rights in gross), with Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208,223-25. For a discussion of
the FTDA, see infra S IfI.C.
'German Trademark Act, supra note 1.
First Council Directive 89/104 of 21 December 1988 to Approximate the Laws of the Member
States Relating to Trademarks, 1989 OJ. (L 40) 1 [hereinafter Council Directive] (addressing certain, but
not all, aspects of trademark law. It contains compulsory provisions, eg., those regarding mark protection
through registration and rules about those signs which are protectable, and also optional provisions, eg.,
those regarding the separability of mark and business establishment).
' See Winfried Tilmann, Das Neue Markenrecbt und die Herkunftsfunktion, 158 ZErrscHRnFr FuER
DAS GEsAMTE HANDELSRECHT uND WIRTScHAFrsREcHT (ZHR] 371, 381-82 (discussing how the

German Trademark Statute that implemented the EU Directive marked the end of an evolution within
German Trademark law).
9 KARL-HEINZ FEZER, MARKENRECHT: KOMMENTAR ZUM MARKENGESETZ, Eini. MarkenG cmt.
no. 28 (1999) (Schutz einer UnternebmeriscbenLeistung"); REINHAPD INGERL & CHRISTIAN ROHNKE,
MARKENGESETZ: GESETZ UBER DEN SCHUTZ VON MARKEN UND SONSTIGEN KENNZEICHEN, Einl.
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Trademark Act considerably enhances trademark owners' rights in
compliance with this modern understanding.
It therefore seems beneficial, to have a closer look at the German law and
to emphasize those traits of, and alterations to, German trademark law that
call into question the traditional view of trademarks as source identifiers.
These traits emphasize the function of trademarks as rights that exist in the
interest of the entrepreneur who exploits them.1" A comparison of the
respective rules and their application will make it obvious that U.S. law
shows characteristics and developments, which reveal a understanding similar
to the one expressed by the German law.1"
One of these traits is the accrual of exclusive rights through registration.
Following a short review of generally accepted trademark functions in the
first part, this article next illustrates that although the respective laws are
based on different philosophical underpinnings, the accrual systems in each
country do not deviate as dramatically from each other as one might assume.
This second section also demonstrates safeguards that are part of the German
system and a reaction to justified concerns associated with a mere registration
system.
In a third section, the article discusses the separate identity of the mark
from the underlying business and, subsequently, the free transferability of
marks. Whereas the German law quite openly stipulates such a system of
separate identities, U.S. law still rejects this notion. This section also takes
a closer look at the degree of adherence to the U.S. traditional view. The
comparison will once again lead to the conclusion that the laws' differences
as a practical matter, are not as drastic as they appear in theory.

cmt. no. 35 (1998) ("Instrumentdo untemehmerischen Handdm).
" The German Trademark Act of 1995 also considerably widened the scope of protectable signs;
under the old law only words, pictorial signs and combinations of words and pictorial signs were
registrable. The new law allows the registration of all signs that are capable of distinguishing the goods
or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings. See definition of marks in German
Trademark Act, supra note 1.
SAlthough other comparative studies have examined certain aspects of the respective trademark laws,
as far as I can see, my approach has not been taken before. See Ludwig Kouker, Is the Purposeof the
Trademark Law Limited only to Protecting Purcha.se?-Analysis Under United States and German
TrademarkLaw, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 151 (1997) (Kouker's discussion islimited to the aspect of post-sale
confusion and its implications for the advertising function of trademarks); ROLF ARNADE,
MARKENFFHGKErr VON ZEICHEN NACH DEuTsCHEM UND U.S. AMER

ANISCHEM RECHT

(1991)

(Arnade's dissertation compares the protectability of marks in the U.S. and in Germany under the old
German trademark law).
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Finally, this article examines the scope of protection afforded under the
respective laws. The European Union (EU) Directive and the German
Trademark Act of 1995 considerably enhance the scope of protection under
German law. The exact scope of protection, i.e., the "likelihood of
confusion" issue, has not yet been resolved completely under European and
German law, but recent European Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions have
taken further steps to resolve this issue."
This section begins with the assumption that protection should be more
readily available under a system that de-emphasizes the origin function. This
article concludes that the laws' protection schemes-partly due to the
idiosyncrasies of European law-do not differ as greatly as assumed. From
an U.S. perspective the dilution concept deserves special attention in this
context. Notwithstanding a current tendency of some courts to apply a
strict standard under the FTDA, U.S. law accepts a notion similar to the one
endorsed by German law.
The overall analysis in this article shows that although German and U.S.
trademark laws are based on different conceptual understandings, both laws
show a similar tendency to emphasize the rights of the respective trademark
owners. The German law openly enhances trademark owners' rights, while
U.S. law does so only as a matter of fact.
11. TRADEMARK FUNCTIONS
One cannot deny that the origin function is an inherent characteristic of
marks and has always been an important criterion for the determination of
the protectability of a mark. However, over time, marks have undergone
tremendous changes with regard to the purposes they serve." As the
function and purposes of marks developed, the laws affording protection to
these marks adjusted to the new needs. 4

'2 See Case C251/95, Sabel BV v.Puma AG & Rudolf Dassler Sport, 1997 E.C.R. 16191, [1998] 1
C.M.L.R. 445 (1998) (discussing "likelihood of association' within the meaning of Council Directive, Art.
4(1)(b)); Case C-39/97, Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 1998 E.C.R. 1-9507, [1999]
1 C.M.LRL 77 (1999) (saying that likelihood of confusion must take into account the distinctive character
of a mark and discussing whether there can be a likelihood of confusion where the public perception is
that the goods have different places of origin).

1 SeeC.D.G. PICKERING, TRADE MARKS IN THEORY ANDPRACTICE 40 (1998) (noting that in early

cases, trademark protection was sought solely for the use of one's name).
14 Ij4
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In the times of the Roman Empire, trademarks served mainly as
proprietary marks in cases of shipwreck and piracy, and as a device for
assisting the illiterate." In the Middle Ages, the use of a trademark was
required by the strict order of the craft guilds.16 During these times, the
personal mark identifying an individual, served as a control and liability
function concerning the quality of the respective good.17 On the other hand,
production marks identifying the guilds served as instruments to preserve the
guilds' monopoly power." With the mass production brought by the
Industrial Revolution at the turn of the century, marks became more of a
lik between the producer and consumer. They enabled manufacturers to
build up goodwill.19 Marks became business assets and today are maybe the
most valuable asset on a company's balance sheet.2"
Today, generally accepted trademark functions in the U.S. as well as
Germany are the origin function, the quality or guarantee function, and the
advertising function." The following overview describes the meanings and
implications of these functions as represented by the different laws. It should
s-id at 37.
'6

Benjamin G. Paster, Note, Trademarks-7Tir arlyHistory, 59 TRADEMARKREP. 551,556 (1969);

FRANK I.SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARxS

38 (1925).
" See Sidney A. Diamond, Tbe HistoricalDevelopmentofTrademarks, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 222,229
(1983) (describing personal marks such as coats of arms); SCHECHTER, supra note 16, at x ("Like the finger
prints taken today by the police, they established a liability rather than a right*).
"SCHECHTER,
supra note 16, at 41-63; Frank I. Schechter, The Rational of Basis of Trademark
Protection, 40 HARv. L. REv. 813, 814 (1927), reprinted in60 TRADEMARK REP., 334, 335, 338 (1970);
PICKERING, supra note 13, at 37-39.
19 SCHECTER, supranote 16, at 101-45; Schechter, supra note 18, at 335-38; PICKERING, supra note
13, at 38-39.
" Thomas D. Drescher, ArtideandReport:The TransformationandEvolution of Trademarks-From
Signals to Symbols ofMyth, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 301,301-03 (1992). The London based consulting firm,
Interbrand, issued its assessment of the world's most valuable marks just recently: Coca-Cola takes the lead
with $84 billion (U.S. dollars), followed by Microsoft and IBM with $57 billion (U.S. dollars), and $44
billion (U.S. dollars), respectively. See Gary Finn, Priceis Placed on World's Top Brands, INDEPENDENT
(London), June 23, 1999, at 12 (noting that the Coca-Cola trademark is worth over sixty percent of the
value of the company); Richard Tomkins, What a GoodNameAdds Up To, FIN. TIMES, June 22, 1999, at
15 (discussing the Interbrand assessment); Coca-Colablibt die urtvollsteMarkeder Welt, FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, June 30, 1999, at 25 (discussing the Interbrand assessment); see also Alex
Batchelor, Brands as FinancialAssets,in BRANDS, THE NEW WEALTH CREATORS, 95,95-103 (Susannah
Hart &John Murphy eds., 1998) (describing the value of brands in today's market); Gregory W. Hotaling,
IdealStandardv. IHT. In The European Union,Must a Company Surrender its National TrademarkRights
When it Assigns its Trademark?, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1178, 1196 n.72 (1996) (noting, as an example,
that Marlboro's trademark is valued at $40 billion (U.S. dollars)).
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, SS 3:4, 3:10, 3:12; Friedrich-Karl Beier, Die Funktionender Marke, in
MARKENREcHTLIcHE ABHANDLUNGEN, 225, 227 (1986).
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help us appreciate the different understanding as expressed by the German
law.
A. ORIGIN OR IDENTIFICATION FUNCTION

The source identifying function as expressed in the Lanham Act and the
German Trademark Act does not imply that the purchaser must know the
identity of the actual producer. "Likelihood of confusion" as a basis for
trademark infringement does not require knowledge of the specific company.
The association of a product with a single, albeit anonymous source will
suffice to indicate the origin of a product.' Under German law, the source
identifying function was frequently subject to attack. The main criticism
was that the laws permitting collective marks,' marks used by a group of
companies belonging to a conglomerate,"' and licensing of marks made the
source identifying function appear as little more than verbiage." The
modern understanding, therefore, is that marks functioning as source
identifiers do not necessarily indicate a single source, but in some cases may
26
indicate a group of related sources.

" Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960,963(2nd Cir. 1918) (opinion by judge
Learned Hand); Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Wittling Away of the Rational Basisfor
TrademarkProtection,58 U. PTrr. L. REV. 789, 800 (1997); MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 3:9; Beier, supra
note 21, at 229.
" FEZER, supra note 9, S 3 cmt. no. 18; see also Lanham Act 5 45, 15 U.S.C. S 1127 (1994) (The term
collective mark' means a trademark or service mark - (1) used by the members or a cooperative, an
association, or other collective group or organization).
24 FEZER, supra note 9, 5 3 cnt. nos. 34-35; see also Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, as revised by Stockholm on 14 July 1967, Art. 5(c)(3) [hereinafter Convention] (stating
.concurrent use of the same mark by industrial or commercial establishments considered as co-proprietors
of the mark according to the provisions of the domestic law").
2 Beier, supra note 21, at 230; see MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S3:9 (stating that courts recognize that
consumer differentiation through the use of trademarks isnot a precise process).
' Beier, supra note 21, at 230, FEzER, supra note 9, Einl. MarkenG cmt. no. 39; Heijo E. Ruijsenaars,
MercJandising von Sportemblmen und Unitvist~alogos- EinmarkenredchesL
sungsmoddl
firEuropa?,
1998 GEWERDLICHER REcHTsscHUTZ uND URHEBERRECHT, INTERNATIONALER TEnL (GRUR INT.]

110, 113 (stating that the consumer does not need to identify the mark with a specific producer);
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, 5 3:10 (discussing the quality function of trademarks, which stands alongside

the source function).
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B. QUALITY OR GUARANTEE FUNCTION

The guarantee function under German law does not imply an enforceable
quality standard for consumers. More accurately one should characterize it
as a quality function that gives consumers the factual assurance that a
product from a certain source will preserve a consistent quality.2 7 This
reveals that the quality function is closely related to the source identifying
function which has led German courts to categorize this function as part of
the origin function." A similar understanding is attributed to the quality
function in U.S. law.2 The function's greatest implication is the right of the
franchiser or licensor to control the quality of his franchisees or licensees.30
At the same time it serves as a justification for licensing agreements under
U.S. trademark law.3"
C. ADVERTISING FUNCTION

The advertising function indicates that the trademark is a valuable means
of advertising and building up brand loyalty.32 Traditionally the advertising
function under German trademark doctrine was one of the defacto functions
for trademarks. Legal protection, however, was afforded only through the
Law Against Unfair Trade Practices.33 The 1995 German Trade Mark Act

v Beier, s"pra note 21, at 233. In the case of appellations of geographical origins, products using these
designations are obliged to meet the pertinent quality standard. See German Trademark Act, smpra note
1,at S127 (2); INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, Einl. cmt. no. 34 (pointing out that this provision of the
German Trademark Act is only applicable in the specific case of designations of geographical origin).
2 Beier, supra note 21, at 233 n.21 (Die Qualititsfunktion der Marke ist also- so die Rechtsprechung
des Reichsgerichts und des Bundesgerichtshofs -keine selbstindige Funktion der Marke, sondern aus ihrer
Herkunftsfunktion abgeleitet). Beier cites Cizano, BGHZ 60,185 (194) (the Court denied the plaintiff's
claim for an injunction on the ground that the defendant did not infringe upon the origin function of
trademarks and denied the plaintiff's claim based on the guarantee function because it did not have
independent significance in this context).
29 Seegeneraly MCCARTHY, supra note 2,S3:10 (discussing the quality function of a U.S. trademark).
See id,(noting that a licensed mark indicates a unified source of quality control).
"See id at S 3:11 (stating that "it is clear that trademark law permits the licensing of a mark under
any circumstances where the license or exercises quality control over the goods and services").
32 See McCARTHY, supra note 2, S3:12 (discussing the advertising function of trademarks); FEZER,
supra note 9, Einl. MarkenG cmt. no. 33. For example, Rolex spends more than $15 million (U.S. dollars)
a year to promote Rolex watches. Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc. v. Michel Co., 179 F.3d 704, 705, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1939, 1941 (9th Cir. 1999).
3 Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb [UWG] v. 7.6.1909 (RGBI. S.499), as amended.
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integrates the relevant parts of this law, thus the German Trade Mark Act"4
protects trademark proprietors against what is comparable to the concept of
dilution under U.S. law." U.S. law openly reflects the importance of a
mark's advertising value or selling power.' The rationale for dilution
protection under U.S. trademark doctrine, accordingly, is based on the need
to protect the value of a mark as an advertising device."
D. THE BROADER GERMAN CONCEPT

A 1979 German Federal Constitutional Court" decision demonstrated
that German trademark law protects more than the aforementioned. While
the decision recited the traditional functions of trademarks under German
law,39 the Court held, further, that trademark rights-as protected under the,
then effective, Trademark Act-were rights protected as property under the

[A]ny sign identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services
which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is protected, where the trade
mark has a reputation in the Federal Republic of Germany and where use of that sign
without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive
character or the repute of the trade mark which has a reputation."
German Trademark Act, supra note 1,S 14(2) no. 3; INGERL & ROHNKE,supra note 9, S 2 cmt. no. I
(discussing the relationship between the old and new German trademark law).
s See infra S M.C. for a broader discussion of the dilution concept.
"Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203,205,53 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
323, 324-25 (1942) (Justice Frankfurter stated stating that 'The protection of trade-marks is the law's
recognition of the psychological function of symbols. A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which
induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants."). See generally
MCCARTHY, supra note 2,S 3:12 (noting that trademarks help to sell the advertised goods).
" See generaUyJulie Arthur Garcia, TrademarkDilationr EliminatingConfusion, 85 TRADEMARK
REP. 489, 489-91 (1995) (discussing how state law and common law have filled the gap to provide
protection of trademarks even in the absence of customer confusion); Klieger, supra note 22, at 804-07
(describing Schechter's rejection of the consumer protection model in favor of the trademark dilution
model).
" The Federal Constitutional Court, Bsndeswrfassungsgericht(BVerfG], is distinguished from the
German Supreme Court BundesVichshof[BGH]. The Constitutional Court is the ezclusive authority
on constitutional questions concerning the validity of statutes and other government actions with respect
to civil rights including the protection of the right of ownership. The Supreme Court is the final
authority in the regular course of legal proceedings and is not entitled to invalidate statutes. In case of
doubt, the Supreme Court refers the question of constitutionality of a pertinent statute to the
Constitutional Court.
" Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 51, 193 (216) (1979) (Listing traditional
functions of trademarks); see also BVerfGE 95,173 (188) (1997) (reiterating previous listings of trademark
functions).
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Constitution.' The Court emphasized the importance of trademarks as
devices to facilitate enterprises in a competitive market.4' Additionally, it
noted that marks do not merely denominate the source of a product, but are
an "expression of an entrepreneur's achievement motivation."42 A later
decision confirmed this notion once again.43 Trademarks in Germany are
not regarded as inferior to patents and copyrights." This notion coincides
with the significance that the European Court of Justice affords to
trademarks.4 The Court principally regards protection for marks as equally
desirable as protection for other forms of Intellectual Property6 because
trademarks stimulate the economic advancement by honoring manufacturers
who consistently produce quality products. Trademarks are an incentive
that motivates entrepreneurs to create new products in the first place.'
Thus, before the changes brought by the German Trademark Act even took
effect, a strong right existed in the interest of the trademark owner and not
merely as a right concomitant with a consumer protection device.
The EU Directive seems to be in accord with the purpose of trademarks
as expressed by the German law, i.e., de-emphasizing the traditional source
identifying function and emphasizing the trademark owner's rights.4 The

BVerfGE 51, 193 (193) (1979) (holding "Das schutzfahig Warenzeiden ist
einedurcbArt.14Abs. 1
Satz IgescbhitzteRecbtsposition.";4e., that Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees the integrity of private
property. Article 14 iscomparable to the Takings Clause in the U.S. Constitution).
BVerfGE 51, 193 (217) (1979).
, BVerfGE 51, 193 (218) (1979) (stating that "Wet durcb ein Warenzeicben aufBesonderbeitenseiner
betrieblichenErzeagnisse hinueisen kann, benennt damit nicht lediglich die Herkunfi seines Produktes; es ist
Ausdruck seines Leistungswillens.).

BVerfGE 78, 58 (1988) (the Esslinger Neckarhalde IHcase).
"FEZER, supra note 9, Einl. MarkenG cmt. no. 24.
43

See Case C-10/89, S.A. CNL-Sucal NV v. HAG GF AG, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3711, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R.

571 (1990) (describingthe nature and function of trademarks); Karl-HeinzFezer,MarkenrecbtimAufvind,
in FEsTscHRIur FOR GAEDERTZ 153,155-58 (1992) (stating that in the European system trademarks are
equal in value to the other intellectual property rights); see also W.R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS, 15-01 (1996). But see Case
40/70, Sirena S.R.L. v Eda S.R.L., 1971 E.C.R. 69, [1971] 10 C.M.L.R. 260, 264 (1971) (concerning the
relative protections of patents and trademarks); Guy TRITTON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INEUROPE,

n.7.049 (1996) (describing the Court's holding in Sirena).
Fezer, supra note 45, at 155-58.

o Compare FEZER, supra note 9, Einl. MarkenG cmt. no. 20, with Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1847, 1854 (1989) (detailing a different concept
expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court).
, The source identifying function has implications regarding the exhaustion of trademark rights. See
INGEP.L & ROHNKE, supra note 9, Einl. cmt. no. 34; Tilmann, supra note 8, at 385. The explanatory
statement of the German Parliament regarding the new Trademark Act explicitly refers to the change in
exhaustion theory as one of the examples of a new understanding of trademark functions.
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tenth recital in the preamble of the Directive states that the function of
marks is "in particular,"49 i.e., not exclusively, "to guarantee the trademark
as an indication of origin."'"Articles 4(4) and 5(2) of the EU Directive make
optional the prescription of trademark protection for non-competing
goods."' The EU Directive does not proscribe free transferability of marks
and does not contain provisions that regulate the possible proprietorship of
marks. Member States therefore are free to provide for separability of the
mark from the business establishment. 2
Judgments of the European Court of Justice to some extent back up this
understanding. 3 Although the European Court of Justice has frequently
emphasized the source identifying function as the main function of
trademarks,-" it has also explained,

Bundestagsdrucksache 12/6581 v. 14.01.1994, Begrdindung zum Markengesetz, 53, 83 [hereinafter BTDrucks., Begriindung zum Markengesetz] (providing the reasoning for the German Trademark Act). The
German Trademark Act, supra note 1, in S 24 provides for exhaustion if a product was put into the market
in Germany or one of the Member States of the EU with the consent of the trademark proprietor. The
old law did not contain such a provision. Courts, however, held that exhaustion derived from the origin
function of trademarks. Once a product entered the market with the consent of the mark's owner, this
function was exhausted. The old law was not limited to the area of the EU, but rather provided for
international exhaustion; seeMaja, BGHZ 41,84 (stating 'udttweiteErscb6pfng," which means worldwide
exhaustion); Case C-355/96, Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co, KG v. Hartlauer
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 1998 E.C.R. 1-4799 [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 953 (1998) (holding that Member States
are barred from providing for worldwide exhaustion by Council Directive Art. 7). This ruling could, be
interpreted as weakening the source identifying function. If one accepts the argument that exhaustion and
source function interact in the way German courts used to, the conclusion that the new law de-emphasizes
this function, insofar as it provides only for EU-wide exhaustion, has some validity. However, scholars
have pointed out that the origin function is not the exclusive rationale for an exhaustion provision. See
Tilmann, supra note 8, at 385 (containing information on how European market concerns deserve just as
much consideration); cf Fezer, supra note 45, at 161-63 (stating that although exhaustion enhances
trademark owners' rights, exhaustion restrictions do not per se reflect the idea of enhanced rights versus
origin function). Therefore this Article will not examine this problem any further.
' The German translation reads 'insbesondere"; see Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG & Rudolf
Dassler Sport, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6191, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 445, para. 32 n.14 (1998) (pointing out that the
English text was worded less appropriately than other language versions).
o Tilmann, supra note 8, at 383 n.39; Ruijsenaars, supra note 26, at112.
s See infra 55 II.C.12.-13. for a discussion of non-competing goods and the dilution concept.
s FEZER, supra note 9, 5 7 cmt. no. 4; see Tilmann, supra note 8, at 387 (noting that the separation
of the mark from the business establishment in German has contributed significantly to the abolishment
of the source identifying function).
"SSee, ag., Vito Mangini, DieMarka NiedergangderHerkunfsfunktion?, GRURINT. 462,466 (1996)
(noting that the emphasis on the source identifying function on the EU level can be reconciled with the
Member States' impairment of the source identification function).
"See
Case 102/77, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG and Hoffmann-La v. Centrafarm
Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH, 1978 E.C.R. 1139,1175-77, (1978] 3 C.M.L.R.
217, 232 para. 7 (1978) (describing various countries' case law and the Court's holdings in relation).
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In relation to trademarks, the specific subject-matter of the
industrial property is the guarantee that the owner of the
trademark has the exclusive right to use that trademark, for
the purpose of putting products protected by the trademark
into circulation for the first time, and is therefore intended
to protect him against competitors wishing to take
advantage of the status and reputation of the trademark by
selling products illegally bearing that trademark."5
This definition does not even mention the source identifying function."
Some authors, however, claim that the Court of Justice has stressed the
origin function rather than de-emphasized it. 7 In sum, it is safe to conclude,
there is a development under European law that tends to enhance trademark
owner's rights. 8
United States law, however, in theory still adheres to the notion that
trademarks serve exclusively to prevent confusion among the consuming
public. Thus, the principle that trademarks exist only in connection with
the good will of a business is axiomatic to U.S. trademark law. 9 Trademark
rights are therefore categorized as a special kind of property that has no
existence apart from the good will of the product or service that it
symbolizes. Although trademarks are regarded as primarily beneficial, an

s See Case C251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG & Rudolf Dassler Sport, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6191, [1998] 1
C.M.L.R. 445, para. 32 (1998) (describing further authority by Advocate General Jocobs); see also Case

102/77, Hoffmann-LaRoche& Co. AG, and Hoffman-La Roche AG v. Centrafarm Vertrebsgesellschaft
Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH, 1978 E.C.R. 1139, 1176, (1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217, 232 (1978)
(containing further analysis by the Advocate General of tendencies of German Law to rule that a
trademark right cannot be relied upon in some third party intervention cases).
Tilmann, supra note 8, at 382.
st INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, Einl. cmt. no. 36; Mangini, supra note 53, at 462-66 (arriving at
"

this conclusion by juxtaposing, Case 40/70, Sirena S.R.L. v. Eda S.R.L., 1971 E.C.R. 69, [1971] 10
C.M.L.R. 260 (1971) and Case 192/73, Van Zuyler Freies v. HAG AG, 1974 E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2
C.M.L.R. 127 (1974), on the one hand, with Case C-9/93, IHT Internationale Heiztechnik v. Ideal
Standard, 1999 E.C.R. 1-2789 [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 857 (1994) and S.A. CNL-Sucal NV v. HAG OF AG,
1990 E.C.R. 1-3711, [1990)3 C.M.L.R. 571 (1990), on the other hand, and also mentioning the tendency

of national laws to de-emphasize the origin function).
"Mangini, supra note 53, at 466-67.
Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that "[a] trademark is
merely a symbol of goodwill and has no independent significance apart from the goodwill that it

symbolizes; MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 18:2 (stating that "g]ood will and its trademark symbol are as
inseparable as Siamese Twins who cannot be separated without death to both").

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol7/iss2/2

12

Rayle: The Trend Towards Enhancing Trademark Owners' Rights-A Comparativ

2000]

COMPARA 7YVE TRADEMARK LAW

understanding shared by the Supreme Court,' they are not qualified as
property rights "in gross" or at "large."61 The Fourth Circuit, in March
1999, rejected the proposal that trademarks create property rights in gross
even for famous marks protected under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
(FTDA).62 Judge Posner has altogether refused to describe the rights
conferred by trademarks as "property."63 The implication of such a
distinction is that "property rights in gross" suggest the existence of a strong
right in a trademark. Mere "property rights," on the other hand, suggest a
more restricted right that is bound to use and the underlying good will. As
McCarthy puts it, "the 'property' in a trademark is the right to prevent
confusion."' 4
What is striking about these differences in the understanding of the nature
of trademarks is not so much that German law considers trademark rights
to be property rights and that U.S. law is somewhat reluctant to do so. The
implications of such a categorization remain unclear because they depend
on
6
what the nature of a property right really implies. ' Trademark protection,
however, is not driven by the theoretical underpinnings of what property is,

'o

Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 US. 189, 193, 224 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 327, 329

(1985).

The asserted doctrine is based upon the fundamental error of supposing that a trademark right is a right in gross or at large, like a statutory copyright or a patent for an
invention, to either of which, in truth, it has little or no analogy. There is no such
thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an established
business or trade in connection with which the mark isemployed. The law of trademarks isbut a part of the broader law of unfair competition; the right to a particular
mark grows out of its use, not its mere adoption; its function is simply to designate
the goods as the product of a particular trader and to protect his good will against the
sale of another's product as his; and it is not the subject of property except in
connection with an existing business.
United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90,97 (1918) (citations omitted).
6 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449,
458, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1072 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that proof of "actual dilution' is required
to establish a dilution claim under the FTDA as opposed to mere "likelihood of dilution); for a discussion
of the FIDA see infra S 1T.C.10.
' Illinois High School Ass'n. v. GTE Vantage Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 246, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1633,
1635 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[w]hat matters is that a trademark is not nearly so secure an entitlement as a
property right"); Libman Co. v. Vining Indus., Inc., 69 P.3d 1360,1361,36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1751,1752
(7th Cir. 1995) ("A trademark is not a property right, but an identifier").
"MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 2:14.
61

6Stephen L. Carter, Does it Matter WhetherIntellectualPropertyis Property?,68 CHI.-KENT L. REv.

715, 716 (1993) (stating that "[p]roperty, quite famously, is only a legal conclusion").
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but rather by the purpose of trademarks.66 And with regard to this it
becomes quite clear that German law protects trademarks for the sake of the
owner because trademarks are considered an essential instrument in
marketing, i.e., profitable commodities in their own right. The U.S., on the
other hand, grants protection only where the "monopolization" of a word
or term is justified because a mark acts as a source identifier and represents
a business' good will, i.e., prevents consumer confusion.67
IH. COMPARISON

A. ACQUISITION OF RIGHTS: REGISTRATION V. USE

The basic difference between the common law and civil law regarding
trademarks is how trademarks originate.68 Under common law, trademarks

" See E. I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917) ('The word
'property' as applied to trademarks and trade secrets is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary
consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith"); Int'l
Order ofJob's Daughters v. Lindeburg and Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919,208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718,725 (9th Cir.
1980) (" '(PIroperty right' or protection accorded a trademark owner can only be understood in the
context of trademark law and its purposes"); Lawyers Title Ins. Co. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 109 F.2d
35, 43, 43 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 166, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ("Although 'property' may be admitted to exist,
whether in a trade-mark, a trade name or a corporate name, that is true, broadly speaking, whenever
economic interests are protected by legal process, but only to the extent that they are so protected.").
It must be noted, however, that the property classification can make a difference, as the cases
College Savings Bank and FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEducation Expense Boardreveal. The Supreme
Court, in itsJune 23, 1999 decision, affirmed the lower courts' notion that the right to be free from unfair
competition was not a property right. The Third Circuit had noted that -because the scope of the
allegations in this case is so narrow, we express no opinion as to whether the TCRA may be applied
constitutionally in a case involving a trademark infringement or involving a misrepresentation about a
competitor's goods or services." College Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131
F.3d 353,362, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1008 (3rd Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court, in dictum, stated,
"The Lanham Act may well contain provisions that protect constitutionally cognizable property
interests-notably, its provisions dealing with infringement of trademarks, which are the 'property' of the
owner because he can exclude others from using them." College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2224, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068.
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 2:15.
Comparativists frequently argue that the use/registration dichotomy is the greatest impediment
to the harmonization of trademark laws; see Kenneth L. Port, TrademarkHarmonization:Norms, Names
& Nonsense, 2 MARQ. INTELL. PRoP. L. REv. 33, 37-38 (1998) (discussing the required changes to
harmonize the Lanham Act with the Trademark Law Treaty); see also Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce, 223 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 909,928-29 (T.T.A.B. 1984) (statement by Edward S.
Rogers arguing for rights and remedies arising from trademark and unfair competition agreements
between United States and foreign nations).
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come into existence through use.69 The United States' regime, thus,
represents a so-called use-based system; whereas, the German system,
adopting the civilian law, confers trademark rights upon registration.
Other common law countries have entirely abandoned the use-based
system. Developments in England exemplify the deviation from the
traditional trademark law system especially well. The United Kingdom now
provides for a dual system of protecting trademarks.7' It bid the use-based
system a partial farewell with the implementation of the Council Directive
by enacting the Trade Marks Act of 1994.7" This Act repealed its
predecessor, the Act of 1938, in its entirety. 2 Moreover, although trademark
protection in England derives from the common law, the 1938 Act had
granted protection for trademarks based on an intent-to-use a certain mark.73
The U.S. rejected giving up its use-based system when considering the
ratification of the Trademark Registration Treaty 4 (TRT) because it believed
that adhering to the agreement would constitute a deviation from the
common law of trademarks.

69 D.R. SHANAHAN, AUSTRALIAN LAW OF TRADE MARKS AND PASSING OFF 16 (1990).

10 RUTH ANNAND & HELEN NORMAN, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE TRADE MARKS ACT 1994,

at 16 (1994); see United Kingdom Trade Marks Act 1994 S2 (1994 ch. 26).
" ANNAND &NORMAN, supra 70, ("[... United Kingdom trademark law provides a dual system of
protecting trademarks. The owner of a mark can choose either to register it, or to leave it unregistered
and rely on the law of passing off to stop anyone who uses the same or similar mark in the course of
trade.").
Canada adopted an intent-to-use system in 1954, and Australia converted to such a system in 1955.
7' The Trademark Registration Treaty (TRTI), adopted in 1973 in Vienna, went into force in 1980
with the accession of the former U.S.S.R. and four African countries. Its purpose was to offer an
alternative to the Madrid Agreement, which was the first international agreement to include a broad
international registration system enabling the filing of a single registration application with the
International Bureau in Geneva. The TRT required each nation to suspend, for a period of three years,
any domestic requirements for use of the mark, but at the same time permitted an intent-to-use
requirement. Although the U.S. never ratified the treaty, the agreement has some significance because it
triggered an intent-to-use discussion in the United States. See Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of
InternationalTrademarkLaw, 2 MARQ. IN'ELL. PROP. L. REV. 1,14-15 (1998) (discussing the reluctance
of the United States to join the TRT in fight of the use requirement).
"s See generally Oliver P. Howes, Jr., The Case Against Intention To Use, 51 TRADEMARK REP. 242
(1961) (arguing that intention to use trademark rights would subvert vast amounts of common law
doctrine in the United States); but see Philip T. Dalsimer, ProposedIntention To Use Legislation:Intention
To Use-A Proposal(Pro),53 TRADEMARK REP. 975 (1963) (arguing that the United States' use requirement
isantiquated and out of line with modern business practices).
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1. Origins-In Germany. Although registration of trademarks was a
common phenomenon in the Middle Ages, 6 the purpose of registration was
not so much the protection of the marks themselves but rather the need to
trace back certain products to their respective manufacturers.' After the
French Revolution, the natural law movement proclaimed that the owner
of a mark should be entitled to government protection through
registration.7 In Germany, these ideas were first adopted in those areas
which formerly had been occupied by the French; in the middle of the
nineteenth century, they became part of the scientific discussion of whether
trademarks could actually be regarded as intellectual property. 9 France
served as a model, on the one hand, and as a medium of contrast on the other
hand.80 In 1869, the advent of the Law Governing Trade and Industry81
brought the right to carry on a business or trade, and it seemed consistent
with this idea to have government guarantee the protection of one's business
mark. 2 Thus, the first law protecting trademarks in the German Empire 3
provided for registration" without any prior examination. In addition, the
use of a mark was not a prerequisite for registration and did not become such
under the 1938 Act or its successor, the German Trademark Act of 1995.
The origins of the registration feature in Germany show that ever since
the inception of statutory trademark protection in Germany, the main goal
has been to grant and guarantee a right.
2. Origins-In the United States. United States trademark law, on the
other hand, originates in the common law of passing off (palming off)."
This is a tort and also, a part of unfair competition law which prohibits
anyone from passing off another's goods as one's own. 6 The trade identity

7(SCHECHTER, supra note 16, at 26-27 (discussing registration in German "HandLsbuch"and English
"trade records").
" See Diamond, supra note 17, at 229-37 (stating that trademark's primary purpose was to fix the
blame for inferior workmanship); SCHECHTER, supra note 16, at 19 (noting that the purpose of the
trademark was to identify the origin or ownership of the goods).
n Schechter, supra note 16, at 19.
7 Id
ElmarWadle,DL-rEinfiFrankreihsaufdieEnticklungGewerblicerSchutzrecteinDeutschLand,
in GEDAcHTNsscHRiFT FLrER LEONTIN-JEAN CoNsTANTEINsco 871, 872 (1983).

* Gewerbeordnung
FEZER, supra note 9, Einl. MarkenG cmt. no. 2.
" Gesetz iber den Markenschutz, v. 30.11.1874 (RGB1 S.143).
"Marks were registered in the so-called Handehregister.
SMcCARTHY, supra note 2, S 5:02.
'

"hI,
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laws in England were mainly concerned with confusion as to the source of
the goods or services. The case most frequently cited on the origins of
trademark protection in the United States and the U.K. is Southern v. How
decided in 1618.7 This case did not involve an infringement suit where a
trademark owner was suing a competitor, but rather it concerned a suit by
a customer based on a counterfeit sale of jewels.8 However, it quotes an
earlier case, from the late 16th century which has been identified as
Sandforths's Case. 9 Sandforth involved a clothier's claim against a competitor
who was allegedly selling cloth under the plaintiff's initial letters that did not
reach the high quality standards for which the plaintiff's cloth was known.'
The Court acknowledged the clothier's rights against trademark piracy and
unfair competition in the marketplace.9"
Confusion was only possible where marks were actually used.92 Thus, the
common law countries protected trademarks on the basis of use and,
therefore, were referred to as use-based protection systems.
Registration of trademarks as a means of government protection,
however, was also considered a necessity in England and colonial America.93
It is reported that in 1772 George Washington insisted that a court grant him
the name "G.Washington" for his brand of flour." Furthermore, in 1791
Thomas Jefferson, as Secretary of State, suggested that securing exclusive
marks for manufacturers would have a positive effect in the market place.9

o SC-IECHTER, supra note 16, at 123-24.
U

SCHECHTER, supra note 16, at 6-10.

"Keith M. Stoke, How Early DidAnglo-American Trademark Law Begin?An Answer to Schecbter's
Conundrum, 88 TRADEMARK REP. 564, 564 (1998).
' Whether the case actually involved the clothier's claim against his competitor or the purchaser's

claim against the seller of the inferior goods seemed unclear due to contradicting reports of Southern v.
How;,however, Stolte, now claims that the former indeed was the case. Id. at 585-88.
"tAlthough the details of the case remain unclear, this much of the decision by the Court seems to
be a reliable assessment. )d at 588-93.
92 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 16:1.
93 SCHECHTER, supranote 16, at 140 (claiming that the main reason for establishing registration was
to enable U.S. manufacturers to obtain the advantages of reciprocal statutes in foreign countries).
4 See Beverly W. Patishall, Two Hundred Years ofA merican TrademarkLaw, 68 TRADF.MARK REP.
121,121 (1978) (referringto Thomas Grubisich, Wasbington'sFlour,CHICAGO SUN-TIMBA,
Apr. 23,1976,
at 46, col. 1.).
" Pattishall, supra note 94, at 122 (In his claim for trademark protection Jefferson stated, "And that
this may be done by permitting the owner of every manufactory to enter in the record of the court of the
district wherein his manufactory is, the name with which he chooses to mark or designate his wares

I...
I .)
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The first statute providing for the registration of marks in the U.S. was
established in 1870 but was held unconstitutional in 1879.96 This result was

due to the unique federal structure of the United States. Article I, section 8
of the U.S. Constitution grants the federal Congress certain powers covering
intellectual property, none of which is to regulate trademark law. The
federal regulation of trademark law is based on the Interstate Commerce
Clause. 7 The Supreme Court struck down the first federal trademark act
because the registration was not specifically bound to use and therefore did
not fall within the Commerce Clause Power of Congress.98 In 1879, the
Supreme Court rejected the idea that the Patents and Copyrights Clause"
was applicable to trademarks. "0
The restrictions of the Commerce Clause, thus, have to be kept in mind
when assessing trademark protection in the U.S. Interstate commerce is
established through use.101 Therefore, the first concern with a registration
system in the U.S. is a constitutional concern." Today, it seems likely that
this constitutional concern could be overcome. In 1984, the Trademark
Trial and Appeals Board (T.T.A.B.) in Crocker NationalBank v. Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce held that a registration of a mark in a foreign
country is sufficient to establish trademark rights in the U.S. because such

In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8,ci. 3 reads, "[The Congress shall have power] [t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
" TradeMark Cases, 100 U.S. at 97-98. The Court stated common law protection could only be
overcome if Congress based the federal law on the Commerce Clause; the Court argued, "The remedies
provided by the act when the right of the owner of the registered trade-mark isinfringed, are not confined
to the case of a trade-mark used in foreign or inter-state commerce." I
U.S. CONST. art. I., S 8, Cd.8.
Compare Trade-Mark Casa,100 U.S. at 94 (noting that the Patents & Copyrights Clause does not

relate to trademarks), with AusTRAL. CONST. pt. 5, S 51 (xviii) (authorizing Parliament "tomake laws
for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to [... copyrights, patents
of inventions and designs, and trade marks").
"' Lanham Act S 1, 15 U.S.C. S 1051 (a) (1994) ("The owner of a trade-mark used in commerce may
apply to register his or her trade-mark under this chapter on the principal register [...1"); Lanham Act
S 45, 15 U.S.C.A. S 1127 (1994) ("The word 'commerce' means all commerce which may lawfully be
regulated by Congress."). One author suggests a rigid distinction between "use in trade," which is the
substantive law requirement and "use in commerce," which refers to the jurisdictional question and has
constitutional implications. Michael H. Davis, Death of a Salesman's Doctrine: A Critical Look at
Trademark Use, 19 GA. L. REV. 233, 247-50 (1985).
"' See generally Kenneth R. Pierce, The TrademarkLaw Revision Act: Origins ofthe Use Requirement
and an Ovxnview of the New FederalTrademarkLaw, 64 FLA. BJ. 35 (May 1990) (evaluating the history
of the U.S. trademark system and the constitutional provisions underlying trademark protection).
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a regulation is based on Congress' Treaty Power.0 ' The court cited a report
which had earlier examined Congress' power to regulate trademarks with
regard to international agreements. 1" The constitutional restraint of
federalism, therefore, is not an insurmountable obstacle to the U.S. bidding
farewell to its use-based system." Furthermore, not only has commerce
itself undergone tremendous changes since the Trademark-Casesdecision, but
the same is true for the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Commerce
Clause and its adherence to legislative actions.1" This aspect, however, will
not be explored further for the purposes of this paper.
The subsequent U.S. trademark statute of 1881 took the interstate
commerce notion into account. Similarly, in England registration of
trademarks as a protection device began in 1875.117 Registration in this
statute, as well, was bound to the use of the mark. Thus, the common law
tradition was upheld in the early English statute as well as in the first valid
federal trademark statute in the United States.
In 1988, the U.S. finally converted to an intent to use (ITJ protection
system 03 with the enactment of the Trademark Law Revision Act. 1" Prior
to this statute, the U.S. was the only country, with the exception of the

' Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Can. Imperial Bank of Commerce, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 909 (T.T.A.B.
1984).
"0William Page Montgomery & Roger A. Reed, ConstitutionalityReport on Proposed Trademark
Registration Treaty, 63 TRADEMARK REP. 575, 580-82 (1973) (stating that 'under common law the
property interest in a trademark, which gives the owner the exclusive right to use the mark, is based on
the owner's use of the mark in connection with a trade or business. The modification of this common
law property right isa power vested solely in the states. Nevertheless, it seems dear that the federal treaty
power makes it possible to adopt an international agreement which alters the local law of trademark
ownership.").
' The Supreme Court left this question open in Trademark-Cases,100 U.S. at 99 (stating "[i]n what
we have here said we wish to be understood as leaving untouched the whole question of the treaty-making
power over trade-marks, and of the duty of Congress to pass any laws necessary to carry treaties into
effect.-).
"0Bruce R. Parker, 'Intent To Use'" On the Road TowardAdoption ofa Registration-BasedSystem of
TrademarkProtection,79 TRADEMARK REP. 319,330 (1989), (stating"[gliven the Supreme Court's liberal
view of 'substantial impact' and its deference to Commerce Clause-based legislation that satisfies the
'rational basis' test, it seems likely that Congress could devise preemptive legislation that would withstand
constitutional scrutiny."). Parker refers to Charles James Vinicombe, The ConstitutionalityofAn Intent
To UseAmendment to the LambamAct, 78 TRADEMARKREP. 361 (1988) and holds Vinicombe's intent-touse rationale equally applicable to a federal preemptive statute. Id. at 330 nn.34-35.
'7 T.A. BLANco WHrrE & ROBINJACOB, KERLY'S LAW OF TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES 1
(12th ed. 1986).
1 See infra text accompanying notes 158-71 for a discussion of the ITU protection system.
10 Leaffer, supra note 74, at 7.
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Phillippines, to require use as a prerequisite for the protection of
trademarks."
3. 7he RegistrationSystem in Germany. Today the German Trademark
Act of 1995, S 4 "Accrual of Trade Mark Protection," stipulates:
Trademark protection shall accrue
from the registration of a sign as a trade mark in the Register
kept at the Patent Office, from the use of a sign in the
course of trade, provided that the sign has acquired
prominence as a trademark among the trade circles
concerned, or from the fact that a trademark is well-known
within the meaning of Article 6bis of the Paris Convention
on the protection of Industrial Property (Paris
Convention). '
Therefore, there are two instances where trademark rights in Germany
can be conferred by use. This is true for well-known marks, 1 2 and where the
mark has obtained prominence as a trademark. The latter confers protection
to a limited area, i.e., the area where such prominence has been obtained.
However, in Germany, trademarks are typically conferred by registration.
11 3
A successful registration yields a presumption of proprietorship.
Registration in Germany is a fairly straightforward process. The
application must include a reproduction of the trademark, a list of the goods
(or services 1 ) for which registration is applied,1 5 and information to help
establish the applicant's identity. The registration of a mark is not unduly

n0 Robert J. Eck, Statement of the United States Trademark Association in Support of S. 1883
(DeConcini)The TrademarkLaw Revision Act, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 382, 387 (1988); Pierce, supra note
102, at n.3.
.. German Trademark Act, supra note 1, at S 4.
" Art. 6bis of the Paris Convention (as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967) requires Member
Countries to protect well-known or famous marks; the goal of the protection is to fight trademark pirates
who register a mark in a foreign country where it has not yet been registered by the legitimate owner.
The scope of protection differs in each country. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, SS 29:61, 29:62.
"' German Trademark Act, supra note 1, S 28 (1).
...This paper refers to trademarks only and not service marks, but generally there is no difference in
the practical application. Further, this paper is only concerned with wordmarks and does not address the

specific problems of trade dress.
"' German Trademark Act, supra note 1, S 32 (2).
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expensive." 6 Priority is established by the date of filing the application with
the Patent and Trademark Office." 7 However, a priority claim, can also be
established prior to filing an application, such as through an exhibition at a
trade fair. 1 8
According to the Patent and Trademark Office, a mark will generally be
registered within a time period of three months if the application is free of
fault." 9 One can take advantage of an expedited examination for an extra
fee.120 The reason for the fairly fast conclusion of the registration procedure
lies in the German Patent and Trademark Office's relatively scarce
examination.
The German Patent and Trademark Office examines only the
requirements for application, whether the sign or term is protectable, and if
any so-called absolute bars to protection exist which would hinder
registration.' For example, registration will not occur if the sign sought to
be protected is not capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one
undertaking from those of other undertakings."
The absolute bars to registration are listed in S 8 of the German
Trademark Act.'
Marks which are devoid of any distinctive character,
merely descriptive, or generic, will be denied registration, according to this

"' German Trademark Act, supranote 1, S32 (4); compare Gesetz iiber die Gebiihren des Patentamtes
und des Patentgerichts (Patentgebiohrengestz-PatGebG) SI and Patentgebiihrenverzeichnis (PatGebZV)
No. 131100 and 131150 (charging 500.- German Marks for three classes and 150.- German Marks for each
additional class) with U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, (last modified Feb. 22, 1999) < http://www.
uspto.gov/web/offices/a/qs/ope/fee1999.htm#tmfee> (charging $245 (U.S. dollars) per class for
trademark processing fees).
" German Trademark Act, supra note 1, S33(2).
m German Trademark Act, supra note 1, S 35. Another possibility is a foreign priority under the
Paris Convention. German Trademark Act, supra note 1,S 34.
"' Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt [German Patent and Trademark Office] (visited Aug. 15,1999)
<http://www.deutsches-patentamt.de/einsteig/einstark.htm>.
"20
German Trademark Act, supra note 1, S 38; FEZER, supra note 9, S 38 cmt. no. 2. Such an
expedited procedure might gain importance for international applications filed under the Madrid
Agreement which requires a home registration before an international application may be filed. On the
other hand, the Madrid Agreement, Art. 4 (2) incorporates the Paris Convention (as revised at Stockholm
on July 14,1967), Art. 4 (c)(1) six-month priority period. Adherence to this priority period would have
put U.S. applicants at a disadvantage because the U.S. registration process tends to take longer than most
other countries' process periods. See Harriet R. Freeman, Reshaping Trademark Protection in Today's
Global Village: Looking Beyond GA Trs UruguayRound Toward Global TrademarkHarmonizationand
Centralization,1 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 67, 77 (1995); Leaffer, supra note 74, at 13.
ul German Trademark Act, supra note 1,SS 36, 37.
' German Trademark Act, supra note 1.
w German Trademark Act, supra note 1,S 8.
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provision.'24 The factors listed in S 8 of the German Trademark Act are
comparable to those stipulated in S 2 of the Lanham Act.' Interestingly,
though, S 8 of the German law does not contain a provision that resembles
Lanham Act S 2 (d)(1), i.e., the German Patent and Trademark Office will
only examine whether a conflict exists with "well-known" marks, as
described in Paris Convention Art. 6bis(1). 26 It will not examine whether
an identical mark exists or is in use and might cause consumer confusion
because it is the trademark owner's responsibility to check the German
Patent and Trademark Office's publications'27 to find out whether a mark
resembling his or her own has been registered. If such a mark has been
registered, the trademark owner may file an opposition to the affected
registration."' Note that the first German law relating to trademarks had
contained no prior examination at all.' The subsequent law, adopted in
1894,1"0 however, brought a tardy prior examination. Under this statute the
Patent Office of the German Empire would examine whether the particular
mark was distinctive. Additionally, it would inform owners of potentially
conflicting marks with respect to filing an opposition.13 ' The Trademark
Law of 1938 brought a comprehensive reform and contained a provision that
the proven use of the same mark by another person was an absolute bar to
registration. After 1945, as a practical matter, it was impossible to keep up
this examination process because a lot of documents relating to trademarks

'u Distinctiveness refers to the specific mark in relation to the specific goods or services. The question
of whether a sign can serve as a mark examines the mark in the abstract, ie., "isolated from the goods or
services for which protection is sought." See FEZER, supra note 9, 5 3 cmt. nos. 203-05 for distinction
between specific and abstract distinctiveness.
Lanham Act S 2, 15 U.S.C. S1052 (1994).
German Trademark Act, supra note 1, S10 (1).
'o According to the German Trademark Act every registration must be published.
German
Trademark Act, supra note 1,S 42 lit. 2. Section 65 (1)1,in conjunction with 5 21 of the Statutory Order
Regarding Trademarks [Markenrecbtsverordnung] stipulate the details of the compulsory publication.
' See German Trademark Act, supra note 1,5 42 (stating that the proprietor of a trademark with a
prior in time rank may raise opposition to the registration within three months from the date of
publication. Section 9 lists the main grounds for opposition, ie., the so-called 'relative bars to
registration.").
129 OTTO-FIEDRICHFRHR.v.GAMM, WARENZEiCHENGESETZ, Einf. cmt. no.3 (1965);seesupratext
accompanying notes 81-83 (noting that no examination was considered necessary under the first German
trademark law).
130Reichsgesetz zum Schutz der Warenbezeichnungen, v. 12.05.1894 (RGBI S. 441).
1 V. GAMM, supra note 129, Einf.cmt. nos. 6, 18. v. Gamm points out that a prior examination, in
any case would have been impracticable because of the decentralized registration system.
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had been destroyed in the Patent Office during the Second Would War.'
The EU Directive gives members leeway in how to conduct their
examination procedure. '"
The German Trademark Act adopted the
historically "tried and tested" system.''
Theoretically, in Germany unrelated businesses might use similar or even
identical trademarks, even if these uses cause confusion among consumers.'
At first glance S 8 (2), No.4,3 6 which stipulates a bar to registration for
deceptive marks, might be understood as a safeguard for such a situation.
Although its goal is to protect consumers, it is only pertinent in those cases
where the mark itself has a deceptive character, i.e., with regard to the
content of the mark.' In addition, the Patent and Trademark Office will
only refuse registration where the likelihood to deceive is evident.'
Note
though, the owner of a prior right may take steps to protect this right, such
as filing an opposition and/or an infringement suit."3 9
German registration is designed to further business interests and
encourage business endeavors. The registration is designed to be a simple
undertaking favoring businesses and their respective interests. The
registration system reflects an understanding of marks as not merely source
identifiers but as devices that enhance a business' scope of action.
4. Use-basedSystem in the UnitedStates. As noted above, trademark rights
in common law countries traditionally were acquired through adoption and
use. U.S. courts have frequently held that trademark rights are not
established by the mere adoption of a mark but rather through use of the
adopted mark.'
132

Id. S 5 n.2; FEZER, supra note 9, S 42 cmt. no.1.

EU Directive, Art. 4, offers the option either to not register conflicting marks or to hold them
liable to be declared invalid.
"3See German Trademark Act, supra note 1,SS 8-9 (which do not provide for the German Patent and
Trademark Office to examine whether identical or similar marks exist, but rather leave it to the owner
of such a potentially conflicting mark to file an opposition); FEZER, supra note 9, S42 cmt. no.1 (for this
proposition).
13

As a practical matter, an opposition will be filed if the mark is actually in use.
See German Trademark Act, supra note 1, S 8 (2) No.4 (stating 'which are of such a nature as to
deceive the public, especially as to the kind, quality or geographical origin of the goods or services.*).
"3 FEZER, supra note 9, S 8 cmt. no. 300 (point out that this requirement might be fulfilled in cases
"

'

where consumers associate a particular quality standard with a certain mark).
ts German Trademark Act, supra note 1, S 73 (3).

German Trademark Act, supra note 1,SS 42, 14-19.
m United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90,97-98 (1918); Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg.
Co., Inc., 508 F.2d 1260, 1265-66 (5th Cir. 1975); Faciane v. Starner, 230 F.2d 732, 738 (5th Cir. 1956).
Regarding the so-called maxim of "no trade no trademark," see generally Tammy J. Snyder, Trademark
13
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The existence of trademark rights depends on state common law and not
on federal statutory law."' The Lanham Act enables a federal registration of
these rights. The registration itself does not create trademark rights, but
rather grants certain advantages."' The rights themselves are conferred by
143
common law, i.e., by the use of a mark in a certain area.
Therefore, protection exists as soon as someone begins using a specific
mark for a certain product. By placing "TM" 1" on the product, the user
indicates that he or she claims to have a trademark right in the mark used.
However, the use of "TM" does not confer trademark rights. These rights
are conferred by actual use. Although the use of the sign is not mandatory,
it is a good practice in the United States.
Today, however, the U.S. system is no longer based entirely on use. The
courts and the legislature have fostered disregard for the distinction between
use and registration ever since the first trademark acts were enacted by
Congress in 1881 and 1905.145 Some deviations can be found in the Lanham
Act itself. Others derive from a lenient application of the Lanham Act by
the courts. 6

Law Revision Act of1988 and the GatekeeperRole of the PTO: HeadingAbuse offat the Pass, 68 WASH. U.
L.Q. 753 (1990).
. Additionally, state registrations are possible in all states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.

They are, however, of little practical significance as they generally do not provide the registrant with
statewide protection, see Mark S. Lee, Trademark Essentials, SC47 A.LI. A.B.A. 1, 14-15 (1998).
142The Patent and Trademark Office, FAQ about Trademarks (last modified Feb. 11, 1999) < http://
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/tmfaq.htm > points out,
What are the benefits of federal trademark registration?
1. Constructive notice nationwide of the trademark owner's claim.
2. Evidence of ownership of the trademark.

3. Jurisdiction of federal courts may be invoked.

4. Registration can be used as a basis for obtaining registration in foreign
countries.
5. Registration may be filed with U.S. Customs Service to prevent importation
of infringing foreign goods.
143 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 19:3. However, federal registration does confer substantive rights.
IS 19:8.
'4 Additionally 'SM" is used in conjunction with service marks and W®refers to registered marks.
Lanham Act S 29, S15 U.S.C. 5 1111 (1994). While such indicators are not required under German hw,
they are sometimes used as a deterrent or for advertising functions. INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9,
$ 26 cmt. no. 14.
See infra S III.A.4.e. (discussing priority and use).
14 Robert C. Cudek, TRTlmpacton UnitedStates Statutoryand Common Law, 63 TRADEMARK REP.
501 (1973).
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These changes reflect the need to make protection easier for businesses.
Therefore, they represent a similar understanding of trademark functions as
that expressed by the German law.
a. Lanham Act Deviations. First, the Lanham Act does confer rights
on a registrant. If a party extends the use of a federally registered mark to an
area where she formerly did not do business, she will prevail in litigation
against anyone who began using the mark in that area after federal
registration occurred.147 The Lanham Act not only establishes rights through
federal registration instead of common law use, but it also expresses a clear
need to protect businesses even when good will has not yet been established.
The Lanham Act S 8 (b)4 8 allows the filing of an affidavit of excused nonuse. This filing allows a trademark owner to obtain trademark rights under
special circumstances even though a mark has not been used.149
In addition, the Lanham Act, S 44 allows U.S. registration based upon
foreign registration in the absence of use of the mark in either the U.S. or its
home country.' s All that is required is foreign registration. Section 44 was
introduced into U.S. law to achieve reciprocity with Member Countries of
the advantages of the Paris Convention for the benefit of U.S. businesses in
the Member Countries."' Thus, this provision expresses an understanding
that marks are an essential planning device for businesses and should be
protected in the interest of business enterprises.

" Stephen L. Carter, Comment, The Trouble With Trademark,99 YALE L.J. 759, 768 (1990).
14

Lanham Act S 8 (b), 15 U.S.C. S 1058 (a)(1994).

*' See Cudek, sra note 146, at 507 (describing the requirements and effects of the filing).
See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 29:14 for the history of the rule as to whether Lanham Act S 44
applicants must prove use.
", The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, with its minimum standard
requirements, was the first attempt to grant international protection for trademarks. It was adopted by
eleven countries on March 20, 1883. These countries were: Belgium, Brazil, France, Guatemala, Italy,
the Netherlands, Portugal, El Salvador, Switzerland, Serbia, and Spain. The United States joined in 1887
and Germany followed in 1901. Today, 140 countries form the Paris Union, including all the members
of the European Union. See MCCARTHY, supranote 2,5 29"22 (discussing the Paris Convention member
states); FEZER, supra note 9, at 1795-1801 (providing an overview of parties to the Treaty and time of
accession); see also GRUR Int. 1999, 427, 427-34 (for an overview). The main regulations of the Paris

Convention and its revisions are "national treatment," "convention priority," and 'protection of famous
marks." The Convention also ensures a certain minimum level of protection for marks of citizens of
Member States. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2,S 29:25 (stating that the Convention members promise to
give all foreign member citizens the same protection as that given to their own citizens); see aso, FEZER,
supra note 9, Int. MarkenR cmt. no. 3 (outlining the various revision phases concerning the original
convention).
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b. Token Use. In applying the Lanham Act use requirement, courts
accepted so-called "token use" as sufficient use to trigger protection under the
federal statute."5 2 Token use is a minimal use, an initial commercial
transaction, which does not put the product into full distribution." 3 Under
the "token use" doctrine, a single or very limited sale or shipment of the
product bearing the mark will allow the prospective trademark owner to
obtain registration." s Thus, a single shipment,' the sending of a single
product sample,"' or even a commercial transaction between the corporate
owner of a mark and a member of its board of directors... have sufficed to
establish "use in commerce" for registration purposes.
c. Trademark Law Revision Act. The "token use" doctrine was
abandoned with the introduction of the Trademark Law Revision Act of
1988 (TLRA).1 8 The TLRA, however, does not follow the common law
'u MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 19:5; Davis, supa note 101, at 251-59; see Cudek, supra note 146, at
506 (describing the concept as "a phenomenon both castigated as evidence of the current hypocrisy and
deviation from strict Common Law principles concerning acquisition of rights, and defended as merely
a reflection of commercial reality which probably dictates that initial trademark use be token.j.
I Willis Raymond Davis, Jr., Intent-To-UseApplicationsFor TrademarkRegistration,35 WAYNE L.
REV. 1135 (1989); DONALD S. CHISUM, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, S 5D[lIa]

(1st ed. 1992).

M Frank Z. Hellwig, The Trademark Law Revision Act of1988: The 100th Congress Leaves Its Mark,
79 TRADEMARK REP. 287 (1989); Snyder, supranote 140, at 759-60.
...
Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 390 F.2d 1015, 1017, 157 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 55,

57 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
" Bertolli USA, Inc. v. Filippo Bertolli Fine Foods, Ltd., 662 F. Supp. 203,6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1043
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
IV Int'l Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. Int'l Mobile Machines Corp., 800 F.2d 1118, 1120, 231

U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 142, 143 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
'" Carter, supra note 147, at 768; Allard Enters., Inc. v. Advanced Programming Resources, Inc., 146
F.3d 350, 357,46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865,? (6th Cit. 1998) (stating that the TLRA redefined the term'use
in commerce* to eliminate 'token use' as a basis for registration); Lanham Act 45, 15 U.S.C. S1127
(1994) reads:
The term 'use in commerce' means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course
of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of this
chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce(1) on goods when(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays
associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the
goods makes such placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the
goods or their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and
(2)on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and
the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one
State or in the United States and a foreign country and the person rendering the
services is engaged in commerce in connection with the services.

S
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notion of trademark use. Instead, it represents the most obvious deviation
from the common law understanding by creating an Intent-To-Use (TU)
registration option. ITU was introduced because of the insistence by U.S.
businesses, which claimed the use requirement had a chilling effect on
them." 9 When developing a mark, ie., investing money in a new product,
its rights
businesses feared conflicts with a prior user who had established
1
W
rights.
any
establish
could
before the investing businesses
The TLRA made it possible to file an ITU application, even though the
mark had not been used in commerce, based on a bona fide intent use it. If
the protection requirements are satisfied, the PTO issues a "Notice of
Allowance." Although no trademark rights are conferred at this stage, the
filing of the ITU-contingent on the subsequent registration-acts as a
"constructive use." The filing means that a priority date has been
established; thus it is as if the mark had actually been used. 161 However, the
applicant must establish use within the six-month period following the
Notice of Allowance. If use is not possible during that time, the applicant
can file a written request for an extension for an additional six-months.
Further six-month interval extensions, for a period of up to three years from
the date of the Notice of Allowance, are possible. However, these extensions
require a showing of "good cause. "la The PTO will accept a showing of
ongoing efforts to make use of the mark, or alternatively, a satisfactory
explanation for the failure to make such efforts. 1" The standards for
showing either of these justifications are rather lenient. With regard to the
first acceptable "good cause," general statements as to the efforts will suffice;
proof of these efforts need not be furnished. An example of the required
explanation of failure to make efforts to use the mark is the applicant's intent
to use the mark on packaging, even though this packaging has not yet been
developed. This explanation has been accepted by the PTO.M In fact,

'PH

P H. SMiTH, INTENT-TO-USE TRADEMARK PRACICE, 1-4 (1992).

,' Ideat 2; Pierce, supra note 102, at 38 (A pre-filing use standard is unrealistic. It is the requirement
in our trademark law that most perplexes American businesses. Bringing a brand to market is costly in
time, effort and money. To make one incur such costs before some assurance it may register or retain the
brand is logistically perverse.").
"' Lanham Act S 7 (c), 15 U.S.C. S 1057 (c)(1994); Henry W. Leeds, Intent To Use-Its Time Has
Come, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 269, 278-79 (1989).
"6 MCCArTHY, supra note 2, S 19.25.
113 TRADEMARK MANUAL Op EXAMINING PROCEDURE S 903.02(a); 37 C.F.R. S 2.89(d)(2) (1999);
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 19.25.
1 In re Alco Indus. Inc., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1799, 1800 (Comm'r Patents & Trademarks 1995).
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generally, the PTO will not scrutinize the applicant's explanations.
However, false statements, make the mark subject to challenges of the
mark's validity.16 In addition the applicant must verify his information by
affidavit or a dedication form.' Companies are even able to file 1TU
applications for a number of marks although they are ultimately planning on
using only one of these marks.lt7 The PTO only issues a trademark
registration once the applicant has filed a "statement of use" and has shown
that the mark has actually been used. Although the ITU system does not
confer any actual de jure trademark rights, it does so de facto through the
constructive use effect.'"
Interestingly, the discussion of whether the U.S. should adopt an ITU
16
system was triggered by the International Trademark Association (INTA)"
whose organizational goal is to promote the role of trademarks worldwide.
The TLRA was finally adopted in the interest of businesses that needed to
bare their business plan and make commercially sound decisions on the
availability of a certain trademark."0 The goals of the TLRA indubitably
reveal the changing notion towards protection in the interest of

"6

MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 19:25.

I0 1L"

"7 Leeds, spra note 161, at 272; Carter, sapranote 147, at 781 n.89.
'" In addition, ITU can lead to retroactive application of the incontestability provisions. Under the
Lanham Act, registered marks become incontestable after having been registered for five years, but this
is true only within limits. 15 U.S.C. S 1065, 1115(b) (1994).
"' Formerly known as the United States Trademark Association (USTA).
0 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,783-84,23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081, 1090
(1992) (stating that "the legislative history of the 1988 amendments reaffirms Congress' goals of protecting
both businesses and consumers with the Lanham Act*); Id at n.19 (quoting S.Rep. No. 100-515, p. 4
(1988):
[tirademark protection is important to both consumers and producers. Trademark
law protects the public by making consumers confident that they can identify brands
they prefer and can purchase those brands without being confused or misled.
Trademark laws also protects [sic] trademark owners. When the owner of a
trademark has spent conside[r]able time and money bringing a product to the
marketplace, trademark law protects the producer from pirates and counterfeiters.);
The United States TrademarkAssociation TrademarkReview CommissionReport andRecommendationsto
USTA PresidentandBoard of Directors,77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 392-93 (1987)
(A pre-filing use standard is unrealistic. It is the requirement in our trademark law
that most perplexes American business. Bringing a brand to market is costly in time,
effort and money. To make one incur such costs before some assurance it may
register or retain the brand is logistically perverse. This is the main reason for token
use applications. To the extent they are being filed and upheld, we now have, in
effect, an intent-to-use system.).
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entrepreneurs.7 ' They therefore express the same functional understanding
of trademarks as German law.
d. Ownershipand Use. The treatment of ownership of trademarks in
the courts reveals that courts do not rigorously enforce the concept of prior
use if the interests of certain businesses require a deviation from conventional
principles. In determining the ownership of a trademark, courts often look
at the agreements of the parties involved rather than at the perception of the
consuming public. 7 2 Traditionally the question whether the landlord or the
tenant owns the mark of a hotel depends entirely on who used the mark and
built up the good will in the mark. Applying the traditional understanding
of marks as source-identifying and consumer-confusion preventing devices
would lead to the conclusion that the owner of the mark will generally be
the tenant who offers the hotel services. The mark is used in connection
with the tenant's services and not in connection with the landlord's rental
business. Courts, however, have acknowledged the landlord's obvious
interest in exploiting a mark that the tenants are using.'" Rather than
emphasizing the use of the mark, courts tend to adhere to the contractual
provisions between landlord and tenant. 4 The landlord's use of the mark
in connection with the management of the building is sufficient to establish
ownership.' These decisions reflect an understanding that whoever has the
commercial interest in the mark, rather than whoever uses the mark as a
source identifying device, should be entitled to exploit it.

",'
See Todd B. Carver, Wat Is the Impact ofthe TrademarkLawRevisionAct of1988?, 16 U. DAYTON

L. REV. 129, 136-37 (1990) (noting that the goals of TLRA include "reduc[ing] the advantage foreign
citizens enjoy in obtaining United States trademark rights [. . .], making] the trademark system more
equitable for all trademark owners [... I enhanc[ing] the climate for investment by eliminating
unnecessary and costly uncertainty [.. .1,[and] creat[ing] commercially-sound procedures for establishing
trademark rights without altering the fundamental principals of [American] trademark law.") (quoting
Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3936 (codified at 15 U.S.C. SS 1051-1127 (1988))).
m See Norden Restaurant Corp. v. Sons of the Revolution, 415 N.E.2d 956, 210 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 944
(N.Y. 1980) (the case involved the famous building of "Fraunces Tavern" in Manhattan. The Court
rejected the tenant's argument that his family had used the mark for over forty years, but instead
emphasized the provisions of the lease.); O'Grady v. McDonald, 66 A. 175, 176 (N.J. Ch. 1907)
(emphasizing the significance of the tenant-landlord relationship).
'"See McCARTHY, supra note 2, S 16:38 (citing various cases where landlord was given ownership
of the trademark).
" See supra note 172 (discussing such cases).
"s Plitt Theatres, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l. Bank and Trust Co., 697 F. Supp. 1031, 1035, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1226, 1230 (N.D. M. 1988).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2000

29

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 2

J. INTELL. PROP.L.

[Vol. 7:227

Courts have also held that the name of a hotel attaches to and remains
with the location, rather than with the particular proprietor. 76 Such a
notion does not take into account that different owners might promote
different quality standards. Although others have every incentive to uphold
the quality standard that has been associated with a particular place, courts
do not analyze whether a particular owner will uphold that standard. Thus,
the location rationale constitutes a deviation from the consumer protection
notion by emphasizing the landlord's interests.
The discrepancy is even more apparent in cases where an advertising
agency is retained to create a mark."r The advertising agency does not use
the mark on the goods for which it was created. The Federal Circuit,
however, has held that the mark created by the agency does not merely
designate the goods it was created for, but also is a source identifier for the
agency's services, thus making the agency the legitimate trademark owner.7 8
This decision takes into account a common business practice. It does not fit,
however, with the traditional use requirement.
If there is no common control, joint ownership runs afoul of the
consumer protection policy, i.e., the source identification function. The
T.T.A.B. has relied entirely on parties' agreements,'" thus elevating the
trademark owner's rights over the need for consumer protection. Especially
critical is the case of dissolution of joint ownership of marks. From the
consumer confusion standpoint, it is unthinkable to sanction a separation of
the mark upon dissolution. However, courts have accepted such a separation
by granting each partner his or her share.' 1 ' Dividing ownership rights upon
dissolution of a partnership, marriage, or joint venture contradicts the

u' Freeland v. Burdick, 204 S.W. 1123, 1124 (Mo. App. 1918); Stogop Realty Co. v. Marie Antoinette
Hotel Co., 217 A.D. 555, 562 (N.Y. App. Div. 1926) (noting that "[i]t has been decided that the name
established for a hotel is a trade-mark in which the proprietor has a valuable interest which a court will
protect.").
17 See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 16:39 (noting that advertising agencies, in some instances may
acquire ownership rights in trademarks used to promote customer products).
"' In re Adver. & Mktg. Dev., Inc., 821 F.2d 614, 620, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2010, 2014 (Fed. Cir.

1987).

"r'In reDiamond Walnut Growers, Inc., and Sunsweet Growers Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 507,509-10
(T.T.A.B. 1979) (focused on contractual relationship because parties had strong interest to uphold
reputation).
'1 See MCCARTHY, supranote 2, S16:43 (citing various cases where rights were shared); Oklahoma
Beverage Co. v. Dr. Pepper Love Bottling Co., 565 F.2d 629,631,194 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 184 (10th Cir. 1977)
(the court hypothesized such a conclusion, but then found abandonment through nonuse). Courts have
generally relied on dicta in Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514 (1888).
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understanding of marks as consumer protection devices. Recently courts,
however, have not adopted this conclusion and have treated trademarks as
indivisible assets.' 1'
Another noteworthy ownership problem arises when entertainment
groups dissolve. Some courts focus on whether the group name is personal
to the members or not;' others grant ownership to the person who controls
the quality and style of the group's music. 83 Courts have taken a variety of
different approaches to solve the conflict of multiple ownership interest.'84
The case law generally focuses on the structure of the groups, i.e.,
partnership or corporation law and only occasionally on consumer
perception."8
By disregarding the consumer confusion policy, courts diminish the
traditional understanding of trademark functions and emphasize the parties'
need for marks as devices that enhance business perspectives. The question
of ownership is pertinent in a distributor and manufacturer relationship.
The manufacturer, as well as the distributor, may be the owner of
trademarks. It seems that under traditional analysis, the manufacturer who
produces the goods should be rewarded with ownership of the mark.
However, it is well-established that the distributor of goods may own the

" See McCARTHY, supra note 2, S 16:44 (citing the modern view of a trademark as being indivisible,
in light of the consumer protection policy); see, eg., Bell v. Streetwise Records, Ltd., 761 F.2d 67, 74, 226
U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 745, 750 (lst Cir. 1985) (where court showed reluctance to divide the rights to a music
group's trademark name).
"' Fuqua v. Watson, 107 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 251,252 (N.Y. Sup. 1955); see generally,Cheng v. Dispeker,
35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1493, 1496 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that under both the "control" test, which
determines ownership based on who controls the nature or quality of the services, and the "personal" test,
which determines ownership based on whether the mark is personal to the performers, the plaintiff
performers would lose).
13. Bell v. Streetwise Records, 640 F. Supp. 575, 580, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 281 (D. Mass. 1986); see
generally Cbeng, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1493, 1496 (discussing the "control" test).
'" See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 16:45 (discussing the various cases and methods of resolution).
185E.g., Rare Earth, Inc. v. Hoorelbeke, 401 F. Supp. 26, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)271 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(relying on corporation law); Fuqua,107 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 251 (relying on partnership law). MCCARTHY,
supra note 2, S16:45, suggests that one first determine whether the mark is personal to the group; and if
the answer is "no" then determine who controls the quality and style of the music. Cbeng, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1493 adopted this approach. Performers have pushed for a bill to enhance their rights and allow
them to use the names of the groups they made famous, even though the trademark is owned by the
record companies. Such a bill has now been introduced as the 'Truth in Rock Act," bill H.R. 1125. See
4/2/1999 PTD d2 Legislation: Truth in Rock Act' Targets ImposterMusical Groups; 5/7/1999 PTD d2
Trademarks: Witnesses Back Bill PermittingChallenges to Trademark RegistrationsBefore Board.
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trademark for goods he does not manufacture. 18 6 Where the distributor,
controls to some extent the production, this notion appears to conform with
the source identifying function as well as with the quality function of
trademarks. 187 Such a control, however, will not be present in the case of
promotional items. Nevertheless, the T.T.A.B. has often held that the
promoter is entitled to the trademark rights in the marks used on these
items.188 Further, in disputes between manufacturers and distributors, courts
generally emphasize the contractual agreements between the parties in
determining ownership, rather than the consumer perceptions.189
e. Priorityand Use. Two other concepts give evidence of the practical
need to deviate from the strict common law use requirement in certain
situations. The first is the challenge courts face regarding the use
requirement when an entrepreneur is preparing to do business. " Such a case
typically involves two companies fighting over a common law priority in a
certain mark.191 A strict application of the rule that a mark is merely a
symbol of existing goodwill should attach protection only to cases where

'" See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 16:46. McCarthy gives the example of Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
which is the owner of many marks, but does not produce the goods bearing its marks.
"2Premier Dental Products Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., Inc-, 794 F.2d 850, 854, 230
U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 233, 235 (3rd Cir. 1986) (noting that (t]he use of a trademark does not necessarily and as
a matter of law import that the articles upon which it is used are manufactured by its user. It may be
enough that they are manufactured for him, that he controls their production, or even that they pass
through his hands in the course of trade, and that he gives to them the benefit of his reputation, or of his
name and business style. The decisive question is not who manufactured the article sold under a given
trademark, but which business or article is symbolized by it.
See the discussion infra S MII.B.3., of control required for license agreements; MCCARTHY, supra
note 2,5 16:46 (discussing "dealer's trademarks" owned by distributors of goods over the manufacturer
of those goods).
'" E.g. Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Midwest Chrome Process Co., 183 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 758 (T.T.A.B.
1974); Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. R. H. Cosmetics Corp., 204 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 155 (T.T.A.B. 1979);
McDonald's Corp. v. McKinley, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1895 (T.T.A.B. 1989); see MCCARTHY, supra note
2,5 16:46 (agreeing that the market mechanism of consumer (dis)satisfaction isa sufficient control guard).
But see 5 18:61 (noting the legal gamble that is taken when the licensor is not given any true control over
product quality).
'" See McCARTHY, supra note 2, 5 16:48 (stating that courts generally hold the contract to be
determinative as to mark ownership); E. F. Prichard Co. v. Consumers Brewing Co., 136 F.2d 512, 58
U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 362 (6th Cir. 1943) (analyzing the case under contract law and rejecting the applicability
of the principles of trademark law).
"' See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, 5 16:12 (discussing the traditional rule that the use of a symbol in
preliminary steps to establishing a business does not warrant federal registration).
"' This problem is distinguishable from the concept of "token use." The priority and use problem
isconcerned with the establishment of common law trademark rights, whereas "token use" was construed
to allow federal registration.
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such goodwill has in fact been established.' Thus, if two persons choose the
same mark for their future business, whoever uses the mark first should
prevail in the race for trademark ownership. This follows the bedrock
principle that common law trademarks flow "from the first actual use of a
mark in agenuine commercial transaction." 93 Accordingly, courts have held
internal shipments and pre-marketing consultations inadequate to
establish prior use. Several cases give evidence that this conventional
approach is not applied rigorously, but rather stretched and replaced by
equitable concerns and the totality of circumstances."
In George Washington Mint, Inc. v. Washington Mint, Inc." r the District
Court for the Southern District of New York granted priority to the
plaintiff for being first to solicit and accept orders although the defendant
had been the first to actually conduct sales. 98 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit,
in New West Corp. v. NYM Co., held that defendant could claim priority due

192 See McCARTHY, supra note 2, S 16:12 (noting that the traditional rule does not recognize amark
as a symbol of business good will until the business isactually established); Brookfield Communications,
Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1051, 50 U.S.P.Ql2d (BNA) 1545,1555 (9th Cir.
1999) (stating:
The Lanham Act grants trademark protection only to marks that are used to identify
and to distinguish goods or services in commerce-which typically occurs when a
mark is used in conjunction with the actual sale of goods or services. The purpose
of a trademark is to help consumers identify the source, but a mark cannot serve a
source-identifying function if the public has never seen the mark and thus is not
meritorious of trademark protection until it is used in public in a manner that creates
an association among consumers between the mark and the mark's owner.).
" Allard Enterprises, Inc. v. Advanced Programming Resources, Inc., 146 F.3d 350, 358 46
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1871 (6th Cir. 1998).
4 See, eg., Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260, 1265, 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 4 (5th Cir.
1975) (finding shipment of product to regional managers inadequate to secure trademark rights); Zazu
Designs v. L'Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499,505,24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828, 1833 (7th Cir. 1992) (detailing
the various pre-marketing maneuvers held insufficient to secure trademark rights).
"' Ii at 505.
"4 See McCAarHY, s"pranote 2, S 16:13 (quoting the Second Circuit decision of Chandon Campagne
Corp. San Marino Wine Corp., 335 F.2d 531, 534, 142 US.P.Q. (BNA) 239, 242 (2nd Cir. 1964), "the
concept of priority in the law of trademarks is applied 'not in its calendar sense' but on the basis of 'the
equities involved' j; New West Corp. v. NYM Co., 595 F.2d 1194, 1200,202 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 643, 648
(9th Cir. 1979) (stating "the totality of [one's] prior actions, taken together, [can] establish a right to use
the trade-mark.).
197 349 F. Supp. 255, 176 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
" Id at 260 (noting that actual sale was not required; here the plaintiff had begun solicitation with
the mark and sample plates at a time that the defendant had been actually using the mark); MCCARTHY,
supra note 2, S 16:13.
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to its promotion and sales solicitation, which took place before defendant
issued and sold a "preview edition." 1"
Other cases have held that a use of the mark analogous to trademark
use-i.e., in a manner intended to create an association in the mind of the
relevant purchasing public between the mark, the goods to be offered, and
a single source-is sufficient to establish common law use.2sO Pre-sale
"analogous use" of the mark is established by conduct such as publicity in
advertising brochures, catalogs, newspaper ads, and articles in newspapers
and trade publications,"' or even by the placement of a sign on a
construction site.' "The 'talismanic test' is whether the mark was used 'in
a way sufficiently public to identify or distinguish the marked goods in an
appropriate segment of the public mind as those of the adopter of the
mark.' "203 Thus, the court in Housing & Services, Inc. v, Minton, the case

concerning "Minton's Playhouse," held that promotional activities, the
erection of a neon sign, plus substantial coverage in the print media were
sufficient to establish such prior use.2 Although U.S. law burdens business
entrepreneurs with uncertainty as to their ownership status in the pre-sale

19 New West Corp., 595 F.2d 1194; See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, 5 16:13 (pointing out that one

should add that the plaintiff had rushed the market with its 'preview edition" for the sole purpose of
preempting defendant's subsequent sales).
I T.A.B. Systems v. Pactel Teletrac, 77 F.3d 1372, 1374, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1879,1881 (Fed. Cr.
1996) (involving the opposition to the registration of the mark "TELETRAK*; the issue was whether the
opposing party, Pactel Teletrac, had used the mark analogous to service mark use prior to the applicant's,
T.A.B.'s, claimed priority date); American Stock Exc., Inc. v. American Express Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
356, 363 (T.T.A.B. 1980) (Dit is settled that use of a mark in a manner analogous to trademark use, such
as use in advertising, use as a grade mark, use as a salient or distinguishing feature of a trade name, use of
an acronym or of the initial letters of a corporate, etc., may be considered in computing the length of use
for determining ownership of a mark.").
m' T.A.R Systems, 77 F.3d at 1375.
' Liqwacon Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 305, 309 ('1T.A.B. 1979);
seeHousing & Serv., Inc. v. Minton, No. 97 Civ. 2725 (SHS), 1997 WL 349949 (S.D.N.Y.June 24, 1997).
This case involved the plaintiff's efforts to reopen the famous jazz club -Minton's Playhouse" in Harlem
New York. The issue was whether the plaintiff had demonstrated a bona fide commercial use of the mark
prior to any such use by defendant, Kevin Minton, the nephew of the founder of the original 'Minton's
Playhouse.' The court held that the plaintiff's promotional activities established sufficient use for
purposes of an injunction against defendant.
mnHousing &Serices,Inc., 1997 WL 349949, at *4.
I
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phase,"' court rulings express an understanding that deviates from the
traditional understanding of the role of trademarks.
Another legal concept grants ownership rights to the interested party
solely on the grounds that the public has come to associate the mark with the
owner, although the party has not used the mark itself."2 This deviation,
however, although de-emphasizing the use requirement, does not deemphasize the consumer confusion policy. On the contrary, it stresses

in See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1052,
50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1555-56 (9th Cir. 1999) (use of "moviebuff.com" in e-mail correspondence
with lawyers and customers did not establish priority as this was not "[use in a way sufficiently public
to identify or distinguish the marked goods in an appropriate segment of the public mind as those of the
adopter of the mark."); Allard Enter., Inc. v. Advanced Programming Resources, Inc., 146 F.3d 350, 46
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (6th Cir. 1998) (defendant's word of mouth or relationship marketing could be
considered genuine use of the mark in commerce); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. CarMax, Inc., 165 F.3d
1047, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1507 (6th Cir. 1999) (the use of the trade name in radio advertisements did
not demonstrate the consistent and continuous use necessary to establish a senior right); Buti v. Perosa,
S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98,45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1985 (2nd Cir. 1998) (mere advertising for a promotion of a
mark is insufficient to constitute use of the mark in commerce within the meaning of the Lanham Act).
' See Univ. Book Store v. Univ. of Wisconsin Bd. of Regents, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385,1392 n.21
(T.T.A.B. 1994) (involving a dispute between the University of Wisconsin and the University Book Store,
which opposed the University's registration of various badger marks). In this case, the court disposed of
the argument that the University was not the first to adopt and use the marks by stating, "an entity may
have 'a protectable property right in [a] term even if the company itself has made no use of the term'
provided that the public has come to associate the term with the entity or its goods or services." Id See
American Stock Exch., Inc. v. Am. Express Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 356, 364 (T.T.A.B. 1980) (in
assessing priority of use of the term "AMEX" between American Express and the American Stock
Exchange, the court noted that
where the public has come to associate a term with aparticular company and/or its
goods or services as a result, for example, of use of the term in the trade and by the
news media, that company has a protectable property right in the term even if the
company itself has made no use of the term);
Coca-Cob Co. v. Busch, 44 F. Supp. 405,52 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 377 (E.D.Pa. 1942) (granting Coca-Cola the
ownership right in 'Coke" although the company itself had never used the mark on its product); National
Cable Television Ass'n v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572,1577-78,19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1424,
1428 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (in assessing whether sufficient use of the mark "ACE" had been made, the court
stated that "[sluch public use by others inures to the claimant's benefit and, where this occurs, public use
can reasonably be deemed use 'by' that party in the sense of a use on its behalf"); Harley-Davidson, Inc.
v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 812, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1458, 1462 (2nd Cir. 1999) (involving the term
"Hog" for motorcycles, the Second Circuit rejected the argument that Harley-Davidson could claim
proprietory rights in the term because " 'hog' was a generic term in the language as applied to large
motorcycles before the public (or at least some segments of it) began using the word to refer to HarleyDavidson motorcycles"); see also National Cable Television Ass'n., 937 F.2d at 1578 (finding that "[pirior
public identification of petitioner with the name ACE for awards from use analogous to service mark
usage is sufficient ground for cancellation"); T.A.B. Systems v. Pactel Teletrac, 77 F.3d 1372, 1375, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1879, 1881-82 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that the concepts do overlap as far as the
potential mark owner's use and public's perception lead to the conclusion of ownership).
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consumer perceptions by granting ownership merely because of public
associations. Judge Posner's ruling in Illinois High School Ass'n v. GTE
Vantage" however, seems to run afoul of the consumer protection policy by
implying that the plaintiff, as well as the defendant, is entitled to use the
term "March Madness" to designate each party's respective services2 te

Posner held that although the term "March Madness" originated with the
Illinois High School Association's annual state high school basketball
tournament, the public associated it with the National Collegiate Athletic
Association's men's basketball tournament. Although he did not address the
scope of the parties' respective rights, he did allow "dual use" or concurrent
use by both parties."° Such a "dual use" concept effectively weakens the
consumer confusion rationale because it implies that a mark is used by more
than one unrelated entity. 1
f Trademark Law Treaty. My final point regarding the deviations
allowed by U.S. law relates to the Trademark Law Treaty (TLT). Although
the adoption of the TLT"' supposedly required only minor adjustments to
U.S. trademark law,"' some requirements of the TLT seem to de-emphasize

27

99 F.3d 244,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1633 (7th Cir. 1996).

1' See Joseph E. Washington, 7he Impact of PublicandMedia Use On TrademarkRights:An Analysis
ofIllinois High School Assn v. GTE Vantage Inc. and "dualuse"Terms, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 605,607-12

(1999) (discussing IllinoisHig, ScboolAss'n).
'"Idat 609-10.
210Id
21, Work on the Trademark Law Treaty (11T) began in 1987 under the supervision of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Although the project originally aimed at harmonizing
procedural as well as substantive trademark protection requirements, this ambitious goal had to be
adjusted in the course of the negotiations. When the TLT subsequently opened for signature in 1994, its
proclaimed aim was to make national and regional trademark registration systems more user friendly.
World Intellectual Property Organization, Trademark Law Treaty (TLT7) 1994 (visited Aug. 16, 1999)
< http://www.wipo.org/eng/main.htm >. This goal is accomplished through alist of maximum formal
requirements that may be imposed on applicants and another list of prohibited formal requirements. See
Leafier, supra note 74, at 20.21 (describing the formal requirements); FEZER, supra note 9, Int. MarkenR
cmt. nos. 13-14 (describing the formal requirements). The TLT, furthermore, contains provisions
regarding formalities in the post-registration stage and when renewals are sought. WIPO, TrademarkLaw
Trmty ("TLT') 1994 (visited August 16,1999) < http://www.wipo.org/eng/main.htm >; See Leaffer, supra
note 74, at 21. In December of 1998, 22 countries were party to the treaty. See WIPO, Contracting
PartiesofTreaties Administeredby W7PO, (visited August 16,1999) < http://www.wipo.org/eng/main.
htm > for the status of ratification and accession on July 13, 1999. The US. signed the Trademark Law
Treaty Implementation Act into law on October 30,1998; this act implements U.S. accession to the TLT.
11/12/1998 PTD d3, Legislation: TrademarkLaw Treaty Bill Receives President'sSignature.
'u 6/11/1999 PT) d3, Trademarks:HearingConsiderRuleAmendmentProposalforTrademarkLaw
Treaty Implementation; 11/12/1998 PTD d3, Legislation:Trademark Law Treaty Bill Receives President's
Signature,10/1/1998 PTD d2, Legislation:SenatePasses TrademarkTreatyAct with TealmicalAmendments
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the use requirement. 2" Generally, registered trademarks are of infinite
duration if the trademark owner initiates the required renewal procedure. 1 4
The obvious purpose of the renewal requirement is to eliminate "deadwood"
from the register. 215 TLT article 13 prohibits requiring the proof of use, i.e.,
an affidavit of use, which used to be a prerequisite for the renewal of a
registration in the U.S. 216 The U.S., however, did not eliminate this
"affidavit of use" requirement altogether. U.S. law requires trademark
owners to file an "affidavit of continued use" during the fifth year of
registration. 27 The TLT does not formally prevent contracting parties from
imposing such a requirement. Its proscription extends only to a renewal
procedure after ten years of registration. Thus, the Trademark Law Treaty
Implementation Act formally complies with the TLT's proscription by
eliminating the "affidavit of use" requirement for the renewal of
registrations.21' At the same time, however, this Act imposes a new "affidavit
of use" requirement after ten years of registration as part of a general periodic
filing scheme. 21' Thus, the requirement of eliminating proof of use as a
condition of renewal is circumvented without formally violating the TLT' 0
and without deviating from the use requirement.
A look at the TLT discloses another provision that seems to weaken the
notion of use as a prerequisite to protection. Article 3(7)(ii) of the TLT
prohibits countries from requiring applicants to prove the existence of a
business establishment before the respective Trademark Offices grant a
registration."' The Lanham Act does not explicitly require the existence of

Bll Attaced.
2" Port, supra note 68, at 38-40.
214 E-g., Lanham Act

55 8,9, 15 U.S.C. SS 1058, 1059 (1998) (amended by Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113

Stat. 1501 (1999)); German Trademark Act 5 47; UK Trade Marks Act of 1994 SS 42, 43; FEZER, supra
note 9, 5 47 cnt. no. 1. TRIPS Art. 18 requires a minimum duration of seven years.
211 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 19:142.
I .l at S 19:142.1.
21 Lanham Act S 8, 15 U.S.C. S 1058 (1998) (amended by Pub. L. No. 106-113, 1313 Stat. 1501).
211Lanham Act 5 9,15 U.S.C. 5 1059 (1998) (amended by Pub. L. No. 106113,113 Stat. 1501 (1999)).
2.9 Lanham Act S 8 (a)(3), 15 U.S.C. S 1058(a)(3) (1998) (amended by Pub. L. No. 106-113,113 Stat.
1501 (1999)); MCCARTHY, supra note 2, 5 19:142.1.
n MCCARTHY, supra note 2, 5 19:142.1; Port, supra note 68, at 41.
22 TLT Art. 3(7), in relevant part reads,
No Contracting Party may demand that requirements other than those referred to
in paragraphs (1) to (4) and (6) be complied with in respect of the application. In
particular, the following must not be required in respect of the application

throughout its pendency:
[...
] (ii) an indication of the applicant's carrying on of an industrial or commercial
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a business establishment. However, U.S. trademark law requires use or
intent-to-use as a prerequisite to receiving trademark rights, both of which
are permissible requirements under the TLT.m The use/1TU requirement
undermines the possibility of separability of the business establishment from
the mark. The existence of a business establishment is inherent to
commercial use. Requiring that a mark be used before it is protected is
tantamount to requiring the existence of a business establishment.22
Notwithstanding this conclusion, the relevant provision of the TLT
expresses a notion corresponding to the German understanding of a
trademark as a right existing in the interest of the respective owner. This
notion corresponds with the overall aim of the TLT, which is to facilitate
registration by making the process more user friendly."
Although the changes required for U.S. law by the TLT might have been
minor and without practical effect, the U.S.'s adherence to the treaty is a sign
of a shift from treating trademarks as consumer protection devices to treating
trademarks as rights for the sake of the owner.

5. Concerns with Registration System.

Although the common law

tradition might be the reason for the initial introduction of the use-based
system in the U.S., this alone does not explain the adherence to this system.
If the deviations outlined above are necessary developments that take
modem business practices and needs into account, the question of why a usebased system should be maintained becomes ever more pertinent.
A more fundamental concern with the registration-based system, aside
from the constitutional matter, is its conferral of exclusive rights to a mark
that does not serve the main function of distinguishing products in the
marketplace. These marks do not represent the good will of the holder; thus
they do not indicate origin and cannot serve to prevent customer confusion.
Why is there a reluctance to confer trademark rights, if they are not
essential to prevent consumer confusion? While the repugnance of allowing

activity, as well as the furnishing of evidence to that effect."
" TLT Art. 3()(a)(xvii), (b).
S discussion infra text accompanying notes 290-300 (discussing concerns with separability of good
See
will and business establishment).
" See WIPO, Trademark Law Treaty ('TLT ) 1994 (visited August 16, 1999) < http://www.wipo.
org/eng/main.htm> ("The aim of the TLT is to make national and regional trademark registration
systems more user friendly. This is achieved through the simplification and harmonization of procedures
and through removing pitfalls, thus making the procedure safe for the owners of marks and their
represeatatives.").
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monopolies to exist might be a viable cultural justification, this alone should
not satisfy the curious lawyer trained under the civil law system.
The predominant concern is not so much the fact that trademarks might
have anti-competitive effects. Some commentators claim that consumer
susceptibility to suggestive advertising restrains competition over goods
themselves. 22 However, trademarks in the U.S. are generally considered
beneficial because they reduce consumer search costsn 6 and encourage the
production of quality products,"2 while not producing significant deadweight
costs on the consumer. Economists reject the antitrust monopoly analysis
with regard to trademarks. 22 This rejection constitutes the main difference
between the trademark right and the patent and copyright monopolies. 1 9
In 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that trademarks promote
competition.23 The German and the European understanding of the benefits
inherent to trademarks is similar."
This understanding does not lead to the conclusion that a registration
system is just as efficient as a use-based system or vice versa. Landes and
Posner, in their much quoted article on the economics of trademarks,
discussed the economic efficiency of the acquisition of trademarks. A "first
possession rule," i e., a use-based system, minimizes rent seeking costs. While
a registration system might draw resources into the creation of trademarks

Klieger, supra note 22, at 856-60; Davis, supra note 101, at 244-45.
z' William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. &
22

ECON. 265 (1987). Landes and Posner illustrate this point by hypothesizing a consumer eager to purchase

decaffeinated coffee made by General Foods.
If General Foods brand had no name, then to order it in a restaurant or grocery store
you would have to ask for 'the decaffeinated coffee made by General Foods.' This
takes longer to say, requires you to remember more, and requires the waiter or clerk
to read and remember more than if you can just ask for 'Sanka.'
1, at 268-69; see also Roger E. Meiners & Robert J. Staaf, Patents,Copyrights, and Trademarks:Property
orMonopoly?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 911, 931 (1990) (stating that the qualities of many products
cannot be determined without looking at the purchase price).
2 McCARTHY, supra note 2, at 5 2.05(2) (describing the monopoly theory as a 'misnomer.*). But
see Carter, supra note 147, at 768 (rejecting a registration system on grounds of the language exclusivity
argument).
2n Landes & Posner, supra note 226, at 275-80.
's For this reason Art. I, S 8 of the U.S. Constitution secures these monopolies for only a limited
time. See, ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE

125-26 (1997) (describing the origin of patents and copyrights in the U.S.).
' Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193, 198, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 327,
329,331 (1985).
2" BVerfGE 51, 193; FEZER, supra note 9, cmt. nos. 18-21.
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beyond the optimal level of such an investment.2 32 In addition to this,
Landes and Posner state that a use-based system induces enforcement costs
only where the trademark is likely to yield the net social benefits associated
with trademarks."
Another argument in favor of the use-based system claims that it is
inefficient to confer rights in words without prior use. This view suggests
that some words are better than others for the purposes of labeling goods 234
and that firms that choose more descriptive or suggestive marks face lower
entry costs and lower long-run costs. If this is so, the conclusion that a
registration system gives the clever entrepreneur an undue advantage on a
first-come-first-served basis has some ground. Although this presumption is
questionable,3 5 it remains clear that a strict reservation system "would
frustrate another's legitimate wish to use that mark or a similar one, and
furthermore vest the registrant with substantial rights of no justifiable
236
basis."
Additionally, a pure registration system, without safeguards, enables third
parties to register marks for the mere purpose of capitalizing on other
companies' legitimate interest in such a mark."'7
6. SafeguardsunderGerman Law-Obligationto Use. The German system
of trademark protection acknowledges these concerns. It is therefore
axiomatic for German trademark law that marks must be used in compliance

Landes & Posner, supra note 226, at 281.
M 1iat 282.
z34
Carter,supranote 147,at768-75; Susannah Hart, DevelopingNewBrandNames, in BRANDS,THE
"'

NEW WEALTH CREATORS 34,42-45 (SusannahHart &John Murphy eds.,
1998) (discouragingthe choice

of descriptive names as trademarks because they are less protectable, but suggesting the choice of

associative terms).

23s Landes & Posner, supra note 226, at 289-90; Carter, supra note 147, at 771; Parker, supra note 106,
at 338, (stating:
First, the idea that companies reserve trademarks for anticompetitive reasons

presumes that there are a finite number of "good* trademarks. This seems far from
dear. For example, would IBM have bothered to reserve the mark APPLE for
personal computers? Even if it did, an arbitrary mark like APPLE had no particular
value in connection with computers prior to its use. As a matter of logic, it seems
probable that the marks that are most susceptible to being reserved for
anticompetitive purposes would tend to be descriptive marks that have informational
or advertising value to competitors.);
see Coca-Cola Co.v.Old Dominion Beverage Corp., 271 F.600,604 (4th Cir. 1921)(enjoiningdefendants

from using the word 'Taka-Coa" and stating, 'Plaintiff's
rights are limited to at the most to two words.
All the rest
of infinity isopen to defendant.").
Pickering, supra note 13, at14.

Seeinfra S M.A.6.b.(discussing bad faith application); Classe E, OLG Frankfurt, GRUR 1998,704.
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with their function.3 The so-called "obligation to use"2 9 a mark was
introduced into German law as early as 1967."' The introduction was
supposed to serve several purposes. The register241 was overloaded and the
Patent Office had to deal with more and more applications, which led to an
increase in oppositions. This increased activity triggered the need for relief
to both the Patent Office and the Federal Patent Court 42 and also made it
necessary to restrict the registration of defensive marks 243 and the
warehousing of marks.2 " Thus, marks would be protected only if someone
might use them.2 4 At the same time the use requirement would enhance the
opportunities for businesses to obtain new trademarks. 2* Today, section 25
of the Trademark Act contains the basic provision, which constitutes the
obligation to use marks. It is an obligation only insofar as it prevents the
proprietor from enforcing his trademark rights if he does not use the
trademark within five years of registration. 247 Further, any person has
' BT-Drucks., Begrfindung zum Markengesetz, supra note 48, at 82; FEZER, supra note 9, Vorb. S
25 note 1; Miriam Kellerhals, Der Benxtzungszurng im Gemeinschaftsmarkenrecht,GRUR Int. 1999, 14.
z"In German, Benutzungszwang.
2,Gesetz zur Anderung des Patentgesetzes, des Warenzeichengesetzes und weiterer Gesetze V.4.
September 1967 (BGBI. 11967, 953 and BGBI. I 1968, 29) (also known as "Vorabgesetz'); FEZER, DEfR

BENUTZUNGSZWANG IMMARKERECHT, 15 (1974).
241In those days the register was referred to as "Zeicbenrole."
2 The German Federal Patent Court is called Bundespatentgericht;it is the Court of first Appeal in
registration proceedings. See FEZER, supra note 240, at 16 (claiming that this increase in activity was the
main purpose for imposing the "obligation to use"). But see INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, 5 26 cmt.
no. 9 (questioning the increased activity rationale as multiple registrations occur just as well under the
.obligation to use' system).
24 Defensive marks are called Defensivmarken. These are marks that are registered, not for purposes
of later use, but rather for the mere protection of a main mark against the use of simila marks. In
comparison to 'warehousing," these marks are not meant to be used at any point. ADOLF BAUMBACH
& WOLFGANG HEFERMEIL, WARENZEICHENRECHT, SI cmt. no. 50 (1985); FEZER, supra note 240, at
16.
244RUDOLF BUSSE, WARENzEiCHENGESETz, Einl. cmt. no. 13, S 5 cmt. no. 44 (1976); Kellerhals,
supra note 238, at 14; INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, S 26 cmt. no. 7.
'sFEZER, supra note 240, at 16.
24 INGERL & ROHNxE, supra note 9,S 26 cmt. no. 8; Cirkulin, BGH GRUR 1997,747 (749). The
Court additionally mentioned the origin function as a rationale for the obligation to use. The authority
referred to by the Supreme Court, however, concerns the old German Trademark law.
14' German Trademark Act, supra note 1, S25. The German Trademark Act, in relevant part, reads:
Exclusion of Claims because of Insufficient Use
(1)The proprietor of a registered trademark cannot assert any claims against third
parties within the meaning of Sections 14, 18 and 19, if the trademark has not been
used pursuant to Section 26 within the last five years prior to the assertion of the
claim for the goods or services cited by him to substantiate his claim, provided, that
the trademark has been registered for a period of at least five years on this date.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2000

41

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 2

. INTELL. PROP.L.

[Vol. 7:227

standing to seek legal action for cancellation of a mark that has not been
used.2 This provision, which eliminates deadwood from the register, serves
the public interest"29 and minimizes the number of possible conflicts between
existing marks.2"
Section 26 of the Trademark Act stipulates the type of uses that are
sufficient for purposes of the use obligation. The Trademark Act explicitly
allows use by third parties with the consent of the proprietor and uses of the
mark in a different form, as long as the differences do not alter the distinctive
natre of the mark. ' Importantly, the trademark owner is obliged to put
the mark to genuine use; sham uses will not suffice to fulfill the use
requirement.5 2 The Supreme Court, Bundesgerichtshof(BGI-1),has frequently
held that the decisive question is whether the claimed use is economically
reasonable. Courts take a global approach, taking into account the overall

2'1 German Trademark Act, supra note 1, at SS 49(1), 55(1), (2) Nr.1 (Popularkiage"); BT-Drucks.,
Begriindung zum Markengesetz, supra note 48, at 98. There is some dispute among German scholars
about whether such a "quivis ex popuo" isjustified in cases where the cancelled mark could not be used
by third parties anyway and whether foreigners without a commercial link to Germany should be entitled
to commence such an action. See INGERL & ROHNKE, supranote 9, S 55 cmt. no. 5 (in favor of general
standing). But see FEZER, supra note 9, S 55 cmt. nos. 4-5 (taking a more restrictive position).
24 INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, S 55 cmt. no. 5; FEZER, supra note 9, S 55 cmt. no. 4.
' INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, S 26 cmt. no. 8; see also RALF HACKBARTH, GRUNDFRAGEN
DES BENUTzUNGSZWANGEs uA GEMEINSCHAFTSmARKENRECHT, 2-4 (1992) (concerning the EU
Community Trademark; Hackbarth emphasizes that there was hardly any other provision whose
adoption was so undisputed as the one regarding the obligation to use a mark).
251German Trademark Act, supra note 1, S 26. This section of the German Trademark Act reads:
(1) Insofar as the assertion of claims resulting from a registered trade mark or the
maintenance of the registration depends on the fact that the trade mark has been used,
it must have been used genuinely by the proprietor in the Federal Republic of
Germany in connection with the goods or services in respect of which it isregistered,
unless there are proper reasons for non-use.
(2) Use of the trademark with the consent of the proprietor shall be deemed to
constitute use by the proprietor.
(3) The use of the trade mark in a form differing from the form in which it was
registered shall also constitute use of a registered trade mark, provided that the
differences do not alter the distinctive nature of the trade mark. Sentence 1 shall also
apply if the trade mark is also registered in the form in which it has been used.
m See BT-Drucks., Begrundung zum Markengesetz, supra note 48, at 83 (avoiding dummy uses isthe
explicit purpose ofthe 'genuine use" requirement); Old German Trademark Act, Warenzeichengesetz v.5.
Mai 1936 (RGBl. 11 S. 134 and BGBI. I S. 29, BGB1. M14 No. 423-1) (as amended) (not explicitly requiring
"genuine use'; the interpretation of the use requirement was left to the courts and the courts did require
genuine use); BAUMBACH &HEFEPMEHL, supra note 243, S11 cmt. nos. 49-50 (for the same proposition);
FEZER, supra note 9, S11 cmt. no. 31 (for the same proposition).
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circumstances of the case such as the manner, extent, and duration of use."'
Thus, in Darcy" the Supreme Court held that small sales of cigarettes
(between 35,000 and 137,000 cigarettes per year from 1974 to 1980) to
members of the Belgium armed forces who were stationed in Germany were
sufficient to establish use. The BGH reasoned that it made economic sense
to supply this customer group with the brand they were accustomed to in
order to prevent a switch to other brands."' In another case involving
cigarettes, King II, the registrant brought sales of 50,000 cigarettes in 1975
down to 20,000 in 1977 and subsequent years. In this case, the same court
found that a supply for three smokers, smoking an average of twenty
cigarettes a day, was not sufficient to establish an economically sensible use,
as opposed to a mere pro forma use, for purposes of maintaining the
registered rights.
The juxtaposition of these two cases exemplifies what courts are looking
for in the use assessment. The overall circumstances are decisive; therefore
a minimal use can be balanced out by special circumstances, as occurred in

Darcy.
A registrant may justify non-use with appropriate reasons. Such reasons
include circumstances beyond the control of the owner, such as acts of God,
natural disasters, import or export restrictions, war, or consequences of
war.2 ' The Supreme Court, in the 1997 Cirkulin decision, held that an
agreement barring the trademark owner from using the mark in the required
way does not constitute a viable justification for non-use. 2 7 The plaintiff,
who was using the registered mark "Zirkulin" for a blood-cleansing specimen
and garlic pills, was seeking cancellation of defendant's "Cirkulin" mark.
The defendant had registered this mark for blood-cleansing tea. In an
agreement between the parties, which had been concluded by their respective
predecessors more than sixty years earlier, the defendant had committed
himself to using the mark "Cirkulin" on licensed preparations only. Thus,
253 Darcy,

BGH NJW 1986, 3138 (3139), translated in 18 I.I.C. 275, 277-78 (1987) (including a

comment by Gerhard Heil, Presiding Judge of the Federal Patent Court); King IU,BGH NJW 1986, 3139
(3140); Topfitz/topfit, BGH NJW 1985, 2762 (2763).
254Darcy, BGH NJW 1986, 3138, translatedin 18 I.I.C. 275 (1987).
2" Darcy, BGH NJW 1986, 3138 (3139), translatedin 18 I.I.C. 275,277-78 (1987).
256 Cirkulin, BGHGRUR 1997,747 (749); WERNERALTRAMMERET AL., MAmKENGESEmZ, 5 26 cmt.
no. 34 (1997).
z Cirkulin, BGH GRUR 1997, 747 (749); see Annual Review: A The Sixth Annual International
ReviewofTrademarkJurisprudence,89 TRADEMARKREP. 309,326-27 (1999) (detailing the findings of the
German Supreme Court in Cirkulin).
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it had not used the mark for the registered blood-cleansing tea. The Court
did not accept the agreement between the parties as a sufficient ground for
justifiable non-use.2 5 The Court held the registered mark to be a mere
defensive mark, which had to be cancelled because it blocked the register and
barred competitors from using the mark or registering it themselves." 9
The "obligation to use" provision is one of the compulsory regulations
required by the EU Directive." Thus, there is an understanding among
Member States that such a provision is essential to the protection of
trademarks.'
Although trademarks in Germany are property rights and
one of their main purposes is to guarantee the right of the owner, their scope
is not as unlimited as this safeguard provision suggests.
The need for such a provision under German law was heightened by the
Trade Mark Act of 1995, which did away with the requirement of the
existence of a business establishment as a prerequisite to registration. 262 Until
then, only businesses could register marks. Now natural persons are entitled
to the same protection. This shift has implications for mark designers,
holding companies, and advertising agencies who might be interested in

25 The court was applying the old German trademark statute. See Warenzeichengesetz SI1 (1)No.4
(1989) (allowing non-use if the use of the mark was "unreasonable" ("unzumutbar")). The new law does
not contain such strong language by allowing "proper reasons" ('berecbhtigte Grfnde") as an excuse for nonuse. However, this change in language was not intended to change the legal analysis. See FEZER, supranote
9, S 26 cmt. nos. 40-41 (explaining the effect of the new langugae); INGERL & ROHNE, supra note 9, S
26 cmnt. no. 120 (explaining the effect of the new language).
"' Cirkulin, BGH GRUR 1997, 747 (749).
" Council Directive, supra note 7, Art. 10. All Member States have converted the Council Directive
into national laws that contain corresponding provisions. See FEZER, supra note 9, Vorbemerkung S25
cmt. no. 9. The Council Regulation on the Community Trade Mark, Art. 15 contains an identical
provision with regard to the Community trademark. Council Regulation 40/94 of 20 December 1993
[hereinafter Council Regulation].
261 See the preamble to Council Regulation, supra note 260, on the Community Trade Mark 5 (9)
("Whereas there is no justification for protecting Community trademarks or, as against them, any trade
mark which has been registered before them, except where the trade marks are actually used.").
26 German Trademark Act, supra note 1, 5 7 (reads:
Proprietorship
Proprietors of registered trade marks and of trade marks applied for may be:
natural persons,
legal persons, or
partnerships provided that they have been vested with the ability to acquire rights
and to assume obligations);
See INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, S 26 cnt. no. 8 (pointing to the change in the law).
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registering marks but are not interested in using the marks on their own
2 63
goods.
a. No Intent-To-Use Requirement. German trademark law does not
contain an intent to use requirement comparable to that found in U.S. law.
German scholars are in disagreement about whether the law should require
the registrant to have such an intent to use the mark.2M Under the old law,
this intent had to be present with regard to the use as a trademark. The new
law enables registration by holding companies and natural persons without
the existence of a business establishment. 26' The law might require only a
general intent that the mark be used in conjunction with a business at a given
point, if it requires such an intent at all. 26 It is, however, legitimate to
conclude that the new law requires a mark to have the ability to distinguish
goods of different enterprises without any further subjective requirements.2 67
Accordingly, the German Patent and Trademark Office does not investigate
the intentions of applicants. Therefore, as a practical matter, there is no
intention to use requirement that functions as a safeguard against the
warehousing of marks in German trademark law.
b. BadFaithApplications. A viable safeguard may be located in section
50 (1) No. 4 of the German Trademark Act, which enables the cancellation
of trademarks if the applicant acted in bad faith in filing the application.268
The scope of this provision remains unresolved. The absence of an
underlying business establishment cannot alone trigger this nullity
provision. 269 Instead, it means to act as a counterweight to the introduction
of the principle of separability of the mark from the business

26

For further implications of this change see infra. SlI.A.6.a-c.

264FEZER, supra note 9, S 3 cmt. nos. 78, 170 (arguing that this follows the nature of marks as source

identifiers). But see INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, S 3 cmt. no. 11 (arguing that it is not the German
Patent and Trademark Office's responsibility to investigate a registrant's intent as the law applies an
objective standard as to the registration of a mark). See ahso ALTHAMMER & STR6BELE, supra note 256,
S 32 cmt. no. 29 (appearing vague on the subject).
26sGerman Trademark Act, supra note 1, S7; see supra note 262 (quoting this portion of the German
Trademark Act).
266See FEZER, supra note 9, S3 cant. no. 78 (in support of this proposition); Classe E,OLG Frankfurt,
GRUR (1998) 704,705 (citing Fezer approvingly).
2" INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, S 3 cmt. no. 11.
26

AUFENANGER & BARTH, supra note 1, S 3; Council Directive, supra note 7, Art. 3 No.2 (d)

(opening up the option for such a provision).
26 FEZER, supra note 9, S 50 cant. no. 30; INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, S 50 cmt. no. 9;
ALTHAwMR & STROBELE, supra note 256, S 50 cmt. no. 7.
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establishment,"O applicable in cases of abuse of legal rights or violation of
moralityY' These concepts of law are subject to interpretation by the
courts.

2z

However, these provisions alone will not prevent warehousing. Some
additional element must be present to make the registration immoral or
abusive in the relevant case. This situation was illustrated in the Mercedes
decision, issued by the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt. 27' A private
party 2 4 registered the term "Classe E" with the German Patent and
Trademark Office and in several other countries. Mercedes Benz AG formed
an agreement with the registrant regarding his registrations in Switzerland
276
and France 27 in order to issue its latest model under the mark "E-Klasse."
Mercedes was not prepared to pay an additional licensing fee for the rights
in Germany and challenged the registration. The Higher Regional Court
held the registration to be abusive. The court distinguished this case from
the registrations sought by advertising agencies and designers of marks,
observing that those groups are pursuing legitimate purposes under the
German Trademark Act. Conversely, the registrant in Mercedes had
registered marks for a number of goods for the purpose of holding the marks
against third parties for pecuniary benefit, without intending to use them for
his or her own business establishment or in conjunction with a broader
The German Trademark
advisory service for other businesses. 2r
Association, a voluntary association of prominent owners of trademarks

' BT-Drucks., Begruindung zum Markengesetz, supranote 48, at 95-96; FEZER, supra note 9,S50 cmt.
no. 30.
:' BT-Drucks., Begriindung zum Markengesetz, supra note 48, at 95.
m The interpretation of section 1 of the Law Against Unfair Trade Practices, which was applicable
under the old system, gives helpful guidance for this purpose. See FEZER, supra note 9, S 50 cmt. no. 29;
INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, S50 cmt. nos. 8, 10ff (for overview of interpretations issued by courts).
V3 Classe E, OLG Frankfurt, GRUR 1998, 704 (affirmed by Urteil vom. 23. November 2000-1 2R
93/98).
' The registrant's name is Ulrich Schele, and he enjoys a reputation comparable to that of the socalled domain name squatter Dennis Toeppen in the U.S.
' Mercedes paid approximately 200,000 German Marks to obtain the rights in France and
Switzerland. Classe E, OLG Frankfurt, GRUR 1998, 704; see Mercedes siegt im Namensstreit,
FRANKFURTER ALLGEME]NE ZEITUNG, June 27, 1996, at 22.
276 See Daimler Benz erteidigt "E-Klasse," LEBENRSnrEL ZErrUNG, November 21, 1997, at 30 (for

summary of the facts of the case).
v7 Classe E, OLG Frankfurt, GRUR 1998, 704, 705 so-called "Hinterhaksmarke."
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from different industries, welcomed the decision."' In sum, this case
illustrates that the German Trademark Act offers means for preventing
registration of marks for exploitative purposes. It will be interesting to see
whether the courts will vigorously protect against trademark "squatters" in
cases where the immoral intent is not as obvious as it was in Mercedes.'"
Another potential safeguard against warehoused marks is that the
examination procedure lacks a confusion inquiry. If a prior registrant does
not enforce his rights, at some point his claims will be limited by
consequence of acquiescence,"O as described in section 21 of the German
Trademark Act. Additionally, section 49 of the Act makes the senior
registrant's mark liable to revocation if the mark has not been used within
five years.
c. Evaluation. What is left of the concerns expressed under U.S. law?
The concern that unnecessary "rent-seeking costs" will occur is somewhat
weakened by the 5-year safeguard provision.
Although unnecessary costs might occur under the registration systems,
such costs will be minimal. The benefits a business accrues in launching a
product will outweigh the costs of un-necessary lawsuits. In addition, there
are also costs which are inherent to the use-based system that tend to tip the
efficiency scale in favor of a registration system. Registers give an accurate
account of trademarks subject to ownership interests"' and make costly
searches of common law sources obsolete. 22 The ITU system, as practiced
in the U.S. with periodical re-filing requirements, also creates costs which do
not occur in a registration system. The Mercedes case demonstrates that there
27 SeeWOLFGANGHEFERMEHL&ADOLFBAUMBAcH, WETrBEWERBRECHT,EinLUWGcmt.no.

35 (1996) (Discussing Markenverband [translation] (hereinafter BAuMBACH&HEERMEHL]; Mercedessiegt
im Namensstreit, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEiNE ZEITuNG, June 27, 1996, at 22; "E-Klasse" bleibt bei
DaimlerBenz, LEBENSMWTTEL ZEnTUNG, Nov. 14, 1997, at 28.
'" Schele tried to argue that he did not know about Mercedes' plans to introduce the mark 'E-Klasse"

and that he intended to settle down as amark designer. He registered more than 50 terms for the purpose
of selling them. See Classe E, OLG Frankfurt, GRUR 1998,704, 705 (rejecting that argument). In less
obvious cases courts might buy this reasoning; the famous mark designer Manfred Gotta had taken legal
steps against Schele because of his presumptuous statements. See Markenstreit; Unter PiratenFoCUS
MAGAZIN, Jan. 15, 1996, at 165; Ein Markenerfinderfabtn Mercedes an den Wagen, SODDEUTSCHE
ZEITUNG, Jan. 15, 1996, Wirtschaft.
21 German Trademark Act, supranote 1,S21 (the limitation will typically be effective after afive year
period of acquiescence).
nLLandes & Posner, supra note 226, at 281-82; Parker, supra note 106, at 327-28.
Common law sources include phone books, local directories, state trademark registers, yellow
pages etc. Although the alleged obsolescence is only partially true, as in the U.S., even a registration
system would have to rely on common law sources with regard to already established rights.
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might still be enforcement costs that would not occur in a plain use-based
system. But this case occurred in the testing of a new law, when the scope
of the law was not yet clear." 3 Precedents such as the Mercedes case should
reduce abusive conduct in the future.
The -argument that some marks are better than others and therefore
should not be warehoused is only applicable to suggestive, not descriptive,
marks. 84 Neither the Lanham Act nor the German Trade Mark Act allows
the registration of descriptive marks without a showing of secondary
meaning."8 If one follows the argument that suggestive marks are "better
than" arbitrary or fanciful marks, there can be genuine concern about
warehousing. Yet, if some marks are better than others, it will take
investment to find out which are the superior marks. It is also likely that
these marks will be used, and not warehoused, because-their "creation" costs
86
money.
One should not forget that the "word monopoly" conferred by a
registration in Germany formally exceeds the monopoly granted by an ITU
system by only two years. Nor should one disregard that the examination
process, with its likelihood of confusion assessment, is considerably more

,23
Note that these kind of lawsuits are encouraged under the U.S. common law system by such
features as the contingent fee, punitive damages, and treble damages. They are, therefore, obviously not
considered inefficient.
"'

SeeVincent N. Palladino, TheReal Trouble With Trademarks,81 TRADEMARKREP. 150, 156 (1991)

(noting that federal trademark law prohibits the registration of descriptive marks).
285 Lanham Act S 2(3), (0,
15 U.S.C. S 1052(e), (0 (1994); German Trademark Act S 8 (2)No. 1., No.
2., (3) (1995). U.S. courts apply the "Abercrombie test," described by Judge Friendly in Abercrombie &
Fch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9, 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 761 (2nd Cir. 1976). U.S. law
distinguishes between fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive marks, which are inherently distinctive and
descriptive terms which need to acquire distinctiveness through use. Generic terms cannot be registered
at all. Note that the latter is not true under German law; according to German Trademark Act S 8(3),
genericness can be overcome through the acquisition of secondary meaning. Here a higher standard is
required than under S 4 No.2. Compare the different German wording: "Verkebrsgeltung" and
"Verkehrsdurchsetzung"; the different approach exemplifies that German trademark law is not so much
concerned about the word monopoly as is U.S. law.
28 See Hart, supra note 234, at 36, for some of the considerations that accompany the development
of new brands. The agency Gotta reportedly asked for 250,000 German Marks for the creation of the
name 'Aventis" for the merging companies of Hoechst and Rhone-Poulenc. See Mit Kunstnamen aufden
Weg in dieZukunfi, FRANKFURTER ALLGEmEINE ZEITUNG, Jan. 12,1999, at 16. The agency Nomen will

charge upto 80,000 German Marks; seeLEBENSM177 £DieneueEss-Klasse,FOCUSMAGAZIN, Nov. 10,
1997, at 336-40. Generally, the so-called branding agencies charge between 50,000 and several 100,000
German marks for the creation of trademarks. The creation of such marks takes between three and twelve
months. See Weiche BuchstabenfiurmdenKaffee, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITU.NG, Feb. 26, 1995,
at 15.
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comprehensive, taking an average of eighteen months.287 This examination
period, combined with the thirty-six month period before the "Statement of
Use" has to be issued, extends the possible period of non-use up to fifty-four
months. The five year obligation-to-use provision and the ITU requirement
serve as functional equivalents. Although the PTO seems to take a lenient
approach in interpreting the "good cause" requirement, and although the
extension procedure seems to be a rather straightforward process, it is costly
and unduly burdens businesses when a less burdensome alternative could
achieve the same result. The ITU, as a reaction to basic business interests,
conveys the principle need for some protection before use occurs.
In sum, it can be said that the U.S. system shows considerable deviations
from its use-based, consumer confusion notion. These deviations are driven
by the practical necessity to enhance the entrepreneur's rights. The German
registration system openly admits to this necessity but, nevertheless, contains
safeguards to ameliorate the justified concerns with such a system.
B. ASSIGNMENTS IN GROSS AND LICENSING

The question of assignments of marks in gross and of licensing of marks
exemplifies the different understandings of the purpose for trademark. U.S.
law strictly prohibits assignments of marks in gross or "naked
assignments, " " whereas the German Trademark Act explicitly allows
them." 9 German trademark law, therefore, again emphasizes the interest of
the trademark owner. U.S. law, on the other hand, emphasizes the
perception of the consumers.
1. The Problemsand Concerns. As McCarthy puts it, "[g]ood will can no
more be separated from a business than reputation from a person. " "g
Because it is the purpose of trademark law to protect consumers, the
w MCCARTHY, supranote 2, S 19Z25; see The Patent and Trademark Office, FA Q about Trademarks

(last modified Feb. 12, 1999) < http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/tmfaq.htm#ApplicationOI4 >,
("How long does it take for a mark to be registered... [The total time for an application to be processed
may be anywhere from almost a year to several years."). The ITU process involves the same examination
procedure, the numbers are therefore equally applicable to ITU.

'" MCCARTHY, supra note 2, 5 18:118:2. (noting that assignments in gross are invalid and can lead
to abandonment of the mark); see ii S 18:17, S 18:48 for a discussion of "naked" licenses.
29 See German Trademark Act, supra note 1, 5 27, ("(1) The right established by the registration or
use of a trade mark or by the fact that the trade mark is well-known may be transferred or assigned to
others for some or all of the goods or services for which the trade mark is protected [...r).
' MCARTHY, supra note 2, S 18:2.
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prohibition of assignments of marks without the underlying good will
ensures that the assignee's use of the mark will not be deceptive to the public
and will not break the continuity of the product symbolized by the assigned
mark.29' Marks assigned in gross without the good will, however, no longer
serve as source identifiers and, thus, do not protect against deception." U.S.
" '
law, therefore, proscribes such assignments in gross.29
The problem with a strict proscription of assignments in gross is that
assignments in gross can benefit trademark owners in some situations. First,
an assignment can be helpful in securing an early priority date for the
assignee against third party users who began using the mark after the assignor
Another example arises from a
had obtained the right in the mark.'
manufacturer-distributor relationship, where the public perception as to the
ownership of a mark might be somewhat uncertain and quite different from
the terms to which the parties of the distributorship agreed.29 It would,
therefore, benefit the parties if they did not have to depend on public
perceptions. Finally, assignments are an important collateral used for loans.
A strict assignment in gross rule undermines the possibility of banks
obtaining a security interest in marks.2" Thus, there is a practical need to
allow such transfers in the interest of mark owners.
The consequences of the proscription are, as a matter of fact, somewhat
ameliorated because other legal constructions can achieve the desired results.
An assignment to acquire priority can be structured as an assignment with
a license-back agreement.29 Here, the trademark owner assigns his mark,
accompanied by the good-will, to an assignee who in turn grants him a
license to use the mark. Such an arrangement might also be helpful as a

Id at S18:3.
' Lisa B. Martin & Stacey M. Berg, TrademarkAssignment: Avoiding a Naked Transfer, 6 NO. 5J.
PROPRIETARY RTS. 8 (1994); Green River Bottling Co. v. Green River Corp., 997 F.2d 359, 362, 27
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1304, 1306 (7th Cir. 1993); Sugar Busters v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 265-66, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1821, 1825 (5th Cir. 1999).
"' Lanham Act 5 10, 15 U.S.C. 5 1060 (1994); Sugar Busters, 177 F.3d at 265 (5th Cir. 1999);
Macmahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chemical Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468 (8th Cir. 1901); Mister Donut of
Am., Inc. v. Mr. Donut, Inc., 418 F.2d 838, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 67 (9th Cir. 1969); Marshak v. Green,
746 F.2d 927, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1099 (2nd Cir. 1984); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION 5 34 cmt. b (1995).
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, 5 18:1; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 5 34 cmts.
b, c (1995).
" RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 5 34 cmt. d (1995).
" Id. at 5 34 cmt. e.
2" MCCARTHY, supranote 2, SS 18:16.1, 18:9.
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means to allow a trademark owner to obtain a loan by allowing a lending
institution to obtain a security interest in the trademark as collateral.298
Legal title does not pass with a conditional assignment as security.2 In the
case of default, however, where a debtor enforces the security, the actual
assignment becomes operative, and the result is that the mark passing to the
creditor must be accompanied by good will. 3"
2. ImplicationsandDeviations. Good will can be defined as the favorable
consideration, shown by the purchasing public, to goods known to emanate
from a particular source." 1 It does not refer to the underlying business or
tangible assets, but rather to that which is necessary to uphold the quality of
the product and therefore meet consumer expectations. 2 It is well settled
that neither the business establishment itself nor the tangible assets of the
business need to be transferred to validate the assignment.0 3
In practice the proscription against assignments in gross implies that if,
for instance, a trademark for a cologne is assigned, the recipe for the cologne
has to be assigned as well.
In other cases the transfer of customer lists,
merchandise or other equipment may be decisive.0 '
Accordingly, ITU-marks, which have not yet been used, cannot be
assigned at all unless the assignee is the successor in the ongoing business.3"
Since the marks have not gained any market significance, there is no good

2,, GregoryJ. Battersby &James G. Coplit, License Back ofTrademarkRigbts,4 No. 4 INTELL. PROP.

STRATEGIST 2 (1998).
z, MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S18:7.
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 18:7; Allison Sell McDade, Note, Trading in Trademarks - Why the
Anti-Assignment in Gross DoctrineShould be Abolished when Trademarks are Used as Collateral,77 TEX.
L. REv. 465, 475-76 (1998); Haymaker Sports, Inc. v. Turian, 581 F.2d 257, 26061 198 U.S.P.Q.(BNA)
610,613-14 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
301 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, SS 2:17, 2:19.
'
Id S 2:17; seealso Martin & Berg, supranote 292, at 8 (noting that transfer of a trademark does not
necessarily require transfer of a tangible asset as well so long as the purchaser isproducing or will produce
a substantially similar product).
' Martin & Berg, supra note 292, at 10.
M4 Mulhens & Kropff, Inc, v. Ferd Muhlens, Inc., 43 F.2d 937, 6 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 144 (2nd Cir. 1930)
(involving the famous mark of the cologne '4711"); see Elke Elizabeth Werner, Are We Trading Our
Lanham Act Auuy?An Evaluation of ConflictingProvisions Between the NAFTA and North American
TrademarkLaw, 2 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 227, 256 (1995) (noting the court's requirement of transferring
the recipe along with the mark in the dispute over "4711").
"' See Mister Donut of Am., Inc. v. Mr. Donut, Inc., 418 F.2d 838, 842, 164 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 67, 69
(9th Cir. 1969) (holding the transfer of the mark of a doughnut business ineffective without the customer
lists, recipes, and equipment of the business).
6 Lanham Act S 10, 15 U.S.C. S 1060 (1994); McCARTHY, supra note 2, S 18:13.
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will that can be transferred together with the mark." 7 The TLRA added
language to the Lanham Act that prohibits assignments of ITU-marks with
the explicit purpose of preventing "trafficking" in marks.' 8 The legal
sanction affixed to a proscribed assignment of an ITU application is not only
°9
the nullification of the mark, but also of the ITU application itself.
The assignment in gross rule does not stand without criticism. Critics
point out that the rule elevates form over substance by focusing on what
might ensure continuity in a business endeavor, although there is no
guarantee that a subsequent owner will maintain the quality of the good or
market the same type of good. 0 Moreover, the problem of defining what
constitutes good will in specific circumstances makes judicial responses
unpredictable for trademark owners.3
The legislative history of the
Lanham Act reveals that there were attempts by opponents of the strict
prohibition to allow assignments in gross with the enactment of the Act. 1
Those who feared the deviation from the common law rule, however,
prevailed. Interestingly, the United Kingdom was one of the first countries
to abolish the assignment in gross prohibition.
Today the U.S. is rather
isolated in requiring the transfer of good will as a prerequisite to a valid
assignment.314
However, if the U.S. ratifies the TLT, it may adopt the majority policy.
As already mentioned, the TLT contains provisions that point in the
direction of allowing a separate identity of mark and underlying business.

3

MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 18:13.

3

MCCARTHY,supra note 2, S 18:13; The Clorox Co. v. Chemical Bank, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1098,

1104 (T.T.A.B. 1996).
' The Clorox Co., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104.
3-0 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, S 617, at 1118 (1975); McDade, supra note 300, at 482.

MCCARTHY, sura note 2, $ 18:10.
i S 18:10; Ladas, supra note 310 at 1118-19.
313 LADAS, supra note 310 at 1118-19.
314 IL; McDade, supra note 300, at 490.
...See supratext accompanying notes 221-23; see TLT Art. 3 (7) (ii) and TLT Art. 11 (4), which in
311
"'

relevant part reads,
[Prohibition of Other Requirements] No contracting party may demand that
requirements other than those referred to in paragraphs (1) to (3) be complied with
in respect of the request referred to in this Article. In particular, the following may
not be required: [...]
(ii) an indication of the owner's carrying on of an industrial or commercial
activity, as wel as furnishing of evidence to that effect;
(iii) an indication of the new owner's carrying on of an activity corresponding to
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TLT Art. 11 (1)(b)further, provides that the recording of only extracts from
the assignment document will suffice to meet the requirements for a request
for a recording. 16 The importance of the recording is its function as prima
facie evidence of the execution of an assignment. Under the old law, the
filing of the complete assignment document was required for recording. The
new language of the Lanham Act requires the filing of the "prescribed
information," i.e., information subject to the PTO's prescription." 7 This
change is only a minor adjustment which nevertheless fits the overall
scheme. It merely weakens the control as to whether a mark was actually
assigned in gross or not.
In addition, NAFTA has been criticized on the ground that Article
1708(11).. does not meet the high consumer protection standards required
under U.S. law.3" 9 NAFTA allows the transfer of a trademark without the
underlying business, thus providing no assurance of consistent quality once
a trademark has been assigned. Although the U.S. did not make use of the
option of free transferability offered by NAFTA, it is interesting to note that
the goods and/or services affected by the change in ownership, as well as the
furnishing of evidence to either effect;
FEZER, supranote 9, S 3 cnt. no. 66.
316 TLT Art. 11 (1) (b) reads,
Where the change in ownership results from contract, any contracting party may
require that the request indicate that fact and be accompanied, at the option of the
requesting party, by one of the following:
a copy of the contract, which copy may be required to be certified, by a notary
public or any other competent authority, as being in conformity with the original
contract;
an extract of the contract showing the change in ownership, which extract may
be required to be certified, by a notary public or any other competent public
authority, as being a true extract of the contract;
an uncertified certificate of transfer drawn up in the form and with the content as
prescribed in regulations and signed by both the holder and the new owner;
an uncertified transfer document drawn up in the form and with the content as
prescribed in the Regulations and signed by both the holder and the new owner.
M17 Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-330, 112 Stat 3064 (1998)
("Acknowledgment shall be prima fade evidence of the execution of an assignment, and when the
prescribed information reporting the assignment is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office, the
record shall be prima facie evidence of execution"); see Port, supra note 68, at 38 (predicting this change).
3
NAFTA Art. 1708(11) reads:
A Party may determine conditions on the licensing and assignment of trademarks, it
being understood that the compulsory licensing of trademarks shall not be permitted
and that the owner of a registered trademark shall have the right to assign its
trademark with or without the transfer of the business to which the trademark
belongs.
319 Werner, supra note 304, at 254-56.
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the U.S. became party to a trade agreement that makes no effort to uphold
its basic trademark law principles.
3. Licensing is Permitted. The treatment of the closely related field of
trademark licensing more clearly reveals the tendency in the U.S. to enhance
trademark owners' rights and to de-emphasize traditional concerns over
consumer confusion.
Licensing, in contrast to assignment, does not transfer ownership of a
mark, but grants only a limited right to use a mark.320 Under the traditional
source theory, licensing was proscribed because it ran afoul of the notion
that trademarks indicate a single source." The acceptance of the quality
Because marks today are
assurance function changed this analysis."
regarded as indicators of consistent and predictable quality, the Lanham Act
and the courts hold licensing agreements valid where the licensor retains
control over the quality of the licensed products."' This approach seems to
confirm the conventional understanding of trademark functions as well as
the consumer confusion rationale. However, as has been pointed out, courts
have applied the control requirement most leniently.32 4 Interalia,they have
held that minimum control, 3 25 a mere control provision,326 or even the
reliance on the licensee's own control mechanism3 27 will suffice to satisfy the
control condition. The reason behind the reluctance to enforce the quality

"* MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 18:1.
321 Kevin Parks, 'Naked' is Not a Four-Letter Worak Debunking the Myth of the *Quality Control
Requirement'in TrademarkLicensing, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 531, 533 (1992); Macmahan Pharmacal Co.
v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468 (8th Cir. 1901).
3" Parks, supra note 321, at 533; Alfred M. Marks, Trademark Licensing-TowardsA More Flexible
Standard,75 TRADEMARK REP. 641, 643 (1988).
" Lanham Act S 5, 15 U.S.C. S 1055 (1994); Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d
358, 121 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 430 (2nd Cir. 1959); see Parks, supra note 321, at 533-35 (for overview of the
change in licensing analysis); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 1829, 6 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1897,
1911 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (describing the change in licensing analysis); Noah D. Genel, Keep
It ReaL'A Call ForA BroaderQuality ControlRequirementIn TrademarkLawe, 8 FORDHAM INTELL.PRoP.
MEDIA&ENT.L.J. 269,278-81 (1997) (arguing that that the quality control requirement should be applied
to all trademark uses); DavidJ. Frantlyn, TheApparent ManufacturerDoctrine, TrademarkLicensors And
the Third Restatement ofTorts, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 67 (1999) (stating the significance of the control
requirement for the licensor's liability).
)24 Johnston, supra note 2, at 27-29; Parks, supra note 321, at 540; Marks, supra note 322, at 645;
McDade, supra note 300, at 485-86; Genel, supra note 323, at 287-88.
'
Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977).
3
Robinson Co. v. Plastics Research & Dev. Corp., 264 F. Supp. 852, 864, 153 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 220,
230 (W.D. Ark. 1967); Wofies Restaurant, Inc. v. Lincoln Restaurant Corp., 143 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 310,

310 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964).
') Embedded Moments, Inc. v. Int'l Silver Co., 648 F. Supp. 187, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
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control requirement lies in the fact that the question usually comes up in
third party infringement cases in which
courts tend to look for reasons to
3 28
allow trademark owners to prevail.
In some cases, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) has made
a retroactive assessment of whether the control requirement was met. 29 In

University Book Store v. University of Wisconsin Board ofRegents the TTAB
rejected the argument that the Badger mark had been abandoned because the
University had tolerated the use of the mark by third parties for years before
a formal licensing program was launched. This court characterized the
situation as a valid, royalty-free, nonexclusive, implied license, although no
quality control had taken place. It relied on the finding that the "licensees"
had maintained a satisfactory, ie., merchantable, quality, so that no
deception of purchasers had taken place.3 ' While such an approach
conforms with the consumer confusion model, it nevertheless reveals a desire
to help the interest of the mark owner prevail.
The less control a licensor is required to retain, the more a license
resembles a transfer in gross.3 ' This adjudication expresses the willingness
to submit to the interests of trademark owners by sacrificing the traditional
functions of a trademark.332
4. PromotionalLicensing. The notion that licensing does not comply
with the traditional source identifying and consumer confusion rationale is
even better illustrated by promotional licensing or merchandising.
Promotional licensing describes the contract between an institution, such as
a school or athletic team, and a third party, allowing this latter party to place
the institution's emblem on certain goods for promotional purposes. 333 Here
marks do not act merely as source identifiers but are part of the product

32,Parks, supra note 321, at 547.
'; University Book Store v. Univ. of Wisconsin Bd. of Regents, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1402
(T.T.A.B. 1994) (citing Stockpot, Inc. v. Stock Pot Restaurant, Inc., 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 52,59 (T.T.A.B.

1983).

University Book Store, 33 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1396.
s3 Johnston, supra note 2, at 29; McDade, supra note 300, at 485.
332 McDade, supra note 300, at 485; Parks, supra note 321, at 567-68.
31
See, eg.,Johnston, supra note 2, at 29 (referring to use of a mark to primarily attract customers who
33o

wish to express allegiance, association, or sympathy as "promotional," "merchandise," or 'character"
trademark licensing.
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itself.33 They are used as profitable products in their own right.33
Consumers are not interested in owning the product because it represents a
particular quality. They are interested in owning the product because it
bears a particular mark.336
For many years trademark owners could not resort to the courts in order
to prevent non-licensees from using the institutions' emblems without
authorization. The major impediment was establishing "likelihood of
confusion" as to the source of the goods, as consumers knew that the school,
sports team, or institution was not the actual producer of the shirts, caps,
towels and the like.33 Courts have shown various reactions to the problem
of unlicensed promotional goods.33 Today confusion as to the source of
sponsorship or endorsement is sufficient to establish an infringement.339
Courts have at times undermined even this requirement by weighing the
equities" or by simply presuming that consumers are likely to be
confused.34'
Now that the trademark owners stand a better chance of prevailing on
the confusion issue, licensing has become a major revenue source for them.342
The problem with promotional licensing is that oftentimes there is no

Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 965 (1993); Plasticolor Molded
Prod. v. Ford Motor Co., 713 F. Supp. 1329, 1332, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1026 (C.D.Cal. 1989) 0.
Kozinski) vacated by Plasticolor Molded Products, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 767 F. Supp. 1036, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1975 (C.D.Cal. 1991) (consent judgment); W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334,
340, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 145 (7th Cir. 1985) 0. Posner); Pickering, supra note 13, at 58-61.
M Kozinski, supra note 334, at 965; Pickering, supra note 13, at 59.
336 Johnston, supra note 2, at 29; W. J. Keating, PromotionalTrademarkLicensing:A Concept Whose
Time Has Come, 89 DICK. L. REv. 363, 363 (1985); Marks, supra note 322, at 652.
3V Johnston, supra note 2, at 29-30; Keating, supra note 336, at 366; Marks, supra note 322, at 652-53;
Boston Prof' Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004,1012,185 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 364, 369 (5th Cir. 1975).
.. Johnston, supra note 2, at 29-36 for overview.
3" Int'l Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg and Co., 633 F.2d 912,918-20, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
718,724-26 (9th Cir. 1980); Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v.J. H. RayJewelry Co., 676
F.2d 1079, 1082-85, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 757,759 (5th Cir. 1982); see infra S 1II.C. for a more thorough
discussion of the confusion issue.
's See Johnston, supra note 2, at. 31 (quoting Boston ProPI Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap &
Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1011, 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 364, 368 (5th Cit. 1975),
Although our decision here may slightly tilt the trademark laws from the purpose of
protecting the public to the protection of the business interests of plaintiffs, we think
that the two become so intermeshed when viewed against the backdrop of the
common law of unfair competition that both the public and plaintiffs are better
served by granting the relief sought by plaintiffs).
34 Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22,35,9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1690,1701 (1st Cir. 1989).
342 Ruijsenaars, supra note 26, at 110.
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quality standard that can serve as an indicator for the goods that are sold by
*the licensee since the trademark owner sets these standards only through his
license agreements?3 The trademark owner himself has not used the mark
on the respective goods. Nevertheless, courts require a quality control
provision which is, however, subject to the aforementioned broad
interpretation.

5. The GermanApproach.
a. Assignments. Until 1992 the inseparability of trademark and the
underlying business source was an axiom of German trademark law. Because
the trademark law of the German Democratic Republic" s had allowed such
an assignment in gross, in anticipation of the emerging Trademark Act, the
legislature in 1992 eliminated the inseparability requirement with the
Protective Rights Extension Act.'
This regulation was adopted in the
Trademark Act of 1995. Section 27 of the Act accordingly allows the
assignment of rights without the assignment of the underlying business
establishment.
Because consumer protection is the main concern with assignments of
trademarks in gross, German courts formerly justified the prohibition of
assignments in gross with the need to avoid customer confusion and with the
function of a mark as a source identifier.? However, the proscription was
subject to heavy criticism.3 8 The main arguments were that consumers very
often have uncertain ideas, or even no idea at all about the source of
particular goods.
Although the inseparability requirement to some extent ensures a quality
standard of a product, this is not true for all cases, for example succession in
the business might alter the product quality. Additionally, it was easy to

"3 Parks, supr note 321, at 538; Marks, supra note 322, at 653.
3" Marks, supra note 322, at 647, 651.
3" Gesetz fiber Warenkennzeicben of November 30th 1984; see FEZER, Markenrecbt,supra note 9, S 3
cmt. no. 59.
' GesetzfiberdieErstreckungvneturbicShdnazrechten(EtreckungsgesetzErstrGof April 23rd
1992 (BGBI. I S. 938). The goal of the Protective Rights Extension Act was to harmonize the trademark
laws of the Federal Republic of Germany and the former German Democratic Republic. INGERL &
RoHNmE, supra note 9, Ein. cmt. nos. 26-27.
-" Rose, BGH NJW 1960, 2208 (2209); BGH NJW 1971, 1936; Baader, BGH NJW 1972, 2123;
BAUMBACH & HEFEPmEHL, supra note 243, S 8 cmt. no. 2; FEZER, supra note 9, S 27 cat. no. 7; Fratelli,
RGZ 146, 325 (331).
31 See BAUMBACH & HEFERMEHL, s"tra note 243, S 8 cmt. no. 2; FEZER, supra note 9, S 27 cnit. no.
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circumvent the proscription. Conspirators could just have the new owner
register the mark, and the proprietor would not file an opposition but would
consequently have his old mark canceled." ° The courts sanctioned such a
procedure" ° while they still adhered to the statutory proscription of
independent transferability."' Under the old German law it was not only
the good will that had to be transferred to validate the assignment, but rather
the business establishment itself." 2 Over time, courts in Germany tended to
interpret the need for a transfer of the underlying business establishment
broadly. Thus, in compliance with the proscription's purpose to prevent
consumer confusion, it would suffice if those elements of the underlying
business were transferred together with the mark that ensured the continuity
on the use of the designation," 3 an approach that closely resembles the
approach taken by U.S. courts in defining good will. What constituted the
requirement of continuity was subject to the particular circumstances of each
case. The assignment of a wholesale business' mark therefore might have
required only the transfer of customer and supplier names together with
descriptions of the supplied goods. In the case of a manufacturing business,
however, this might not have sufficed." 4 The critics did acknowledge that
potential misuse is inherent to the concept of free transferability, which
makes safeguards necessary."
Today the general clauses of the Law Against Unfair Trade Practices are
considered sufficient safeguard provisions." Thus, the purchase of a mark
might be regarded as an anti-competitive practice,"' or the use of the assigned

'" So-called Leeribertragung, BAUMBACH & HEREERMEHL, supra note 243, S 8 cmt. no. 2; BUSSE,
supra note 244, S 8 cmt. no. 2.
" RG GRUR 1942, 174; see BUSSE, supra note 244, S 8 cnt. no. 2.
...Schwarz Weiss, RGZ 169,240; BGHZ 1, 241 (245); Rose, BGH NJW 1960, 2208; Baader, BGH
NJW 1972,2123.
" Warenzeichengesetz S 8 (1) in relevant part read, ... ] Das Recht kann jedoch nur mit den
Geschaftsbetrieb oder dem Tel des Geschaftsbetriebs, zu dem das Warenzeichen gehbrt, auf einen anderen
ibergehen[.. r
" FEZER, supra note 9, S27 cmt. no. 8; compare Rose, BGH NJW 1960,2208 (2209), Nocado, BGH
NJW 1971, 1936 and Baader, BGH NJW 1972, 2123 with BGHZ 1, 241 (245) (an earlier case).
's Rose, BGH NJW 1960, 2208 (2209).
...
BAADER, BAUMBACH & HEFERMEHL, supra note 243, S8 cmt. no. 2.
"s6 FEZER, supra note 9, S 3 cmt. no. 76; INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, S 27 cmt. no. 12; Joachim
Starck, Marken und Sonstige Kennzeicbenrecbte als verkeftabige Wirtschaftsgiter-Anmerkungen zura
neuen Markenrecbt, WRP 1994, 698, 699-700.
"s TrWG, supra note 33, S 1. Conceptually this means that a violation of the general clause against
unfair trade practices is a violation of a statutory prohibition that voids the transaction according to S 134
of the German Civil Code. Bdrgerliches Gesetzbuch of 18 August 1896, as amended (RGBI. S. 195)
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mark might be considered misleading.3" The mere confusion as to the
source of the goods will not suffice to invalidate the assignment. An
additional qualified deception is necessary. A case involving the name "R.
G. D. & Co." which was used by the U.S. private detective agency to
designate its services.. 9 illustrates the additional element that is required to
make the use of a name or mark an unfair trade practice. In World War I,
the U.S. company's branch in Germany had been put under sequestration
and later was put into private use. The Supreme Court barred the acquirer
of the company from using its own name with the addition "R. G. D. &
Co." because such a use would have invoked the customer perception that
the parties were affiliated in a permanent business relationship. The
qualifying factor here was the confusion as to the permanent business
relationship .360
In addition to these safeguards, section 27 (2) of the German Trademark
Act preserves a connection between mark and business by prescribing a
rebuttable presumption that the mark has been transferred together with the
underlying business if the business establishment is transferred. 61 The
purpose of this provision, however, is not to act as a safeguard against
consumer confusion. Since the old law had contained a similar provision and
because this notion generally complies with the parties' intentions, the
legislature thought it necessary to clarify the continuing applicability of this
rule to avoid future legal actions. 62
Another potential safeguard might be seen in the fact that the
interdependence between mark and business is at least partly restored after
five years because the protection is then limited to the scope of the use.63

[hereinafter BGB].
"'
UWG, supra note 33, S 3 in conjunction with BGB, supra note 357, S134.
"s

BGHZ 10, 196 (200-03).

S3
See infraSE I.B.5.b. for further discussion of application of the Law Against Unfair Trade Practices.
"'
ALTHAMMER, supra note 256, S 27 cmt. no. 2.
"a FEZER, supra note 9, S 27 cmt. no. 29. It should be noted that this concept does not establish an
automatism. These kinds of rules of interpretation are only applicable if a general interpretation of the
parties' intentions does not lead to a reliable conclusion. Thus, more significant facts include whether an
extra sum was paid for the good will or whether single items had been explicitly listed as part of an asset
deal. See INGERL & ROHNKE,supra note 9, S 27 cmt. no. 17.
"' FEZ
, supra note 9, S3 cmt. no. 75; see Loma Linda Food Co. v. Thomson & Taylor Spice Co.,
279 F.2d 522,524,126 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 261,269 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (citing an indentical rule under U.S. law);
Discount Muffler Shop, Inc. v. Meineke Realty Corp., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 439, 449, 217 U.S.P.Q.(BNA)
1154, 1160 (N.D.Ohio 1982) (stating an identical rule).
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This, however, does not protect against consumer confusion subsequent to
the assignment.
b. Licensing. The German Trademark Act of 1995, for the first time,
contains explicit provisions regulating trademark licensing."4 The old law
had presupposed the existence of license agreements, and the courts did
sanction the licensing of marks in spite of the dependence of the mark on the
business establishment. 6 The license agreement need not contain a control
provision to be valid.' The German Trademark Act itself does not protect
consumers against deception as to product quality. Instead, the Act relies on
the trademark owner's interest to uphold a particular quality standard.6 7
Such a notion is consistent with the understanding that trademarks primarily
serve the interests of trademark owners and only concomitantly serve the
interest of the consuming public."
CompareGerman Trademark Act, supra note 1, S 30 (stating
(1) The right established by the registration or use of a trade mark or by the fact
that the trade mark is well-known may be the subject matter of exclusive or nonexclusive licenses for some or all of the goods or services for which the trade mark is
protected and for the whole or part of the territory of the Federal Republic of

Germany.
(2) The proprietor of a trade mark may invoke the rights conferred by that trade
mark against a licensee who contravenes any provision in his licensing contract with
regard to,
the duration of the license,
the form covered by the registration in which the trade mark may be used,
the scope of the goods or services for which the license was granted,
the area within which the trade mark may be affixed,
the quality of the goods manufactured or of the services provided by the

licensee.)

with Council Directive, supra note 7, Art. 8 (prescribing licensing provisions for registered marks in the
member states) and Council Regulation, s"pra note 260, Art. 22.
3s INGERL& ROHNKE, supra note 9, S 30 cmt. nos. 2,7; Melmer-Tee-Il, BGHZ 44,372 (375). Under
the old law only in personam licenses were possible ("scbuldrechdich"). The new law allows in rem licenses
(dinglich); only the latter affords the licensee with the trademark owner's priority date.
3" INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, S 30 cmt. nos. 7, 59; BAUMBACH & HEFERMEHL, supra note
243, Anhang WGZ S 8 ant. no. 20; ALEXANDER V. MOHLENDAHL, ET. AL., DEE
GEMEINSCHAFrSMARKE, S 9 cmt. no. 33 (1998) (concerning the Community Trademark; the inclusion
of a quality control requirement had been discussed but was omitted in the end).
M7 Which is now expressed in German Trademark Act, supra note 1, S 30 (2); see V.MOHLENDAHL,
supra note 366, S 9 cmt. no. 33 (discussing Council Regulation Art. 22 (2), which resembles German
Trademark Act S 30 (2). These provisions provide for a cause of action for the trademark owner if the
licensee does not meet the contractual quality standards; they illustrate that the quality function primarily
serves as a means to protect trademark owners' interest); see also BT-Drucks., Begrdindung zum
Markengesetz, supra note 48, at 86 (discussing Trademark Act, 5 30).
' BAUMBACH & HEFERMEHL, supra note 243, Anhang WGZ. 5 8 cmt. no. 20 (expressing the same
view with regard to the old law).
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The Law Against Unfair Trade Practices serves as a safeguard for the
370
concern of abuse. 69 Section 3 of the Law Against Unfair Trade Practices
invalidates the license agreement 37 ' if the use of the mark by the licensee
would convey misleading information as to the origin of the product and if
a certain quality standard is inadvertently linked to this source and the
licensee does not meet this standard. 3' The typical scenario would be that
the licensee alters essential product features for which the licensor's product
was known when he used the mark himself.3 73 A Supreme Court case
involving the mark "Nevada" for ski-bindings illustrates the scope of this
safeguard." 4 The French licensor manufactured this renowned ski-binding
with certain special technical characteristics that had made the binding the
choice of many professional skiers. The licensee sold a ski-binding under the
name "Ess-Nevada." This binding, however, was not equipped with these
special features. The Court held that the mere assumption that the licensor
was the source of the "Ess-Nevada" binding was not sufficient to invalidate
the license agreement. 7 5 However, consumer expectations that the skibinding might have certain special characteristics did invalidate the
agreement.' 6

' INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, S 30 cmt. no. 59; FEZER, supra note 9, S 30 cmt. no. 51;
BAUIMBACH & HEFERMEHL, supra note 278, S 3 cnt. no. 261.
'" UWG, supra note 33, S 3 states:
Any person who, in the course of business activity for purposes of competition,
makes deceptive statements concerning business matters, in particular concerning the
nature, the origin, the manner of manufacture, or the pricing of individual goods or
commercial services or of the offer as a whole, concerning price lists, the manner or
the source of acquisition of goods, concerning the possession of awards, concerning
the occasion or purpose of the sale, or concerning the size of the available stock may
be enjoined from making such statements.
Translatedin FREDRICH-KARLBEirETAL., German Industrial Property, Copyright and Antitrust Laws
124 (2nd ed. 1989).
7 BGB, supra note 358, 5 134; FEZER, supra note 9, S 30 cmt. no. 53.
-v INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, S 30 cmt. no. 59; BAUMDACH & HEFERMEHL, supra note 278,
S 3 cmt. no. 261-63.
'' INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, S 30 cmt. no. 59.
7 Nevada Skibindung, BGH NJW 1965, 2150.
"7' 14 at 2151.
'v Note that it did not make adifference that licensee's ski-binding might have been of a better quality
than licensor's; hiaat 2151; this approach conforms with the U.S. notion that quality refers to "consistent
quality"; MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 3:10. See also Griiner Punkt, KG Berlin, Betriebs-Berater 1994,
2299,2299-2300 (discussing S3 of the Law Against Unfair Trade Practices and elaborating on the question
whether consumers expect special quality features in connection with a green dot indicating a particular
recycling system).
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Promotional licensing is also a big issue among sports clubs in
Germany. 77 As to the problem of preventing third parties from making
unauthorized uses of logos and symbols, courts interpret the likelihood of
confusion in a broad sense. 78 The problem is somewhat ameliorated by the
fact that some sports clubs today actually manufacture their own apparel. 9
6. Evaluation. In comparison to U.S. law, the German approach
emphasizes the result of an assignment or license rather than the formalities
accompanying the assignment. Some authors have suggested a similar
solution for U.S. law. 80 For instance, the Badger case"' illustrates that such
a notion might be a viable alternative for U.S. law.
Under German law no concern at all should arise with regard to those
marks that are not used. The concern of consumer confusion is not
pertinent as no good will has been built up yet. 2 The separate existence of
mark and business has enabled the business of mark designers to flourish.8 3
The ITU system, in conjunction with the proscription of assignments, makes
it difficult for U.S. entrepreneurs to establish such a business.
The Statement of the German Parliament regarding the introduction of
the separability of business and mark illustrates the benefits of the present
assignment in gross regulation.38 4 As mentioned above, the main purpose of
the separability of business and trademark is to enable holding companies to
own marks although they do not themselves constitute the business that uses
the mark. In addition to this, the change was supposed to enable "charactermerchandising," i.e., business establishments that specialize in the design and
sale of symbols.8
The Statement also expresses the urge to adjust to
international developments, which on the European level was taking steps

'" Ruijsenaars, supra note 26, at 111.
in 1 at 114. Note that courts are not barred from finding confusion even where it is obvious to the
buyer that the product is a bootleg; see INGERL & ROHNKE, supr note 9, S 14 cmt. no. 140; FEZER, supra
note 9, S14 cmt. no. 75; see infra S lII.C.3. for deeper discussion of confusion issue.
'"' Ruijsenaars, supra note 26, footnote 41 (citing DieBegeisterungfirFan.Artikel Uflt langsam nach,
SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, August 6, 1997, at 24).

MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at S 18:18; McDade, supra note 300, at 483.
s In the Badger case, the court emphasized the result by implying a valid, royalty-free, nonexclusive
license. See supa text accompanying notes 329-30.
3
ALTHAMMER, supra note 256, S 27 cnt. no.7.
SSee supra note 286 for citations to articles containing examples of mark designers' prospects.
"u Bundestagsdrucksache 12/1399 v. 30.10.1991, Begriindung zum Erstreckungsgesetz, 68 [hereinafter
BT-Drucks., Begriindung zurn Erstreckungsgesetz].
"' Weben und Kaufen, Marke wirdbandelsbaresWirtschaftsgutErste Brsen entstehen bereits,January
"'

13, 1995, at 15.
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in the direction of free transferability." 6 Now EU Regulation Article 17
stipulates just this, with regard to the Community Trademark. Although the
EU Directive does not contain a provision prescribing such a regulation, all
of the Member States have adopted a similar provision allowing independent
transferability of marks.3 87
The groups with an interest in trademark protection unanimously
welcomed the provision allowing assignments in gross.388 Some authors
argue that the proscription against naked assignments and licenses does not
reflect economic reality, especially with regard to the use of marks as
merchandising marks, i.e., marks that have a value on their own, such as
logos, emblems, and symbols of sports clubs and universities. 89
With regard to the quality control requirement, the market will likely
undertake self regulation.3 9 The "assignee has every commercial motivation"
to use the mark in a continuous way.391 Landes and Posner point out that
an incentive to deceive only exists if the short term sale profits exceed the
long term loss of reputation. 3 ' Gross assignments, therefore, are a real
concern only in last period settings, when the seller of the mark is leaving
the market at the same time as the sale.393 Furthermore, consumers do not
expect the quality and characteristics of a product to remain the same even
if the owner remains the same,394 and the owner has no obligation to keep
the quality at a consistent level when using the mark himself.39
Although, absent a quality control requirement, consumers might be
" BT-Drucks., Begraindung zum Erstreckungsgesetz 2, supra note 384, at 69.

s8 FEZERT,
sura note 9, S 27 cmt. no. 6; see, e.g., United Kingdom Trade Marks Act, 1994, 5 24 (Eng.).
"'

BT-Drucks., Begriindung zum Erstreckungsgesetz 2, supra note 384, at 69.

"'

Kozinski, supra note 334, at 960-66,977-98; Parker, supra note 106, at 332; Pickering, supra note

13, at 36; Marks, supra note 322, at 647-49.
3"0BAUMBACH &HEFERMEHL, supra note 243, 5 8 cmt. no. 20; v. Miihlendahl & Ohlgart, supra note
366, S 9 cnn. no. 33; see also Constance L. Hays, This Bud'sfor Tbem;AnbeuserBuscb Takes CloserAim at
ForeignMarkets, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1999, at C1
Foreign expansion is a costly exercise. Like Coca-Cola, Anheuser believes that a key
to winning converts is making a product that tastes exactly the same everywhere in
the world. So it sends brewmasters to its overseas plants to supervise the making of
Budweiser from ingredients that are mostly imported from the United States;
quoting Frank Walters, the director of research at Impact, a trade newsletter in New York, "If you don't
have a consistent product, you can't build up brand loyalty"); McDade, supra note 300, at 473-75, 480-81.
391Werner, supra note 304, at 258.
392 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 226, at 285-86.
" RESTATEMENT (IR9D) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 5 34 cmt. c (1995).
3" PARKS, supra note 321, at 536; LADAS, supra note 310, S 617, at 1118.
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deceived if the assignee or licensee launches an inferior product, this might
not be any different under the safeguard.'
It therefore does not come as a surprise that the assignment and licensing
rules, under the flexible standard applied by the courts, again stress a
tendency in the U.S. to drift into the direction of an understanding of
trademarks as marketing devices in the interest of the respective owners.
Deviations are allowed to enhance business prospects. The German law
accepts the necessity to allow the conduct discussed and contains safeguards
for those cases of misuse.
C. SCOPE OF PROTECTION INCLUDING DILUTION

As we have seen, the different trademark laws are subject to convergence
with respect to the acquisition of trademark rights and the transferability of
marks. The inconsistent application of U.S. trademark law derives from the
need to grant extensive rights to businesses in order to enhance business
opportunities. The practical needs, and not the theoretical underpinnings,
determine the scope of protection. The following section discusses the scope
of protection afforded to trademark owners under the respective laws.
1. General Scheme. One would assume that the scope of protection
should be broader under German law, which employs a system that
emphasizes the function of a mark as a right in the interest of owners instead
of as a source identifier.
The remedies open to the trademark owner in case of a trademark
infringement are of a comparable nature under U.S. and German law. Once
an infringement has been established, the proprietor of the mark, under the
respective specified circumstances, will be able to obtain the necessary
injunctive " 7 and monetary relief. 98 Although the remedies afforded to a
trademark owner are crucial to the question of how strong a right he owns,
a more thorough discussion of the remedies and their ramifications would go
beyond the scope of this article.'" The more pertinent question for our

"' McDade, supra note 300, at 482.
s Lanham Act S 34, 15 U.S.C. S 1116 (1994); German Trademark Act, supra note 1,S 14 (5).
3
Lanham Act S 35, 15 U.C. S 1117 (1994); German Trademark Act, supra note 1,S 14 (6).
See generally MCCARTHY, supranote 2,5 30:1 et seq. (discussing remedies for mark infringement);
INGERL & ROHNXKE, supra note 9, SS 14-19 (for comprehensive discussions of remedies). It seems
worthwhile to mention that German law requires willful or negligent conduct on behalf of the infringer
for any kind of monetary relief, German Trademark Act, supra note 1, S14 (6), whereas under U.S. law
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purposes is the problem of what triggers the remedies available to trademark
owners, i.e., what constitutes a trademark infringement.
2. US. Law. Under U.S. law, "likelihood of confusion" is the keystone
of common law and statutory trademark infringement.' The assessment
under statutory trademark law becomes important with regard to
infringements of registered 1 or unregistered 4 2 marks and with regard to
applications for federal registration.'
3. Confusion as to Source. Generally speaking, the critical question is
whether the purchasing public" would mistakenly assume that the
applicant's goods originate with, are sponsored by, or are in some way
associated with goods sold under the trademark."5
Section 32 of the 1962 Lanham Act required confusion of "purchasers as
to the source of origin of such goods."4" The amended language merely
requires use of a mark which is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive" without any further requirement. Courts interpreted
this amendment to codify a post-sale confusion doctrine, which allows
confusion not only with regard to the actual purchasers (point of sale
confusion) but also with regard to non-purchasers as prospective
customers.4 7

an element of fault is not necessary for such arecovery. Courts, however, are reluctant to enforce astrict
liability concept, and therefore require proof of actual losses or actual damage instead of likely confusion,
MCCARTHY, S 30:28. The concept of statutory damages in lieu of actual damages, 15 U.S.C. S 1117(c),
and the concept of treble damages in cases of intentional infringement, 15 U.S.C. S 1117 (b), are unknown
to German law. The same is true with regard to punitive damages, which cannot be awarded under the
Lanham Act, but are available under state law. The losing party under German law, as a general
procedural rule, is liable for the winning party's necessary costs; a specific regulation with regard to
attorneys' fees cannot be found in the German Trademark Act; compare with 15 U.S.C. S 1117(a), (b)
(discussing charges for trademark infringement).
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 23:1.
4' Lanham Act S 32, 15 U.S.C. S 1114 (1994).
Lanham Act S 43(a), 15 U.S.C. S 1125(a) (1994).
13 Lanham Act 2(d), 15 US.C. S 1052(d) (1994). The analysis of section 2 (d) resembles that of
Lanham Act S 43 (a) and will not be discussed any further; see Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763,769 (1992) (discussing S2(d) of the Lanham Act); MCCARTHY, supra note 2, SS 23:1, 23:8,23:78,
27:26,27:14.
'" The standard is the reasonable prudent purchaser, see MCCARTHY, supra note 2, SS 23:91 - 23:103

(discussing the entire analysis).
' MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 23:78; Lanham Act 5 2(d) (describing the modern test for
infringement).
McCarthy, supra note 2, SS 23:7, 23:21, 23:76, 29:167.
See id; Insty Bit, Inc. v. Poly-Tech Indust. Inc., 95 F.3d 663 (8th Cir. 1996); Computer Care v. Serv.
Sys. Enter., Inc., 982 F.2d 1063, 1070 (7th Cir. 1992).
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The Second Circuit has held that confusion as to the products themselves
will suffice." The case involved the registered mark "Vagitrol" for a vaginal
creme product and the enjoined use of the unregistered mark "Vagestrol" on
a vaginal suppository product. The Second Circuit thought it proper to look
primarily at product confusion among physicians and pharmacists, rather
than at confusion among purchasers as to source of origin. The Court
emphasized the possible dire effects on public health, but also stated, "In
amending that section in 1962, Congress eliminated the italicized, qualifying
language, thereby evincing a clear purpose to outlaw the use of trademarks
which are likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception of any kind, not
merely of purchasers nor simply as to source of origin." '
What this illustrates is that the language of S 32 of the Lanham Act gives
courts leeway to prevent any kind of consumer confusion. Confusion is not
limited to the source of the product.
Similarly, section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act was amended with the
enactment of the TLRA in 1989 to include confusion "as to the affiliation,
connection, or association," or "the origin, sponsorship, or approval." This
was a codification of existing law, and although it was not supposed to bring
a change in judicial analysis, it was broad enough to permit subsequent
judicial interpretation."'
Therefore, today it is clear that confusion does not require uncertainty as
to the source of the goods in a strict sense. On the other hand, a mere calling
to mind of a source is not sufficient to establish a likelihood of confusion.
In the case of unregistered marks, there must be confusion either as to the

' Syntex Lab., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566,568-69,169 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 1 (2nd Cir.
1971); see also Morgenstern Chem. Co. v. G. D. Searle & Co., 253 F.2d 390, 116 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 480 (3rd
Cir. 1958) (finding infringement by defendant's mark "Mictine" of plaintiff's mark "victurin" even
though the two prescription drugs have separate and independent uses).
0 Syntex Lab., 437 F.2d at 568; seealso Marathon Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Prod. Corp., 767 F.2d 214,221,
226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 836 (5th Cir. 1985)
In 1962, the quoted words were deleted, specifically to allow any kind of confusion
in support of a trademark infringement action. Likelihood of confusion, due to
similar trademarks, need no longer be predicated upon the claim that the public may
be misled by a similarity between the goods. Marathon need only prove likelihood

of confusion...
USTA Commission, supra note 170, at 378 & n.5.
0 Marie V. Driscoll, The 'New" 43(a), 79 TRADEMARK REP. 238, 238 (1989). The old law provided

for a cause of action for "false designation of origin," which was the basis for a federal infringement
remedy for unregistered marks; see McCarthy, supra note 2, at SS 27:9, 27:18, 27:10, 27:14.
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source or the sponsorship,4 11 whereas in the case of registered marks, any
kind of confusion may suffice. Courts might apply an even broader standard
ifsection 32 is taken literally.412
4. Confiusion Assessment. Confusion is pretty obvious in cases where the
infringer uses an identical mark on identical goods. Such cases therefore are
referred to as "open and shut" cases. 4 " The analysis is not as obvious in
those cases where the marks or the goods are not identical but are only
similar. The Federal Circuits have adopted different tests for determining
likelihood of confusion in these cases.414 All circuits commonly consider the
degree of similarity among the marks, the proximity of the products,
defendant's intent in selecting the product, evidence of actual confusion, and
the strength of plaintiff's mark. These factors are not exhaustive, but rather
are illustrative.4 ' Importantly, courts consider a number of factors and the
market context for purposes of the assessment.4 16 They take a global
approach and weigh all the relevant factors.41

41 See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at S23:9, who quotes Judge Rich's analogy to a traffic light where
one color calls to mind the other, but does not lead to confusion; see also Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Komm, 46
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1233, 1239 (T.T.A.B. 1998). The court found no confusion between "My-T-Mouse"
used for computer software, and the cartoon character "Mighty Mouse" used in film series of animated
cartoons for motion pictures and television. The Court held, "We acknowledge that applicants' mark
MY-T-MOUSE and design might bring to mind the cartoon MIGHTY MOUSE. However, this does not
necessarily mean that consumers will be confused into believing that the two marks indicate the same
source of origin." See Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Creative House Promotions, Inc.,
944 F.2d 1446, 1456, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1491, 1499 (9th Cir. 1991) (involving the marketing of the
"Star Award," a gold figure closely resembling the Academy's famous "Oscar" statuette; the Ninth Circuit
found an infringement under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act S 43 (a) although survey evidence had only
established an association and no confusion).
412In practice the standards seem to resemble each other; courts in a section 32 proceeding give weight
to the fact that the PTO denied registration because of likelihood of confusion with another mark. See
W. E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 662, 168 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1(2nd Cir. 1970).
4..
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 23:20.
...
See generally McCARTHY, supra note 2, S 23:19 (citing the various factors leading to confusion
recognized by the courts).
415RESTATEMENT (I'IRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION S 21 cmt. a (1995); Heartsprings, Inc. v.
Heartspring, Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 554 (10th Cir. 1998); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188,
194 (5th Cir. 1998).

416McCARTHY, supra note 2, S 23:19; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION S 21 cmt.

a.

4 Hearnprings, 143 F.3d at 558; Elvis, 141 F.3d at 204; Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meridian Ins.
Group, Inc., 128 F.3d 1111, 1120 (7th Cir. 1997).
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5. German Law. As in the case of U.S. law, under German law the core
41 8
of the infringement assessment is the question of likelihood of confusion.
German law presumes such a confusion in cases where an identical
trademark is used on an identical product. No additional showing is
necessary.419 The cases of double identity are just as "open and shut" as they
are under U.S. law. Additionally, the owner will have a cause of action
where the products and marks are similar or identical if a likelihood of
confusion on the part of the public exists. 20 German courts interpreted the
likelihood of confusion requirement under the old German law as
encompassing several different kinds of confusion. First, there was "direct
confusion" which could be found where the public confused the sign and the
mark in question.421 "Indirect confusion," in contrast, could be established
where the public made a connection between the proprietors of the sign and
of the mark and confused them. Thirdly, "confusion in a broader sense"
referred to the public's mistaken assumption that there is an organizational
or economic link between the companies marketing the two products. 23
Two important recent European Court of Justice decisions addressed the
issue of confusion beyond the case of double identity. 24 The rulings defined
the basic scope for the assessment by EU Member Countries, and I will
therefore take a closer look at these decisions.
6. Likelihood of Association/Indirect Confusion/Confusion in a Broader
Sense. The wording of Council Directive article 4 (1) (b) and its
corresponding provision of the German Trademark Act, section 14 (2), put
...
The German Trademark Act, supra note 1,SS 9, 14, as well as the German version of the Council
Directive, supra note 7, articles 4, 5 use the term 'risk of confusion." The inaccurate translation is not
meant to reveal a conceptual difference with the English version of "likelihood of confusion."
...
See First Council Directive 89/104 to approximate the laws of the member states relating to
trademarks, 1989 OJ. (L.40), Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TMIPS)art. 16(1) 1994, OJ. (L336) 214 (presuming likelihood of confusion in case of identical sign for
identical goods or services).
' Section 9 (1), numbers 1-3 of the Trademark Act resemble section 14, numbers 1-3; the difference
isthat section 9 isconcerned with cancellation of registered marks whereas section 14 refers to third party
uses. Note that section 9 (1), number 3 does not entitle the trademark owner to file an opposition
proceeding pursuant to section 42; the exclusive remedy to attack the application, or, better, to attack the
registration is the cancellation proceeding.
42' Unmittelbare Veiwecbnsungsgefabr, INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, 5 14 cmt.nos. 150, 427.
4
Mittelbare Vermbslunggefabr, INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, S 14 cmt. nos. 150, 427.
42 Verwecbslungsgefabr in weiterem Sinne; INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, S 14 cmt.nos. 150, 427.
424Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG, and Rudolf Dassler Sport, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6191, [1998] 1
C.M.L.R. 445 (1998); Case C-39/97, Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc, 1998 E.C.R.
1-5507, [1999] 1 C.M.L.R. 77 (1998).
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into question the traditional analysis under the old law. The EU Directive
required "likelihood of confusion on the part of the public," but continued
to state, "which includes the likelihood of the sign and the trade mark
becoming associated in the mind of the public." 2 This wording could be
interpreted as enhancing trademark owners' rights by lowering the
infringement threshold. In the case of Sabel v. Puma426 the German Federal
Court of Justice" 7 had found a resemblance between Sabel's "bounding
feline" and Puma's registered "bounding feline" with respect to certain classes
of sport goods. It, however, did not find a likelihood of confusion. 28 As the
relevant provision in the German law is based on Council Directive article
4, the Court referred the question to the European Court of Justice 429 which
had to decide whether a mere association which the public might make
between two marks was sufficient to justify a finding of likelihood of
confusion.
The European Court of Justice answered the question negatively, mainly
relying on the tenth recital in the preamble of the Directive, which makes
likelihood of confusion the specific condition for protection.43
Defendant Sabel and the United Kingdom had invoked the argument that
trademark protection cannot go further than is necessary to protect its
function as a guarantee of origin. The Benelux countries in contrast argued
that where a sign is likely to give rise to the association of a mark, ie., where
the public makes a connection between the marks although the two are not
confused, an infringement is established. The European Court of Justice, in.
essence, held that likelihood of association is not an alternative to likelihood
of confusion, but rather serves to define the scope. 431

s See German Trademark Act, supra note 1,for English version.
Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG, & Rudolf Dassler Sport, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6191, [1998] 1
C.M.L.R. 445 (1998).
'2 Bundesgericbtsbof[BGH].
' The case involved an opposition proceeding under German Trademark Act 5 9 (1)No.2. This
provision resembles S 14 (2) No. 2,and the legal analysis isthe same.
4'For purposes of a preliminary ruling under article 177 of the EC.
40 Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG, & Rudolf Dassler Sport, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6191,
V 1-6222,16225, HH 18,26 [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 445, 470, 472, HH 18,26 (1998).
431 Ia; reiterated in Case C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH v. Klijsen Handel BV,
1999 E.C.R. 1-3819, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 1343, 117 (1999).
426
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The Court, however, also unambiguously endorsed the view that indirect
confusion could suffice to establish a likelihood of confusion.432 In an earlier
case which had also been referred to the European Court of Justice by the
BGH, the court had held that confusion in a broader sense, i.e., when "the
mistaken assumption relates to the existence of an organisational or
economic link between the undertakings concerned, such as a licensing
agreement under which one undertaking is authorised to manufacture a
product with the same properties as the product of the other" was an
In its recent
acceptable test for the likelihood of confusion assessment.433
Canon decision the Court held that confusion in a broader sense at the same
time presents the outer limit for likelihood of confusion, 4e., at a minimum
confusion regarding the link between the two undertakings must exist for
infringement purposes.434
These notions conform with the meaning the German legislature
attributed to the wording, which it considered to be a confirmation of the
traditional understanding of indirect confusion and confusion in a broader
sense.

43 5

In light of this judgment, a decision issued by the Higher Regional Court
of Hamburg (OberlandesgerichtHamburg)just three months before Canon
was concluded seems troubling.3 6 The case involved the question of whether
the design of the cigarette packaging for the brand "CABINET-mild" caused
confusion with the design of the "Marlboro-King-Size" packaging. The
Court, while discussing the concept of confusion in a broader sense, notes
that the concept no longer requires confusion with regard to an economic or
organizational link between the undertakings marketing the products in
question. The Court added that, although not every association would
432Sabel

1997 E.C.R. at 1-6222-23, HH 16-17 [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 470, HH 16-17 (1998); INGERL &

ROHNKE, supra note 9, S 14 cmt. nos. 150, 427.
" Case C-317/91, Deutsche Renault AG v. Audi AG, 1993 E.C.R. 1-6227, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 461
(1995), Decision 136; GRUR Int. 1994, 168 (170); INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, S 14 cmnt. no. 439;
see also Sabel 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6204, J 38, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 457, 1 38 (1998) (opinion of Advocate
General Jacobs).
,' Case C-39/97, CanonKabushikiYaishav. Metro-Goldwyn-MayerInc., 1998 E.C.R. 1-5507,1-5535,
1 30, [1999] 1 C.M.L.R. 77, 97 1 30 (1998); see also Case C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co.
GmbH v. Khijsen Handel BV, 1999 E.C.R. 1-3819 [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 1343, 17 (1999); Annett Wagner,
Infringing Trade Marks: Function,Association and Confusion of Signs According to the E.C. Trade Marks

Directive,[1999] E.I.P.R. 127-132 (1999).

43s BT-Drucks., Begriindung zumMarkengesetz, supra note 48, at 125; INGERL&ROHNKE, supra note

9, S 14 ctn. no. 443.
436 Cabinet, OLG Hamburg, GRUR 1999, 172.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol7/iss2/2

70

Rayle: The Trend Towards Enhancing Trademark Owners' Rights-A Comparativ

2000]

COMPARATIVE TRADEMARK LA W

suffice to constitute confusion, the new law did not require a strong
emphasis of the source identifying function. Thus, a mistaken association of
product characteristics or specific quality standards could be sufficient. The
interpretation did not make a difference in the outcome of the case as the
Court did not find a likelihood of confusion, in spite of this broad
understanding. It seems questionable whether such an approach can be
upheld in light of Canon, although the decisions might be reconciled if
confusion as to the characteristics or quality standards is regarded as
tantamount to confusion in a broader sense.
In the final analysis, the likelihood of confusion assessment has not
changed under German law. It therefore does not give evidence of a shift of
the understanding of trademark functions.
7. Similarity. The old German law used an objective test to assess
whether there was similarity between the goods in question.4 3 This static
approach asked for an isolated assessment of whether the products were
similar. The new act in implementing the Council Directive, altered the
wording regarding the assessment.43 The explanatory statement by the
German Parliament to the trademark reform law explicitly states that the
purpose of this new choice of words was to redefine the scope of protection,
and most German scholars agreed. 9 Thus, the old expression was
interpreted primarily in light of the origin function of trademarks," whereas
the new expression is no longer based on this notion."' Although the courts
did not apply the changes with force,"' as a whole, they came to
acknowledge that the scope of the new law was broader than that of the old
one." 3 In 1996 the German Supreme Court referred to the European Court
of Justice a question as to the interpretation of article 4(1)(b) of the Council

"' SS 5 (4) No.1, 11 (1) No.1 Warenzeichengesetz; based on the wording "Warengleichartigkeit."
See SS9 (1) No.2, 14 (2) No.2 "Anlichkeit."
'" BT-Drucks., Begriindung zum Markengesetz, supra note 48, at 72; FEZER, sur note 9, S 14 cmt.
no. 119; INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, S14 cmt. no. 249. But see ALTHAMMER, supra note 256, S 9
cmt. no. 9. Both expessions can be translated as "similarity." See Collins German Dictionary(1997). If
a distinction should be made, the old expression of "Warengleichattigkeit" could be translated as "great
similarity* or "of the same kind." See Brockhaus, Enzykopadie, Bd 29, Wdtterbuch Englisch (1996). For
our purpose, it is important to note that the new wording was intended to change the analysis.
40 INGERIL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, S 14 cmt. no. 248.
"4 BT-Drucks., Begr~indung zum Markengesetz, supra note 48, at 72; Tilmann, supra note 8, at 384.
42 See INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, 514 cmt.no. 250 for citations.
4 See Oxygenol II, BGH NJW 1995, 1677 (1679) (in obiter dictum).
4m
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Directive,' which the specific provision of the German law" is based on."
The case involved an application by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM) for
registration of the word "CANNON" with respect to "films recorded on
video tape cassettes" and other items. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha (CKK)
opposed the application on the basis of its registration of "Canon" for certain
leisure electronic devices, including video recorders. The Federal Patent
Court (Bundespatentgericht,abbreviated BPatG) had denied that there was a
similarity of the goods in question based on the factual finding that the
relevant average purchaser did not think that recorded video tapes and the
corresponding recording devices came from the same business operation."'
Under this analysis, CKK's opposition had to fail because there was no
similarity of the goods involved and therefore no confusion possible,
regardless of the distinctiveness or reputation of CKK's "Canon" mark. The
BGH on appeal held the new law applicable and thus had to decide the
question of the appropriate analysis. It proposed an analysis based on an
inverse correlation between the similarity of the goods on the one hand, and
the similarity of the marks and the distinctive character of the earlier mark
on the other hand."' Thus under such an analysis CKK could prevail as a
lower degree of similarity between the goods could be offset by a greater
degree of similarity between the marks. The BGH accordingly referred the
following question to the European Court of Justice:
May account be taken, when assessing the similarity of the
goods or services covered by the two marks, of the
distinctive character, in particular the reputation of the

Council Directive Art. 4 (1) reads:
A trade "mark" shall not be registered or, if registered, shall be liable to be declared
invalid:
if it isidentical with an earlier trade mark, and the goods or services for which the
trade mark is applied for or is registered are identical with the goods or services for
which the earlier trade mark isprotected; if because of its identity with, or similarity
to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services
covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the
public, which includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.
"4 German Trademark Act, supra note 1, S 9 (1)Nr. 2; see also id, S 14 (2)Nr. 2.
Canon, BGH GRUR 1997, 221 (translated in 28 II.C. 213-216 (1998)).
", Case C-39/97, Canon KabushikiKaishav. Metro-Goldwyn-.Mayer Inc., 1998 E.C.R.I.5507, .5514,
119,1-5528, H5, [1999]1 C.M.L.R. 77,83,119,92,15 (1998); Canon, BGH GRUR 1997,221 (translated
in 28 I.LC. 213-216 (1998).
*" Canon, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-5514, 119, 1-5528, 5; Canon, BGH GRUR 1997, 221.
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mark with earlier priority (on the date which determines the
seniority of the later mark), so that, in particular, that
likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article
4(1)(b) of the Directive 89/104/EEC must be taken to exist
even if the public attributes the goods and/or services to
different places of ('Herkunftsstitten') origin?" 9

The European Court of Justice answered in the affirmative with regard
to both parts of the question."' First, the distinctive character, that is the
reputation of a mark can play a role in the assessment of whether the goods
are sufficiently similar to give rise to a likelihood of confusion. Second, the
likelihood of confusion is possible, even where the public perception is that
the goods or services have different places of production.
The likelihood of confusion therefore depends on numerous elements,
such as recognition of a trademark on the market, the association that can be
made with the mark, and the degree of similarity between the trademark and
the goods identified.""
8. Conclusion. EU Directive article 4(1)(b) and its implementation
correlate in German law by enhancing trademark owners' rights to some
extent, and at the same time diminishing the source identifying function.5 2
Sabel v. Puma, on the one hand, emphasized the origin function by rejecting
the mere association (association in a strict sense) approach as a basis for a
confusion analysis. On the other hand, this case endorsed the notion of
Canon enhanced trademark owner's rights by
indirect confusion.
prescribing a focus on the overall impression, i.e., a global approach to
confusion assessment. This decision also stressed the origin function by

Canon, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-5516, 125; Canon, BGH GRUR 1997, 221 (223).
With the caveat as to the link between the enterprises in question, seesupratext accompanying note
430. See British Sugar Plc. v. James Robertson & Sons Ltd., [1996] R.P.C. 281 for the approach of Justice
Jacob in UK. For a commentary, see Rachel Montagnon, "Strong*Marks Make More Goods Similar,"
"0

[1998] E.I.P.R. 401-04.

451Canon, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-5532,1116-18; Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG & Rudolf Dassler
Sport, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6191,1-6224, 1122-24 [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 471, 122-24; INGERL & ROHNKE, supra

note 9, S 14 cnt. no. 180; ALTHAumER/STROBELE, supra note 256, $ 9 cmt. no. 14; Cabinet, OLG

Hamburg, GRUR 1999, 172, 175; see also Rolf Sack, ProblemedesMarkensbstzesimAbnlichkeitsbereich,
1998 WRP 1127, 1139-41 (arguing that such an overall assessment opens up the possibility to interpret
"likelihood of confusion" broadly based on the particular interests of the respective trademark owner).
' See Canon, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-5516, Opinion 125 ("According to the Bundesgerichtshof [... I it
would be considerably easier than under the previous German law to demonstrate a likelihood of
confusion.").
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setting the outer limit of possible confusion where confusion in a broader
sense is at stake.
9. ComparativeAnalysis.The assumption that protection should be more
readily available under German law is not supported by a juxtaposition of
the applicable law. An assessment of the actual protection offered under the
applicable laws would require an additional analysis of the law in the courts.
Here the conclusion must be that both the U.S. system and the German
system make the question of confusion a judgement call by relying on the
courts to make an overall assessment of several relevant factors. The ECJ
struck down the static approach under the old German law and thus
enhanced trademark proprietor's rights by allowing a low degree of
similarity of the goods to be overcome by a high degree of similarity of the
marks. Before this change, U.S. law evidently offered broader protection.
On the one extreme, under both systems a mere association between two
marks will not suffice to establish an infringement. On the other extreme,
both systems relate the scope of protection as to confusion to a link between
two undertakings. The ECJ held accordingly in Canon."3 Section 43 (a) of
the Lanham Act stipulates just the same with regard to unregistered marks.
Section 32 (a), which is concerned with registered marks, does not contain
this restrictive language. It gives courts leeway to interpret confusion in a
4" reveals.
broad sense as the Second Circuit ruling in Syntex Laboratories
There are two points that essentially explain this result.
First, the conflict of a strong right as opposed to an emphasis on the
source identifying function is not applicable here. Consumer protection, the
primary goal of U.S. trademark law, is best achieved if any kind of confusion
not just confusion regarding the source is prevented.
Second, the "restraints" imposed by the law of the EU must not be
disregarded. EU trademark law has to take into account considerations that
are different and additional to those that drive trademark laws. The concern
with trademarks is not only to strike a balance between a more or less
justified concern about conferring a monopoly in words and about anticompetitive effects in the national market."' The concern is also to avoid
4s3Case C-39/97, Canon KabushikiKaishav. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 1998 E.C.R. I-5507,[1999]
1 C.M.L.R. 77 (1998).
Syntex. Lab., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1,(2d Cir. 1971).
See generally Hotaling, supra note 20, at 1205-10 (discussing implications of the EC Treaty
provisions); see also Wagamama Ltd. v. City Centre Restaurants plc, [1995] F.S.R. 713, 729-31 (involving
the marks "WAGAMAMA" for a Japanese restaurant and "RAJA MAMA's for an Indian style
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putting up barriers to the free flow of trade betweeen the Member
Countries. 6 Advocate General Jacobs in his opinion in Sabel, set forth the
problem as follows: "The Trade Mark Directive, if interpreted too
stringently, would have the effect of insulating the national markets."4"' The
German Trademark Act provides for a seizure remedy against infringing
goods during importation and exportation. 4 " Thus, if the infringement
provisions are interpreted too broadly, this would trigger such seizure
remedies more easily and impede trade between the Member States. Before
the Council Directive took effect the prominent ECJ judgments concerning
trademarks gave evidence of this European concern. They addressed the
issue of confusion for trademark law purposes in the light of arts. 30 and 36
of the Treaty Establishing the European Community which balance out the
prohibition and need for quantitative and similar restrictions on imports.4 9
Thus, although German law is based on a more owner friendly notion
than U.S. trademark law, this additional concern leads to a similar
conceptual understanding with regard to the scope of protection granted by
the respective laws.'
10. Dilution. Finally, the concept of dilution gives evidence of the
different understandings in the respective trademark laws. It also, most
obviously, illustrates the struggle U.S. trademark law has with accepting a
new, additional rationale for the protection of trademarks. Here, however,
only a broad overview-sufficient to mark the basic differences-can be

restaurant). Justice Laddie, in dictum, disposes of the proposal that non-origin association could suffice
to establish an infringement. He uses strong language as to this concern: 'Monopolies are the antithesis
of competition," Id at 728; "Monopolies are the exception not the rule," Id at 729; "If the broader scope
were to be accepted, the Directive and the Act would be creating a new type of monopoly not related to
the proprietors' trade but in the trade mark itself," Id at 730-31.
456 Wagamama,[1995]F.S.R.at 728, ("They can create barriersto trade between countries. Differences

between the laws of Member States of the European Union may add further obstructions to inter-state
trade because what is permissible under the law of one Member State may be prohibited under the law
of its neighbour.").
'5' Sabel BV v. Puma AG & Rudolf Dassler Sport, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6191, 1-6209, 151. Note that the
Advocate General offers an opinion to the ECJ in preparation for its decision; the opinion is in no way
binding on the Court or the Member States.
4" German Trademark Act, supra note 1, SS 146-151.
See Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6201, 131.
Which, of course, to some extent might also be a concern for the US. in NAFTA and TRIPS. See
Daniel R. Bereskin, The Canada-UnitedStates Free Trade Agreement: Are Trademarks Barriers to Free
Trade?, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 272,284 (1990).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2000

75

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 2

J. INTELL. PROP.L.

[Vol. 7:227

given. 46' Today both laws offer protection for specific trademarks against
"dilution." 42 The remarkable point about the dilution concept is that it
grants trademark protection without there being a risk of consumer
confusion. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), which was
introduced into U.S. law in 1995, defines dilution as "the lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,
regardless of the presence or absence of-(1) competition between the owner
of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion,
mistake, or deception." 3 The FTDA created a new "federal cause of action
to protect famous marks from unauthorized users that attempt to trade upon
the goodwill and established renown of such marks and, thereby, dilute their
distinctive quality."' With this statute, U.S. law for the first time grants
federal trademark protection even if there is no risk of consumer
confusion. 46s
The dilution doctrine is traced back to Frank Schechter's landmark article
of 1927 in the Harvard Law Review.' Schechter proposed that preserving
a mark's uniqueness was the only rational basis for protecting trademarks.' 7
He therefore introduced a pioneering idea by disposing of the consumer
confusion rationale as the main test for trademark protection. He claimed
that the real injury that needed to be prevented was "the gradual whittling
away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the
s For a thorough discussion see MCCARTHY, supra note 2, SS 24:67-24:114; Klieger, supra note 22,
at 790; FEZER, supra note 9, S 14 cmt. nos. 410-52; INGERIL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, S 14 cmt. nos. 453531.
4
See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98,109 Stat. 985 (codified at Lanham
Act SS 43(c), 45, 15 U.S.C. SS 1125(c), 1127); see German Trademark Act, supra note 1,

(Third parties shall be prohibited from using in the course of trade without the
consent of the proprietor of the trade mark [...]
3. any sign identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or
services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is protected, where
the trade mark has a reputation in the Federal Republic of Germany and where use
of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the
distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark which has a reputation.).
Lanham Act S 45, 15 U.S.C. S 1127 (Supp. LV 1998).

H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N 1029; see I.P. Lund Trading
ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27,45, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225,1238 (1st Cir. 1998) (where plaintiff sued
under the cause of action created by the FTDA).
40 LP.Lund TradingApS, 163 P.3d at 45; Klieger,supra note 18, at 833-35,839;RinglingBros.-Barnum
& Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 453, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1065, 1067-78 (4th Cir. 1999); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION S 25 cnt. b (1995).
Schechter, supra note 18; Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 453.
4" Schechter, supra note 18, at 339-45.
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mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods.""' Interestingly,
Schechter relied on a German case involving the famous mark of "ODOL,"
which was used for mouth wash and a registration that had been obtained for
the same word for various steel products. 9 As a reaction to Schechter's
proposals, some courts adopted Schechter's ideas and from the late 1940s
onwards state anti-dilution statutes emerged, with Massachusetts enacting the
first of the kind in 1947. By the time the FTDA was put into law, half the
states had followed the example. 470 However, courts at first were not very
receptive to the broad rights conferred by the statutes. 471 A turning point
was brought by the 1977 landmark New York decision, Allied Maintenance,
which acknowledged the extension of rights through the anti-dilution statute
and applied it literally.4
The Fourth Circuit in a recent decision,
acknowledged that, even after the enactment of the FTDA, trademark
dilution under U.S. law today is still a "dauntingly elusive"473 or "somewhat
nebulous concept."474
The EU Council Directive of 1988 does not mandate protection of marks
against dilution. It does, however, contain an optional provision allowing
Member States to adopt such legislation as they see fit,47 and all Member
States have availed themselves of option.476 The ODOL case quoted by

Id at 342.
01 Id at 345-46; GRUR 1924, 204 the Landgericht Elberfeld case).
"0 Klieger, supra note 22, at 811; RinglingBros., 170 F.3d at 453; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COWMETMTON S 25 cmt. b (1995).
47 Klieger, supra note 22, at 814-19; Johnston, supra note 2, at 49-50.
47 AlliedMaintenance Corp. v. Allied MechanicalTrades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162,1165-66 (N.Y. 1977);
40

see Johnston, supra note 2, at 50.
4" Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 450.
' Id at 455 (quoting Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan,Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625 (2nd Cir. 1983) which had

applied a New York statute)).
'7 First Council Directive 89/104 to approximate the laws of the member states relating to
trademarks, 1989 O.J. (L40) 1 (stating
Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be entitled to prevent
all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade any sign
which is identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services
which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, where the latter

has a reputation in the Member State and where use of that sign without due cause
takes unfair advantage of, or isdetrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute
of the trade mark.);
see aso art. 4(4)(a); cf art. 4 (3) and Council Regulation on Community Trademark Art. 9 para. 1(c)
(granting proprietors of a community trademark the right to prevent use under the (verbatim) same
circumstances).
q' Canon, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-5523, 150.
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Schechter makes clear that German law did contain provisions that protected
against dilution before the EU Directive was enacted.
11. Well-known" andFamousMarks. Whereas the old German law and
the German Trademark Act of 1995, granted and now grants protection to
famous, as well as to well-known mark 478 the FTDA affords protection only
to famous marks.
What constitutes a well-known mark under German law is somewhat
uncertain. The classification will depend on quality as well as on
quantitative aspects."" In April 1998, the Higher Regional Court of
Hamburg (OLGHamburg) held that a mark may be considered well-known
if thirty percent of the overall population knows the mark." The plaintiff
in this case owned the registered mark "YVES ROCHE" which was used on
cosmetics and perfumes. The defendant produced wine which for the most
part was exported into the former U.S.S.R. He also used the mark, Yves
Roche, on his products and had obtained a registration for it in the class for
wines and spirits. The plaintiff sought the cancellation of this registration on
the ground of dilution.4"' The Court also held that whether a mark was wellknown should primarily be proven through empirical studies, i.e., opinion
polls. In this particular case, however, a sufficient amount of undisputed
circumstantial evidence led to the conclusion that the "YVES ROCHE"
mark was well-known. First there was a private study conducted by a
publisher in 1990, which had concluded that the mark was known by
seventy-one percent of the population in the old states. Furthermore, the

' Note that "famous" must not be mistaken for "well-known" within the meaning of Paris
Convention Art. 6bis. The German text uses the expression "notoriscbbekannteMarke." See FEZER, supra
note 13, S 14 cmt. no. 416; INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, S14 cmt. no. 468; German Trademark Act,
supra note 1,SS 4 Nos. 3, 10 (1).
4" See BT-Drucks., Begrfindung zum Markengesetz, supra note 48, at 71-72 (distinguishing between
"bekannten" and "berihmten' Marken). The old law afforded protection for well-known marks under S
1 UWG and for famous marks under SS 12, 823, 826 BGB. However, the distinction is of more formal
nature, as there is no case imaginable where a famous mark would not also qualify as a well-known mark.
INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, S 14 cmt. no. 461.
'" BT-Drucks., Begriindung zurn Markengesetz, supra note 48, at 72; FEZER, supra note 9, 5 14 cmt.
no. 419. For a more thorough discussion, see Ulrich Boes &Volker Deutsch, Die Bekanntheit' nach dem
neuen Markenrehtund die Ermitttungdurch Meinungsumfragen, 1996 GRUR 168, 168-173.
' Yves Rocher, OLG Hamburg GRUR 1999, 339.
41 To be accurate, the plaintiffs claim was a counterclaim. The defendant had taken action first by
seeking cancellation of the plaintiff's registration of the mark for certain classes of goods for which the
plaintiff had not made use, and therefore had not met the "obligation to use" requirement. This claim was
sustained.
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plaintiff could refer to turnovers worth 375 million German Marks in 1995
and 396 million in 1996 for goods of a mid-level price range.
Lanham Act S 43(c)(1) lists a number of factors which courts may
consider in assessing whether a mark is famous or not, and thus eligible for
dilution protection."' The standard of fame is supposed to be a high one.
Only truly prominent and renowned marks should be able to take advantage
of the enhanced protection." 3 Comparable to the quantitative requirement
under German law, the Lanham Act makes the degree of recognition in the
relevant trading areas and channels of trade one decisive factor. Such
recognition must be established for more than an "appreciable number" of
the buying public, whereby recognition with a "substantial number" is
regarded as sufficient. 4 McCarthy suggests that recognition should be
established in at least a majority of the respective customer group.8 One
court has stated that the most important factors are the extent of use of same
or similar marks by third parties, and whether the mark was registered under
the 1881 or 1905 acts or on the Principal Register. 6
Because the standard set by the FTDA is a discriminatory one, it appears
that more marks are eligible for dilution protection under the German law
82

Lanham Act S 43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. S 1125(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1998) states:

In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider
factors such as, but not limited to(A) the degree of inherent [... ]distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or
services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark isused;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark isused;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of
trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the
injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties;
and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3,1881, or the Act
of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
48 See I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kahler Co., 163 F.3d 27,46, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, (1st Cir.
1998) ("Both the text and legislative history of the original bill in 1988 and the FTDA itself indicate a
congressional intent that courts should be discriminating and selective in categorizing amark as famous");
see aso RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION S 21 cmt. e (1995) (discussing how foreign
marks can be confused with U.S. marks in translation).
4 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 24:92.
485 Id
4' See Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 500, 517 (M.D.Pa. 1998) (indicating that
factors G and H of 15 U.S.C. S 1125(c)(1) were the most important to the court).
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than under U.S. law. A caveat, however, must be made with regard to those
states that grant additional protection through state anti-dilution statutes.""
These statutes apply to all distinctive marks rather than solely to especially
unique or famous marks." Courts therefore have sometimes used the
spectrum of distinctiveness of the Lanham Act instead of applying a strong
distinctiveness requirement."
At least one court and some commentators have argued that the state antidilution statutes undermine the goal of the Lanham Act, which is to secure
definite rights to owners of trademarks used in interstate commerce. 4"
Accordingly, they conclude that these statutes must be preempted by the
federal act. A majority of courts, however, apply the general principle that
states are entitled to extend rights granted by federal law and apply the state
statutes in addition to the FTDA.491 Thus, in most of those states that have
enacted anti-dilution statutes, trademark owners will be entitled to more
extensive rights than under the FTDA.
12. Non-competing Goods. The German dilution provision seems to
apply only to goods or services that are not similar to those for which the
trademark is protected, ie., only with regard to non-competing goods.
'V See RESTATEMENT (THID) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 5 25 cmt. i (1995) (giving an overview of
those states with anti-dilution statutes).
' Klieger, supra note 22, at 813. Many of these statutes are based on section 12 of the 1964 United
States Trademark Association Model State Trademark Bill reprinted in INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK
AssociATION, STATE TRADEMARK & UNFAIR COMPETITION LAw, app. 1 (1998).

Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality
of a mark registered under this Act, or a mark valid at common law, or a trade name
valid at common law, shall be a ground for injunctive relief notwithstanding the
absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the
source of goods or services;
McCarthy, supra note 2, S 24:80; Johnston, supra note 2, at 48.
Johnston, supra note 2, at 51.
SU.S. Jaycees v. Commodities Magazine, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1360, 1368,2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1119,
1126 (N.D.Iowa 1987); M. Handler, Are the State Antidilution Laws Compatible with the National
Protection of Trademarks?, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 269 (1985); MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 24:82;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETMON S 25 cmt. b (1995).
"1 Plasticolor Molded Products v. Ford Motor Co., 713 F. Supp. 1329, 1345 n. 25, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 102.3, 1039 n.25 (C.D.Cal. 1989), Nikon, Inc. v. Ikon Corp., 803 F. Supp. 910,925-26 (S.D.N.Y.,
1992) (stating,
The basic purpose of the Lanham Act is to protect trademark holders and the public
[...] New York's anti-dilution statute simply provided greater rights than its federal
counterpart. To the extent that the New York statute protects rights not provided
for by the federal statute, it does not conflict with the Lanham Act but rather, it
complements and supplements it.
(citingMeadDataCent., Inc. v. Toyota MotorSales, U.S.A. Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1031, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
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German scholars agree that such a limited application would be absurd since

4 2
dilution protection seems especially desirable in competitive relationships.
One argument claims that the wording "in relation to goods which are not
similar to those for which the trademark is protected," is not meant to
exclude an application for similar goods, but rather serves as a clarification
that non-competing goods are included. 93 Others reject this argument, but
point out that equal protection for marks on similar products can be
achieved under the provisions of the Law Against Unfair Trade Practices494
or through an analogy.49
The FTDA does not include such a restriction.'
As one court noted,
however, cases of dilution caused by competitors are the exception. The
dilution cause of action is not supposed to serve as a fallback for trademark
owners who are unable to show infringement.49 Again U.S. courts use
restrictive language with regard to the application of the dilution doctrine.

INGERL & RoHNKE, supra note 9, S 14 cmt. no. 488.
4s FEZER, supra note 9, S 14 cmt. no. 431; but see Cabinet, OLG Hamburg, GRTR 1999, 172, 176.
The German Supreme Court has not yet resolved the question; see Yellow Phone, BGH GRUR 1997,311
(312); Dribeck's Light, BGH GRUIR 1999, 155 (156). As the provisions are subject to interpretation by
the ECJ, it is important to note that the Court appears to interpret the similar wording of the EU
Directive Art. 5 (2) as meaning "even where there is no similarity between the goods in question." See
Case C-39/97 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goidwyn-Mayer Inc., 1998 E.C.R. 1-5507,1-5511-12,
(1999] 1 C.M.L.R. 77, 80-81, 8 (1999) (Advocate General Jacobs uses the term "even though the goods
[...] are not similar"); Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v Puma AG & Rudolf Dassler Sport, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6191,
1-6223, 20, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 445, 471, 120 (1998) (stating that Articles 4(3) and (4)(a) and 5(2) of the
EU Directive "permit the proprietor of a trademark which has a reputation to prohibit (others use of the
trademark...] even where there is no similarity between the goods in question.").
' ALTHAMWR & KLAKA, supra note 256, S 14 cmt. no. 5- S I UWG. Section 2 of the Trademark
Act explicitly states that the application of other provisions for the protection of signs within the realm
of the German Trademark Act are not excluded by the Act. But see Cabinet, OLG Hamburg, GRUR
1999, 172, 176; MAC DOG, BGH GRUR 1999, 161 (163) (translated in 30 I.I.C. 326, 328-29 (1999) (S
2 does not allow additional protection for 'well-known' marks.").
4" INGE ,L & ROHNKE, supra note 9, S 14 cmt. no. 488 and others suggest an analogous application
of S 14 (2) No. 3. Protection through an extensive interpretation of "association in the mind of the
public" as had formerly been suggested by some scholars is not a viable alternative after Case C-251/95,
Sabel BV v. Puma AG & Rudolf Dassler Sport, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6191, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 445 (1998).
" See generallyMCCARTHY, supra note 2, S 24:72 (notinga split of authority as to whether the federal
anti-dilution law applies to competitors); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 222-23, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1882, 1892-1893 (2nd Cir. 1999) (holding explicitly that the FTDA applies to
competitors as well as noncompetitors).
' I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 48 (1st Cir. 1998).
4"
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13. Dilution Standard. Dilution under U.S law can occur through
tarnishment on the one hand and blurring on the other." 8 Tarnishment
refers to inherently negative or unsavory associations that weaken a mark's
reputation." Blurring is the classic case of dilution; it occurs when the use
of a similar or identical mark weakens the distinctiveness and selling power
of a mark.'
The three main elements of establishing dilution by blurring of a famous
mark under the federal U.S. law are proof that (1) a defendant has made use
of a junior mark sufficiently similar to the famous mark to evoke, in a
relevant universe of consumers, a mental association of the two that (2) has
caused (3) actual economic harm to the famous mark's economic value by
lessening its former selling power as an advertising agent for its goods or
services." The Fourth Circuit, in its recent decision Ringling Bros. v. Utah
Divison of Travel, vigorously claimed that Schechter's broad understanding
of what dilution protects against had not been adopted by the introduction

4" Recent case law refers to cybersquatting as a third and distinct form of dilution. See McCARTHY,
supra note 2, SS 24:69.1, 25:77. After the editorial deadline for this publication, Congress passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, adding 15 U.S.C. 1125(d) (1999) to the Lanham Act. The new
provision creates a cause of action against those registrants who register or traffic in certain marks with
a bad faith intent to profit from the particular conduct. The law also establishes in rem jurisdiction for
cybersquatting actions.
'" MCCARTHY, supra note 2, S24:68; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION S25 cmt.
c (1995?). Recent cases include: NBA Properties v. Untertainment Records LLC, 1999 WL 335147
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that an advertisment linking the NBA logo with violence could constitute
dilution by tarnishment); Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d
1145, 1145 (E.D.Mo. 1999) (finding that the defendant's use of "papal visit 1999" and derivatives thereof
to identify a sexually explicit Internet site, and the internet domain names "papalvisit1999.com" and
"papalvisit.com," tarnished plaintiff's marks 'Papal Visit 1999," "Pastoral Visit," "1999 Papal Visit Official
Commemorative Items," and "Papal Visit 1999, St. Louis," which were used in connection with the Pope's
visit to St. Louis); American Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prod., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 727 (D.
Minn. 1998) (finding tarnishment of the mark "Dairy Queen" by use of the movie title "Dairy Queens"
for a movie satirizing beauty contests in rural Minnesota); America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F.
Supp.2d 444, 444 (E.D.Va. 1998); America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp.2d 548, 548, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1857,1857 (E.D.Va. 1998) (finding dilution of AOL mark by tarnishment because defendants sent
large numbers of unauthorized and unsolicited bulk e-mail advertisements to AOL customers, as a result
of which in one case AOL received 100,000 complaints daily).
s McCARTHY, supra note 2, S 24:69; RESTATEMENT (rHRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION S25 cmt.
c (1995).
" Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449,
50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (4th Cir. 1999); Playboy Enter. Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55
F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1070, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1162, 1162 (C.D.Cal. 1999).
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of the FTDA. s2 The FTDA, therefore, does not protect a mark's
distinctiveness but rather only its selling power. The Court found that the
phrase "The Greatest Show on Earth," which had been used by plaintiffs for
more than one hundred years to identify their circus services was not diluted
by the phrase "The Greatest Snow on Earth," which defendant had been
using since 1962 to advertise its winter skiing facilities. The Court based its
finding on the ground that the FTDA requires proof of "actual dilution." A
mere "likelihood of dilution" is not sufficient under the federal law. s3 Other
courts have followed this notion."° The Second Circuit, in its recent
decision in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., however, explicitly rejected the
Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the FTDA and instead endorsed a
"likelihood of dilution" standard."5
Again the notion that federal law does not preempt state anti-dilution
statutes gains importance. State anti-dilution statutes require only a
"likelihood of dilution." Although courts at first were reluctant to give the
language of the statutes its full effect, thus requiring even a "likelihood of
confusion," today they apply these statutes broadly" and infer the harm to
a prior user's selling power or economic value either from the circumstances
of the case.. or from the mere identity or sufficient similarity of the marks
in question.'"

Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 454 (the court stated "this radical dilution proposal, whose practical
effect if fully adopted would be to create as the whole of trademark-protection law property rights in gross
in suitably 'unique' marks, never has been legislatively adopted by any jurisdiction in anything
approaching that extreme form.").
101id at 454; Playboy Enter., 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1088; Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Nutraceutical Corp., 54
F. Supp. 2d 379 (D.N.J. 1999).
' Playboy Enter., 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1070; Am. Cyanamid Co., 54 F. Supp. 2d at 379; World Gym
Licensing, Ltd. v. Fitness World, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 614, 614 (D. Md. 1999).
' Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223-25; see also NBA Properties,1999 WL 335147 at 6 (granting a preliminary
injunction on grounds of tarnishment, but stating, -The irreparable harm test is met under section 43(c)
where there is a likelihood of dilution." This case, however, had also involved dilution allegations under
the New York anti-dilution statute, N.Y. Gen. Bus.Law S360-1, which might have influenced the court's
statement.).
Johnston, supra note 2, at 50 n.157.
s Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1035, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1961, 1969 (2nd Cir. 1989) (Sweet, J., concurring); see also Nat'l Football League Properties, Inc.
v. ProStyle, Inc., 57 F. Supp.2d 665, 670 n.4 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (noting the criticism of the approach used

inMma).
See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc.,
855 F.2d 480,484, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1072,1076 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying Illinois statute); Freedom Say.
& Loan Assoc. v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 1186, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 123, 130 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying
Florida anti-dilution statute); see alsoRingling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div.
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Because the EU Directive makes the protection against dilution optional,
it appears that the protection granted by the various Member States differs
considerably. Whereas the Benelux countries in compliance with their old
law grant a broad protection," the UK affords only a limited protection by
continuing to require a "likelihood of confusion" even as to reputable
marks. 10 German dilution doctrine protects trademark owners against the
dilution of the distinctiveness of a mark in a strict sense and against
exploitative or detrimental use of a well-known mark."' The latter
resembles the concept of tarnishment s 2 The former requires proof of a
specific detrimental effect,"1 3 i.e., the distinctiveness must actually be
diminished. The argument that leads to this conclusion is based on the fact
that if any third party use would suffice to dilute the distinctiveness of a
mark, the requirement of "likelihood of confusion" for an infringement as

of Travel Development, 170 F.3d 449, 457-58, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1071-72 (4th Cir. 1999)
(explaining that the likelihood of harm may be presumed from the identity of sufficient similarity of the
marks).
' Interestingly, the Benelux countries formerly afforded protection from any economic use that was
prejudicial to the owner of any trademark, ie., whether or not it was well-known, reputable, or famous.
Today, in accordance with the Council Directive, the revised Benelux law limits dilution protection to
marks with reputation. For a further discussion of dilution in the European context, see William T. Vuk,
ProtectingBaywatch and Wagamama:Why tbe EuropeanUnion ShouldRevise the 1989 TrademarkDirective
861, 906-08 (1998).
to MandateDilution ProtectionForTrademarks, 21 FORDHAM INTL .J.
' Baywatch [1997] F.S.R. 22. This occurs in spite of the UK use of Council Directive Art. 5 para.
2 and implementation of a similar regulation in the U.K. Trade Marks Act 1994, which states:
A person infringes a registered trade mark if he uses in the course of trade a sign
which -

is identical with or similar to the trade mark, and
is used in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the
trade mark is registered,
where the trade mark has a reputation in the United Kingdom and the use of the sign,
being without due cause, takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the
distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.
..German Trademark Act, supranote 1,S 14 (2)Nr.3; see note 450 for text; BT-Drucks., Begriindung
zum Markengesetz, supra note 48, at 72; FEZER, supra note 9,5 14 cmt. nos. 424-27.
"' See MAC DOG, BGH GRUR 1999, 161, 164 ("MAC DOG" and "MAC CAT' for dog and cat
food are likely to cause negative associations as to products of McDonald's restaurant);
BGH NJW 1994, 1954 and NJW 1995, 871 (use of "Mars" term on
Markenverunglimpfung I and II,
condoms); SL, BGH NJW 1991, 3214, 3217 (use of "SL" on low priced small cars can harm mark "SL"
as used for Ieus cars); Lusthansa, OLG Frankfurt, GRUR 1982, 319 (regarding the use of the term
"Lusthansa" on bumper stickers); BMW, BGHZ 98, 94 (involved the use of an obscene phrase for the
shorthand symbol "BMW*); FEZER, supra note 9, S 14 cmt. nos. 427,434; ALTHAMMER, supra note 256,
S14 cmt. nos. 17, 64.
...INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9, S 14 cmt. no. 509; ALTHAWER, supra note 256, 5 14 cmt. no.
12.
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to competing goods as well as the other options to establish dilution would
be pointless."1 4 Several aspects play a role in the assessment of the
detrimental effect.51 5 The closer the related product lines, the more easily
dilution will be found. The degree of recognition among consumers is
important, too. Thus, "Coca-Cola" or "Adidas" will possibly be able to
claim a strong protection in any line of commerce,516 i.e., the more famous
a mark, the stronger protection. The same is true with regard to the strength
of the mark and the similarity of the marks involved."1 ' Such a correlation
between the degree of recognition and other factors takes some power from
the "famous" and "well known" mark distinction between the two laws
because under German law marks which are "only well known" are not
entitled to as much protection as truly prominent marks.
14. Conclusionfor Dilution. Subject to the noted restrictions, the scope
of protection under the dilution doctrine seems broader under German law
than under U.S. law. The application of the new German law by the courts
and the development of the dilution doctrine in U.S. courts will have to
show whether this really is true. The tendency of U.S. courts to apply a
strict standard with regard to the assessment of "fame" and the protection of
well-known, as well as famous marks under German law fit the overall
schemes of trademark protection in the two countries. The acceptance of
the dilution rationale in U.S. law nevertheless exemplifies the convergence
of the understanding in trademark doctrine. Although the FTDA may not
grant protection for the distinctiveness of a senior user's mark, it nonetheless
deviates from the traditional consumer confusion and source identifying
model. This deviation becomes obvious when considering that courts refer
to the "loss of a mark's selling power," its "economic value" or "commercial
magnetism" when assessing dilution claims." ' The USTA had tried to
introduce federal dilution protection as early as 1987 in the course of the
negotiations of the TLRA for the benefit of businesses. 19 The hearings
before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House

514 INGERL & ROHNKE, supra note 9,
:1s kd at S 14 cmt. nos. 509-18.

S 14 cmt. no. 509.

s16Id
s7 Id at S 14 cmt. no. 515.

"' See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Development,

170 F.3d 449, 456, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, pinpt cite (4th Cir. 1999) (citing examples concerning state
anti-dilution statutes).
"' USTA Commission, supra note 170, at 433-35.
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Committee on the Judiciary contain evidence of this same notion as the
testimony of businesses made reference to trademark owners' efforts by
spending time and money to create and maintain the trademark property. 2
The state anti-dilution statutes give even clearer evidence of the practical
need to enhance trademark rights for the sake of business undertakings.
IV. CONCLUSION

U.S. and German trademark law are based on a different understanding
of what a mark stands for. The U.S. consumer protection model grants
protection only to the extent that marks are used to distinguish goods, i.e.,
rights are only conferred where marks represent good will. In compliance
with this understanding U.S. trademark law puts a strong emphasis on the
source identification function of trademarks.
The distinct conceptual basis for German trademark is exemplified by
several aspects of German trademark law, namely the registration system, the
licensing scheme and separability of mark and business establishment.
Although these concepts are not compatible with traditional U.S. trademark
law theory, their patterns can also be identified in U.S. law. The
introduction of the ITU registration system and the practical application of
the licensing rules illustrate this convergence especially well. These changes
in U.S. trademark law reveal a tendency to a similar understanding of marks
as marketing devices which exist in the interest of the mark's owner.
Although German trademark law might be said to create property rights
in gross and although German law definitely considers trademarks to be
worth protecting as much as it does copyrights and patents, 21 they are not
rights without limits. Nevertheless, protection is still based on the idea that
marks exist as devices to enhance business prospects. The protected function
is not limited to identifying the source of origin.' U.S. law, on the other
mnSee Klieger, supra note 22, 838-39 (referring to testimony by Nils Victor Montan, Vice President
and Senior Intellectual Property Counsel at Warner Bros.). Klieger also notes that "[f)or the first time in
the Lanham Act's fifty years, proprietary rights in trademarks were elevated above consumer protection
and welfare. Id. at 839.
'2' See supra text accompanying notes 38-48.
' The Parliamentary Statement regarding the new German Trademark Law gives evidence of this

notion. BT-Drucks., Begrindung zum Markengesetz, supra note 48, at 71 states:
Dutch diesen wettbewerbsrechtlich orientierten Schutz bekannter Marken wird im
Ergebnis der in der bekannten Marke verk6rperte Goodwill geschfitzt, ohne daB es
auf eine Beeintrichtigung der Herkunftsfunktion ankime. An diesem Tatbestand
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hand, might not create property rights in gross, 2 ' but the introduction of the
FTDA once again acknowledges that marks deserve protection for the sake
of the mark proprietor and not merely concomitantly as a consumer
protection device.

zeigt sich in besonders deutlicher Weise die Abkehr des neuen Markengesetzes von
der getenden Rechtslage, nach der im Kern lediglich die Beeintr'chtigung der
Herkunftsfunktion geschiitzt wird.
CompareRingling Bros., 170 F.3d at 456 (interpreting the FTDA as protecting the selling power
of amark instead of an in gross property right) with Nabisco,Inc., 191 F.3d at 208 n.6 (agreeing with the
Fourth Circuit that FTDA does not create a "property right in gross").
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